Opinion of the Court
Time and again, this Court has prudently avoided reading incongruous breadth into opaque language in criminal statutes. In Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. ___ (2021), the “far-reaching consequences” of the Government’s reading “underscore[d] the implausibility of the Government’s interpretation.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 17). In Marinello, the Court rejected the Government’s reading of a statute about obstructing administration of the Tax Code that would have swept in the “person who pays a babysitter $41 per week in cash without withholding taxes,” as well as someone who “leaves a large cash tip in a restaurant, fails to keep donation receipts from every charity to which he or she contributes, or fails to provide every record to an accountant.” 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). Nor was all such conduct innocent, as the statute required an individual to act “ ‘corruptly.’ ” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Even still, “[h]ad Congress intended” to sweep so far, “it would have spoken with more clarity than it did.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7). In Yates, the Court held that the Government’s “unrestrained” reading would have turned a provision focused on “records” and “documents” into “an all-encompassing ban on the spoliation of evidence” that would “sweep within its reach physical objects of every kind,” including a fish. 574 U. S., at 536, 540 (plurality opinion). Had Congress set out to do so, “one would have expected a clearer indication of that intent.” Ibid.
So too here. The Government’s reading would sweep in the hour-inflating lawyer, the steak-switching waiter, the building contractor who tacks an extra $10 onto the price of the paint he purchased. So long as they used various common billing methods, they would all be subject to a mandatory two years in federal prison. To say that such a result