Page:Discourses of Epictetus volume 2 Oldfather 1928.djvu/533

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THE ENCHEIRIDION OF EPICTETUS

who has made such a lapse; if, however, the occasion does not arise, at all events show by keeping silence, and blushing,[1] and frowning, that you are displeased by what has been said.


34. When you get an external impression of some pleasure, guard yourself, as with impressions in general, against being carried away by it; nay, let the matter wait upon your leisure, and give yourself a little delay. Next think of the two periods of time, first, that in which you will enjoy your pleasure, and second, that in which, after the enjoyment is over, you will later repent and revile your own self; and set over against these two periods of time how much joy and self-satisfaction you will get if you refrain. However, if you feel that a suitable occasion has arisen to do the deed, be careful not to allow its enticement, and sweetness, and attractiveness to overcome you; but set over against all this the thought, how much better is the consciousness of having won a victory over it.


35. When you do a thing which you have made up your mind ought to be done, never try not to be seen doing it, even though most people are likely to think unfavourably about it. If, however, what you are doing is not right, avoid the deed itself altogether; but if it is right, why fear those who are going to rebuke you wrongly?


36. Just as the propositions, "It is day," and "It is night," are full of meaning when separated, but meaningless if united;[2] so also, granted that for

  1. The ordinary person, to be sure, can no more call up a blush off-hand than he can a sneeze or a hiccough, and the observation of nature implied by the command is, therefore, imperfect (cf. note in IV. 11, 1). But all Epictetus means is that one should make no effort to conceal any natural expression of moral resentment under such circumstances.
  2. Compare I. 25, 11–13. It does not seem possible in our idiom to use the same expressions for ἀξία, "worth," or "value," which occurs three times in this section, and ἀπαξία, "lack of worth," or "lack of value," which occurs twice.
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