Government opened the gates to agitation which began to undermine the morale of the reserve divisions. Insubordination was the order of the day in the army and the navy. The excesses of certain German bodies of troops on Hungarian soil, and the increasing impression that the peace was only prevented by German militarism, began to create a tremendous hatred against Germany. The idea of making a separate peace acquired strength. The confusion on our frontiers was heightened by anarchy in the capital. The fight between parties grew daily in strength, and so did ambition. There were those who believed the nation was behind them, and thought that they were called upon, as Siegès declared concerning the tiers état, to be everything, whereas in reality they were nothing, and there were those who believed that they alone could save the nation, which would perish without them—all had the effect of pouring fuel upon the flames and of adding to the excitement of the public mind. Foreign money was also at work, and there was great danger that our internal front would collapse before the conclusion of peace and that we would be delivered into the hands of our enemy and have to depend on his mercy or cruelty.
Such were the circumstances when we, that is to say, Wekerle, Tisza, Apponyi and myself, received the invitation of Burian (October 5) to come to Vienna in order to discuss what should be done. He informed us that Germany's power had broken down to such an extent that, although she had accused especially us of cowardice, she now urged an armistice and the imme-
