made upon the Italian front until the Italian army had been vanquished completely, and further, that we did not extend our offensive against Serbia as far as Salonica? I am not in a position to judge this question fully, but at any rate it was a misfortune. At the same time, I could not avoid the impression that we did not exploit our successes sufficiently, and that we changed the aims of our operations too often, and that the last attack against Italy was made without due preparation and that it was based upon a fundamental mistake originally. Finally, there is another question that must be asked: was the forcing of the last offensive in the West not based upon a complete misapprehension of the relation of strength, and would it not have been better at that time to confine oneself to the defensive and to aim at such resistance as would bring about a peace by negotiation rather than putting all the eggs into one basket?
The most serious mistake of the military command was certainly the absolutely erroneous calculations with regard to the effects of the submarine war and the ability of America. It was a mistake which ultimately developed into the final cause of the catastrophe.
In spite of all these mistakes, however, the final collapse did not take place in any theatre of war, as a result of the many clever ideas, the many admirable combinations and the incomparable material of our armies, but upon the internal front. When Bulgaria deserted us and paralysed our power of resistance, our troops were upon enemy territory and they had not
