Page:Diplomacy and the War (Andrassy 1921).djvu/169

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DIPLOMACY AND THE WAR

The conditions which could be obtained were fixed by the cause of the war. If the famous phrase of Clausewitz was right, that the war was only the armed continuation of the political battle which led to a combat, it is equally true that the peace negotiations were the logical conclusion of the armed exertions of the belligerents. The aims were to remain the same throughout the three phases; only the means were to change. Victories often make it possible to carry the aims of the war far beyond the causes of it. At the same time, it is rarely a sound policy to exceed the original purpose and to suit the demands completely to the results. The fall of Napoleon was due to the fact that he wanted to realize the possibilities which he had achieved by means of his military genius. For this reason every one of his wars was the cause of another one. He finally created an empire which could not be maintained permanently, and he made so many enemies that their united efforts made it impossible for him to resist them. It is very much to the credit of Bismarck that he kept the demands of Prussia in 1866 within the confines of the original purposes for which he went to war, and that he was not carried away by the possibilities which victory offered him.

It is a general rule that one may only conquer that which one can keep and that which assists actually to strengthen the conqueror. One must only strive after such a position of power as bears relation to one's constant strength, and not one which aims at a position which is only the result of passing military successes