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Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism

In mid-October [2018], JTAC launched its initial capability on DET, taking the lead for strategic-level national threat assessments through a *** team of analysts (in on-going partnership with CT Police).[1]

200. In June 2019, David Anderson QC (Lord Anderson) published an unclassified summary of the progress made by MI5 and CTP in implementing the recommendations of the Operational Improvement Review (OIR) and Post-Attack Reviews of 2017. The 'Implementation Stocktake' summarised progress made up to and including 31 January 2019 in a number of key areas, including 'non-Islamist terrorism', and identified a number of challenges. These are listed below, together with MI5's response:

2017 Terrorist Attacks—MI5 and CTP Reviews—
Implementation Stocktake[2]
8.17. In keeping with the frank nature of my briefings, I was informed of a number of initial or continuing difficulties. Most of these were not however fundamental in nature, and there has been a healthy tendency to see teething problems as learning points rather than obstacles. For example:
D. There was some initial reluctance to share information around the CT network which was resolved by negotiation.
E. It has been necessary to manage the inherent tension that exists between Police prioritisation of evidence-building in order to effect executive action and the intelligence agencies' desire to build as full an intelligence picture as possible, particularly in relation to SOIs [Subjects of Interest] travelling overseas.
F. There was uncertainty, now resolved, as to who should conduct international liaison (e.g. with the FBI) and who should authorise or seek the authorisation of covert activity: as to the latter, it was concluded that MI5 would have primacy in the covert phase and the police in executive action.
MI5 response:[3]

"As outlined here, Lord Anderson has already detailed the mitigations and decisions on each of these issues."

8.19. The changes have had a resource impact for MI5 (though not for CTP), particularly in terms of training. New growth funding has been made available to restore dedicated 'DE' desks in the regions, which existed previously but were phased out a few years ago.

MI5 response:

"MI5 continues to manage resources dynamically across ERWT, LASIT and International Terrorism based on threat and risk."


  1. Domestic Extremism Terrorism—Letter from Director General MI5 to the ISC Chairman, 31 January 2019.
  2. David Anderson QC, '2017 Terrorist Attacks—MI5 and CTP Reviews—Implementation Stocktake, Unclassified summary of conclusions', 11 June 2019.
  3. MI5 written evidence—31 January 2020.

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