FRAGMENTS
control, but by virtue of a certain force of their own thrust themselves upon the attention of men; but the assents (which they call συγκαταθέσεις), whereby these same things seen by the mind are recognized, are subject to man's will, and fall under his control. Therefore, when some terrifying sound comes from the sky, or from the collapse of a building, or sudden word comes of some peril or other, or something else of the same sort happens, the mind of even the wise man cannot help but be disturbed, and shrink, and grow pale for a moment, not from any anticipation of some evil, but because of certain swift and unconsidered motions which forestall the action of the intellect and the reason. Soon, however, our wise man does not give his assent (this is, οὑ συγκατατίθεται οὐδὲ προσεπιδοξάζει)[1] to τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας[2] (that is, these terrifying things seen by his mind), but rejects and repudiates them, and sees in them nothing to cause him fear. And this, they say, is the difference between the mind of the fool and the mind of the wise man, that the fool thinks the cruel and harsh things seen by his mind, when it is first struck by them, actually to be what they appear, and likewise afterwards, just as though they really were formidable, he confirms them by his own approval also, καὶ προσεπιδοξάζει[3] (the word the Stoics use when they discuss this matter);[4] whereas the wise man, when his colour and expression have changed for a brief instant, οὑ συγκατατίθεται,[5] but keeps the even tenor and strength of the opinion which he has always had about mental impressions of this kind, as things
- ↑ Does not assent or confirm by approval.
- ↑ Such external impressions.
- ↑ Also confirms by his approval.
- ↑ The word seems to occur only here, and may be peculiar to Epictetus.
- ↑ Does not give his consent.
