Kavanaugh, J., concurring
amendments. See generally Amdt. 9; Amdt. 10; Art. I, §8; Art. V; J. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law 7−21, 203−216 (2018); A. Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 285−291, 315−347 (2005).
The Constitution does not grant the nine unelected Members of this Court the unilateral authority to rewrite the Constitution to create new rights and liberties based on our own moral or policy views. As Justice Rehnquist stated, this Court has not “been granted a roving commission, either by the Founding Fathers or by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, to strike down laws that are based upon notions of policy or morality suddenly found unacceptable by a majority of this Court.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 467 (1972) (dissenting opinion); see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720–721 (1997); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 292–293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
This Court therefore does not possess the authority either to declare a constitutional right to abortion or to declare a constitutional prohibition of abortion. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 953 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id., at 980 (opinion of Scalia, J.); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
In sum, the Constitution is neutral on the issue of abortion and allows the people and their elected representatives to address the issue through the democratic process. In my respectful view, the Court in Roe therefore erred by taking sides on the issue of abortion.
II
The more difficult question in this case is stare decisis—that is, whether to overrule the Roe decision.
The principle of stare decisis requires respect for the
