Page:Discourses of Epictetus volume 1 Oldfather 1925.djvu/135

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BOOK I. XII. 2-12

forethought for things terrestrial and the affairs of men, but only in a general way, and not for the individual in particular; and a fifth set, to which Odysseus and Socrates belonged, who say

Nor when I move am I concealed from thee.[1]

We must, therefore, first of all enquire about each of these statements, to see whether it is sound or not sound. 5For if gods do not exist, how can it be an end to follow the gods? And if they exist, indeed, but care for nothing, how even thus will that conclusion be sound? But if, indeed, they both exist and exercise care, yet there is no communication from them to men,—yes, and, by Zeus, to me personally,—how even in this case can our conclusion still be sound? The good and excellent man must, therefore, inquire into all these things, before he subordinates his own will to him who administers the universe, precisely as good citizens submit to the law of the state. And he that is being instructed ought to come to his instruction with this aim, "How may I follow the gods in everything, and how may I be acceptable to the divine administration, and how may I become free?" Since he is free for whom all things happen according to his moral purpose, and whom none can restrain. 10What then? Is freedom insanity? Far from it; for madness and freedom are not consistent with one another. "But I would have that which seems best to me happen in every case, no matter how it comes to seem so." You are mad; you are beside yourself. Do you not know that

  1. Homer, Iliad, X. 279 f.; compare Xenophon, Memorabilia, I. 1, 19.
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