to their own devices. Only federation could render such a peace possible, but mutual hatred is too strong, mutual understanding too weak, and the general standard oi civilization too low. The establishment of a world peace might bring about peace in the Balkans, but not vice versa. The Balkans remain the heel of Achilles in the armour of peace. In the circumstances it is crass injustice to attribute the disturbances in the Balkans to the policy which we advocated during the Congress of Berlin.
Let us now consider the Serbian question. I admit that the quarrel between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was the cause of the European catastrophe, brought about by the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I can only repeat what I have said. The conclusion of the Congress of Berlin was the result of the acute crisis of the Serbian question; it was an attempt at a solution but not the source of the crisis.
Those who see the origin of the quarrel in the mandate given to the Monarchy by the Berlin Congress maintain that it cut across the natural path of Serbia's ambition to possess Bosnia and Herzegovina, for whose liberty Serbia had in the past made great sacrifices, and that the occupation of these countries was bound to drive Serbia into enmity.
All these farts are correct, but the deduction is erroneous. The opposition was not created by our mere occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but because our occupation prevented the Serbs from expanding beyond those countries into territories which
