BOOK I. XXVII. 18-XXVIII. 4
something, I never take the morsel to that place but to this[1]; when I wish to take bread I never take sweepings, but I always go after the bread as to a mark. And do you yourselves,[2] who take away the evidence of the senses, do anything else? Who among you when he wishes to go to a bath goes to a mill instead?20—What then? Ought we not to the best of our ability hold fast also to this—maintain, that is, the commonly received opinion, and be on our guard against the arguments that seek to overthrow it?—And who disputes that? But only the man who has the power and the leisure should devote himself to these studies; while the man who is trembling and perplexed and whose heart is broken within him, ought to devote his leisure to something else.
CHAPTER XXVIII
That we ought not to be angry with men; and what are the little things and the great among men?
What is the reason that we assent to anything? The fact that it appears to us to be so. It is impossible, therefore, to assent to the thing that appears not to be so. Why? Because this is the nature of the intellect—to agree to what is true, to be dissatisfied with what is false, and to withhold judgement regarding what is uncertain. What is the proof of this? "Feel, if you can, that it is now night." That is impossible. "Put away the feeling that it is day." That is impossible. "Either feel or put away the feeling that the stars are even in number." That is impossible. When, therefore,
- ↑ The accompanying gesture explained the allusion, which was probably to the eye and the mouth, as in II. 20, 28. A Cynic like Diogenes would very likely have illustrated his point in a somewhat coarser fashion; and this is not impossible in the present instance.
- ↑ The Pyrrhonists, or Sceptics.
