Page:Discourses of Epictetus volume 1 Oldfather 1925.djvu/385

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BOOK II. XVII. 10-17

idea of each of these terms? Very well, is it fitted into a system and complete? Prove that it is. "How shall I prove it?" Apply it properly to specific facts. To start with, Plato classifies definitions under the preconception "the useful," but you classify them under that of "the useless." Is it, then, possible for both of you to be right? How can that be? Does not one man apply his preconceived idea of "the good" to the fact of wealth, while another does not? And another to that of pleasure, and yet another to that of health? Indeed, to sum up the whole matter, if all of us who have these terms upon our lips possess no mere empty knowledge of each one severally, and do not need to devote any pains to the systematic arrangement of our preconceived ideas, why do we disagree, why fight, why blame one another?

And yet what need is there for me to bring forward now our strife with one another and make mention of that? Take your own case; if you apply properly your preconceived ideas, why are you troubled,[1] why are you hampered? 15Let us pass by for the moment the second field of study[2]—that which has to do with our choices and the discussion of what is our duty in regard to them. Let us pass by also the third—that which has to do with our assents. I make you a present of all this. Let us confine our attention to the first field, one which allows an almost palpable proof that you do not properly apply your preconceived ideas. Do you at this moment desire what is possible in general and what is possible for you in particular? If so, why are you hampered? Why are you troubled? Are you not at this moment trying to escape what

  1. The word, δυσροεῖν, ia the opposite of the technical term εὐροεῖν (τὸ εὐροῦν, εὐροία), which is a metaphor derived from the even flow of quiet waters.
  2. The three fields, according to Epictetus, are, 1. ὄρεξις, desire; 2. ὁρμή, choice; 3. συγκατάθεσις, assent. Compare III. 2.
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