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DUBIN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

bears little resemblance to any ordinary meaning of “identity theft.” Consider again an unlicensed doctor who fills out a prescription actually requested by a patient; no one would call that identity theft. Even judges below who agreed with the Government’s reading of §1028A(a)(1), and ultimately the Government itself, acknowledged that its reading of §1028A(a)(1) does not fairly capture the ordinary meaning of identity theft. Nor is the difference just around the edges; the Government’s reading would, in practice, place garden-variety overbilling at the core of §1028A.

Instead, “identity theft” has a focused meaning. One dictionary defines identity theft as “the fraudulent appropriation and use of another person’s identifying data or documents, as a credit card.” Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary xi (2d ed. 2001) (Webster’s). Another similarly offers “[t]he unlawful taking and use of another person’s identifying information for fraudulent purposes; specif[ically] a crime in which someone steals personal information about and belonging to another, such as a bank-account number or driver’s-license number, and uses the information to deceive others.” Black’s Law Dictionary 894 (11th ed. 2019) (Black’s) (defining “identity theft”).[1]

This supports a reading of “in relation to” where use of the means of identification is at the crux of the underlying criminality. These definitions refer to offenses built around what the defendant does with the means of identification in particular. In other words, the means of identification specifically is a key mover in the criminality. This central role played by the means of identification, which serves to designate a specific person’s identity, explains why we say that the “identity” itself has been stolen. See, e.g., Spears, 729 F. 3d, at 756 (“identity theft” occurs when someone’s “iden-


  1. “Steal[ing]” can, of course, include situations where something was initially lawfully acquired. See Black’s 1710 (defining “steal”).