i.e., ſuch as rule for the good of ſociety, which is the only end of their inſtitution. Common tyrants, and public oppreſſors, are not intitled to obedience from their ſubjects, by virtue of any thing here laid down by the inſpired apoſtle.
I now add, farther, that the apoſtle's argument is ſo far from proving it to be the duty of people to obey, and ſubmit to, ſuch rulers as act in contradiction to the public good, and ſo to the deſign of their office, that it proves the direct contrary. For, pleaſe to obſerve, that if the end of all civil government, be the good of ſociety; if this be the thing that is aimed at in conſtituting civil rulers; and if the motive and argument for ſubmiſſion to government, be taken from the apparent uſefulneſs of civil authority; it follows, that when no ſuch good end can be anſwered by ſubmiſſion, there remains no argument or motive to enforce it; if inſtead of this good* end's being brought about by ſubmiſſion, a contrary end is brought about, and the ruin and miſery of ſociety effected by it, here is a plain and poſitive reaſon againſt ſubmiſſion in all ſuch caſes, ſhould they ever happen. And therefore, in ſuch caſes, a regard to the public welfare, ought to make us withhold from our rulers, that obedience and ſubjection which it would, otherwiſe, be our duty to render to them. If it be our duty, for example, to obey our king, merely for this reaſon, that he rules for the public
