8.
similar fashion to that which preceded the initial attack. All hands were again alerted to the possibility of repeated attacks. No attacks occurred however, and the jets disappeared from the scene. To further assist in identification of the ship, at 1611 I ordered the ship's international call sign hoisted.
Both boilers had been put back on the line at approximately 1520, but at 1523 lube oil Suction was lost to the main engines and the ship again became dead in the water. The heading of the ship at this time is not known. About 1555, communications were restored, and at 1600 a message was sent providing ad- ditional information concerning the attack by unidentified aircraft and the fact that the torpedo boats had been identified as Israeli. Preliminary estimate of the number of dead and casualties, as well as the condition of the ship. was also provided.
At the time this message was being dictated to Lieutenant Bennett on the port wing of the bridge, 1 was lying on the deck with a tourniquet being applied to my right leg at the thigh. A few moments prior to this I felt myself blacking out from loss of blood, and called for assistance of CTl Carpenter to apply a tourniquet. I had assumed the conn immediately upon the air attack and retained the conn until rendezvous was effected with the destroyers about 0630 on the morning of 9 June 1967, leaving the bridge only about 3 times during the night hours to make brief head calls on the 02 level.
No bodies were noted in the area of ship following the explosion. Several life rafts, however, were releaSed and placed into the water by various crew members whom I was unable to communicate with prior to their placing the boats in the water. They exercised their initiative on the scene, and no fault can be found with their estimate not having the information that I had. When the messenger was sent to tell them to leave the lifeboats alone, that the ship was in no danger of sinking at that time, but that the lifeboats might be needed at a later time, no additional lifebo ats were placed in the water.
At about 1637, the torpedo boats commenced retiring from the area without further signal or action. At this time, the ship was attempting to make good a course of 340 magnetic, at speed 8 knots. Emergency manual steering was being conducted from after steering. The amount of rudder was given to after steering over emergency rigged sound powered telephones. They would apply the rudder. When the ship had come to the approximate magnetic heading, the rudder would be shifted to attempt to maintain that heading. It was possible to maintain within plus or minus 30 degrees of the ship's heading most of the time. The exact position of the ship was not known at this time. At 1653 an attempt was made to steer and make good a course of 000 magnetic. It was not known what effect the nearby explosions might have had 0n the pilot house
magnetic compass. The gyro compass was out. It was not known what the
