East immediately after Gorlice, that Roumania would also have come in on our side. And can it not be assumed that, if Italy and Roumania had been neutral, in consequence of which the collapse of Russia would have been brought about earlier than it actually occurred, we would have had an opportunity of concluding a loyal peace by agreement before we entered into a conflict with America, and it is probable that we would have remained so strong that Italy, in her own interests, would have adhered to the new agreement?
Moreover, the assumption that Italy would not honour the agreement did not play a leading part in the consideration of the Government, because the Government was determined to conclude the alliance with Italy.
The outbreak of the Italian war was a catastrophe. Her entry into the war influenced our position so adversely that it became one of the main causes of the tragic conclusion of the war. A further result of these events was that the relation between Vienna and Berlin became even worse. If Prince Bülow and our diplomats had played their cards together, I believe that they would have achieved a favourable result. As, however, this was not the case. Bülow's attempt to keep Italy out of the war did not only fail, but left with us a painful feeling permanently and became one of the main causes of that unsatisfactory relation between us two allies, to which I will return later.
I was not informed as to the attitude of Roumania during the war. I am not in a position to judge
