A certain change of policy now became noticeable in our Government. We entered into a discussion with Russia concerning the Serbian ultimatum (July 30). Although Berchtold had refused to accept a similar proposal on July 28, made by Sasanow, we were also prepared to consider the conditions of negotiating à quatre which we had refused hitherto. We did not abandon the idea of defeating the Serbian Army, because the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that we had to anticipate another attack on the part of Serbia in two or three years, but he did not know whether the first attempt would not result in further measures to meet us.
The diplomats of the Entente began to hope again. Russia, however, proceeded to order a general mobilization, which suddenly put an end to the possibility of peace. Germany had already indicated that, in case Russia should mobilize against her, Germany would be forced to do the same, and that a general German mobilization meant war. When Russia mobilized, in spite of the knowledge of these circumstances, everybody felt in Berlin that Russia meant to go to war, and it is an unquestionable fact that Russia was aware that the result of her mobilization would be a European war. Sasanow transmitted a note on July 29 to Poincaré to the effect that his military measures made it necessary to reckon with the inevitability of war. Berlin regarded it as her first duty to increase her chances of victory by rapid entry into the war, and to exploit the advantages which lay in speedy action.
