cause even the Poles of the highest society and those who were the most spoilt pets of the court were guided chiefly by their national Polish sentiments. It was with difficulty that the truth came to be recognized that the union could only be of advantage if it involved the satisfaction of the Polish nation, and that only this method was a moral one, and that every other solution involved new dangers for us. After the fall of Tisza, Hungary did not oppose the Austro-Polish solution, but no clear agreement had been reached between the Austrian and Hungarian Governments, and in fact I believe that even the Hungarian Government had not arrived at a firm decision.
This situation made it only more difficult to arrive at an agreement in this matter with Germany. When I went to Berlin in the autumn of the year 1915, on account of this very Polish question, I discovered that an agreement with Germany, especially with Bethmann-Hollweg, was possible. This statesman recognized that the history and the sentiment of the Poles had created an unbridgeable gulf between them and Germany, and that the only natural solution which corresponded to the will of the people was the idea which I represented. In case of economic and military agreement with Germany, the Chancellor would have been prepared to accept this idea of mine. However, Bethmann-Hollweg was not the master of the situation in Germany. Strong forces were at work against him and against the Austro-Polish solution. The military command would not hear of giving up Poland. They were of
