rendered a separate peace with Russia more difficult. If there had been more mutual trust and more complete agreement with the Polish nation in view of the well-known sympathy, and if our decision had been reached with greater rapidity, the Polish question would have served as a link for the two allies and have brought about real and substantial support on the part of the Poles, together with the military assistance that we longed for so much. If the policy of Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been followed, we would at any rate have made it easier to come to a separate agreement with Russia. As it was, we had no advantages, only disadvantages. This sad result was hardly changed by the fact that when the war was already lost and it was obvious that our will would not decide the Polish question, Germany approached our standpoint, and the mistake with regard to Cholm was made good. All this was much too late!
The Polish question leads necessarily to a discussion of our relations with Germany, for these questions are organically bound up with one another. I have already pointed out that our Polish policy was detrimental to our relations with Germany. After the Italian question it was the Polish difficulty which, more than anything else, disturbed the harmonious co-operation of both powers. And the unsatisfactory relationship between these powers was not without its effect on the situation in Poland.
Just as mistakes had been made in the Polish question, so were mistakes made in the German question, and
