were rejected. The course of action that was finally decided upon was in accordance with neither of these points of view. I am under the impression that the proposal of Tisza was used for the purpose of transferring the blame for the war to the opponent; at the same time it seemed that official policy regarded the war as the proper solution. The note was drafted in such a way that its acceptance was very difficult indeed.
This decision was fatal! The intention was apparent and became even more clear when we refused Serbia's conciliatory answer and declared war. We were thus unable to throw the blame off, and furthermore, we were accused of intrigue. If our Government did not consider the war against Serbia necessary, the note should have been worded differently, and Serbia's answer should have been used as a basis for negotiations. If, on the other hand, we wanted the war, then Serbia's policy, which led to the assassination in Serajevo, was sufficient cause, as these actions endangered the integrity of the Monarchy. Even later on there was no other motive for the war which could not be challenged than this one, as the investigations which were made in Serajevo did not even throw any suspicion upon the Serbian Government, which allowed one to suppose that they had taken part in the preparation for the murder. For this reason immediate action would have been more valuable than the transparent pretence of long-suffering and mercy. Rapid military success and a rapid offer of acceptable peace
