Page:Draft Constitution of King Prajadhipok (1926).pdf/28

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4.I will now consider the likely effect that the innovation would take upon the ruling class, taking the effect already seen by the creation of the S.C.S. as a standard of judgement. It would in all probability create 3 kinds of sentiment, i.e.,

(A)Those who applause and willing to support the innovation, either by conviction, or by allowing loyalty to the King to override their conviction, and those who applause because they expect personal benefit from it.

(B)Those who are indifferent and scepticle, either because they have no interest of their own to concern, or being opportunists simply awaiting to profit themselves out of whatever result it may bring.

(C)Those who oppose it either by their own conviction, or by personal jealousy, or having profit or interest to loose by the innovation.

In fact no matter what system of government is adopted it can never give universal satisfaction, and there bound to be divisions of sentiment something similar to what I have said. The only thing to be hoped for is that the proportion of favourable sentiment be the majority, which I do not think would be the case in the appointment of a Prime Minister as proposed.

5.H.M. rightly stated in his memorandum that he has received deplorable inheritance when he ascended the Throne, because the authority of the sovereign had fallen much in respect and confidence, the treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy, and the government was corrupted and the services more or less in confusion. It was the master’s stroke of H.M. in the creation of the S.C.S. immediately after his accession that instantly restored the general confidence in the Throne. Now let us look at the composition and the working of the S.C.S. The Council is a committee of five persons of repute and experience preside⟨d⟩ always by the King in person, and every resolution passed in the Council is executed by the King alone, no member of the Council is ever mentioned in any act, nor has any of them interfered with the work of ministerial departments, and yet accusations are not wanting, that the Council has usurped H.M.’s authority and power, and also trying to interfere with the ministerial responsibility. I am glad indeed that H.M. himself refuted these accusations in his memorandum. But the fact that mischievous accusations are capable of being made against a Council of five persons (perhaps I may be allowed to call of high repute) is enough to make one realise what difficulties a Prime Minister alone would have to face against all sorts of intrigue, while on the other hand he is being held responsible for the good administration of the country. Here one discerns the necessity which may arise that a Prime Minister would be obliged to resort to strategems, good or bad in order to keep his position or otherwise throw up his appointment altogether.

6.Now I come to the person and the responsibility of the Prime Minister. No doubt H.M. will select the best qualified person in the Kingdom as his first Prime Minister, and let us presume that the selection meets with universal approval. The first impression created by the appointment of the Prime Minister would be that he is expected to improve