BOOK I. XVII. 1-10
wherewithal shall it be analyzed? Why, clearly, either by itself, or by something else. This latter is assuredly either reason, or it will prove to be something else superior to reason, which is impossible. If it be reason, who again will analyze that reason? For if it analyzes its own self, the reason with which we started can do as much. If we are going to require something else at each step, our process will be endless and unceasing.[1]
"Yes," says someone, "but the cure (of the decisions of our will) is a much more pressing need (than the study of logic),"[2] and the like. Do you then wish to hear about this other matter? Very well, listen. 5But if you say to me, "I do not know whether your argument is true or false," and, if I use some ambiguous term, and you should then say, "Distinguish," I shall bear with you no longer, but shall tell you, "'Nay, but there is a much more pressing need.'" This is the reason, I suppose, why the Stoic philosophers put Logic first, just as in the measuring of grain we put first the examination of the measure. And if we do not define first what a modius[3] is, and do not define first what a scale is, how shall we be able to proceed with measuring or weighing anything? So, in the field of our present enquiry, if we have neglected the thorough knowledge and intellectual mastery of our standard of judgement for all other things, whereby they come to be known thoroughly, shall we ever be able to attain intellectual mastery and thorough knowledge of the rest of the world? And how could we possibly? 10"Yes," we are told, "but the modius is made out of wood and bears no fruit." True, but it is something with which we can measure grain.
- ↑ Reason, therefore, can be analyzed only by itself.
- ↑ The course of the argument is highly condensed here, but this is the plain sense of the passage.
- ↑ A Roman dry measure, slightly less than half a bushel.
