Page:EB1911 - Volume 01.djvu/339

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AFFREIGHTMENT
302

were betrayed, opened fire upon the national guard, and the archbishop fell, struck by a stray bullet. He was removed to his palace, where he died on the 27th of June 1848. Next day the National Assembly issued a decree expressing their great sorrow on account of his death; and the public funeral on the 7th of July was one of the most striking spectacles of its kind. The archbishop wrote several treatises of considerable value, including an Essai sur les hiéroglyphes egyptiens (Paris, 1834), in which he showed that Champollion’s system was insufficient to explain the hieroglyphics.

See Ricard, Les grands évêques de l’église de France au XIXe siècle (Lille, 1893); L. Alazard, Denis-Auguste Affre, archevêque de Paris (Paris, 1905).


AFFREIGHTMENT (from “freight”, q.v.). Contract of Affreightment is the expression usually employed to describe the contract between a shipowner and some other person called the freighter, by which the shipowner agrees to carry goods of the freighter in his ship, or to give to the freighter the use of the whole or part of the cargo-carrying space of the ship for the carriage of his goods on a specified voyage or voyages or for a specified time; the freighter on his part agreeing to pay a specified price, called “freight,” for the carriage of the goods or the use of the ship. A ship may be let like a house to some person who takes possession and control of it for a specified term. The person who hires a ship in this way occupies during the currency of his term the position of shipowner. The contract by which a ship is so let may be called a charter-party; but it is not, properly speaking, a contract of affreightment, and is mentioned here only because it is necessary to remember the distinction between a charter-party of this kind, which is sometimes called a demise of the ship, and a charter-party which is a form of contract of affreightment, as will hereinafter appear.

The law with regard to the contract of affreightment is, of course, a branch of the general law of contract. The rights and obligations of the shipowner and the freighter depend, as in the case of all parties to contracts, upon the terms of the agreement entered into between them. The law, however, interferes to some extent in regulating the effect to be given to contracts. Certain contracts are forbidden by the law, and being illegal are, therefore, incapable of enforcement. The most important example of illegality in the case of contracts of affreightment is when the contract involves trading with an enemy. The law interferes again with regard to the interpretation of the contract. The meaning to be given to the words of the contract, or, in other words, its construction, when a dispute arises about it, must be determined by the judge or court. The result is, that certain more or less common clauses in contracts of affreightment have come before the courts for construction, and the decisions in these cases are treated practically, though not perhaps quite logically, as rules of law determining the sense to be put upon certain forms of expression in common use in shipping contracts. A third way in which the law interferes is by laying down certain rules by which the rights of the parties are to be regulated in the absence of any express stipulation with regard to the matter dealt with by such rules. This is done either by statutory enactment, as by that part (Part VIII.) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 which deals with the liability of shipowners; or by established rules of the unwritten law, the “common law” Rules of law.as it is called, as, for instance, the rule that the common carrier is absolutely responsible for the safe delivery of the goods carried, unless it is prevented by the act of God or the king’s enemies. These rules of law, whether common law or statute law, regulating the obligations of carriers of goods by sea, are of most importance in cases which are uncommon though not unknown at the present day, in which there is an affreightment without any written agreement of any kind. It will, therefore, be convenient to consider first cases of this kind where there is no express agreement, oral or written, except as to the freight and destination of the goods, and where, consequently, the rights and obligations of the parties as to all other terms of carriage depend wholly upon the rules of law, remembering always that these same rules apply when there is a written contract, except in so far as they are qualified or negatived by the terms of such contract.

The rules of the common or ancient customary law of England with regard to the carriage of goods were no doubt first considered by the courts and established with regard to the carriage of goods by common carriers on land. These rules were applied to common carriers by water, and it may now be taken to be the general rule that shipowners who carry goods by sea are by the English law subject to the liabilities of common carriers. (See, as to the grounds and precise extent of this doctrine, the judgments in Liver Alkali Company v. Johnson (1874), L.R., 9 Ex. 338, and Nugent v. Smith (1876) 1 C.P.D. 423.) In practice goods are not often shipped without a written contract or acknowledgment of the terms upon which they are to be carried. For each separate consignment or parcel of goods shipped a bill of lading is almost invariably given, and when a whole cargo is agreed to be carried the terms are set out in a document called a charter-party, signed by or on behalf of the shipowner on the one part, and the shipper, who is called the charterer, on the other part. But at present we are considering the relations of shipowner and shipper independently of any express contract, as in a case when goods are shipped and received to be carried to the place to which the ship is bound for a certain freight, but without any further agreement as to the terms of carriage. In such a case the rights of the parties depend on the rules of law, or, which is much the same thing, upon the warranties In defaults of express contract.or promises which though not expressed must, as the courts have held, be implied as arising from the relation between the parties as shipper and carrier. The obligations on the one side and the other may be defined shortly to be as follows:—The shipper must not ship goods of a nature or in a condition which he knows, or ought, if he used reasonable care, to know to be dangerous to the ship, or to other goods, unless the shipowner has notice of or has sufficient opportunity to observe their dangerous character. The shipper must be prepared, without notice from the shipowner, to take delivery of his goods with reasonable despatch on the arrival of the ship at the place of destination, being ready there to discharge in some usual discharging place. The shipper must pay the agreed freight, and will not be entitled to claim delivery until the freight has been paid. In other words, the shipowner has a lien on the goods carried for the freight payable in respect of the carriage. On the other hand, the obligation upon the shipowner is first and foremost to deliver safely at their destination the goods shipped, and this obligation is, by the common law, subject to this exception only that the shipowner is not liable for loss or damage caused by the act of God or the king’s enemies; but by statute (Merchant Shipping Act 1894, Part VIII.) it is further qualified to this extent that the shipowner is not liable for loss, happening without his actual fault or privity, by fire on board the ship, or by the robbery or embezzlement of or making away with gold or silver or jewellery, the true nature and value of which have not been declared in writing at the time of shipment; and, further, the shipowner is not liable for damage to or loss of goods or merchandise beyond an aggregate amount, not exceeding eight pounds per ton for each ton of the ship’s tonnage. The shipowner is bound by an implied undertaking, or, in other words, is made responsible by the law as if he had entered into an express undertaking: (1) that the ship is seaworthy; (2) that she shall proceed upon the voyage with reasonable despatch, and shall not deviate without necessity from the usual course of the voyage.

It is not our purpose in this article to discuss minute or doubtful questions; but in their general outline the obligations of shipper and shipowner, where no terms of carriage have been agreed, except as to the freight and destination of the goods, are such as have been described above. The importance of appreciating clearly this view of the relations of shipper and shipowner arises from the fact that these fundamental rules apply to all contracts of affreightment, whether by bill of lading, charter-party or otherwise, except in so far as they are modified or negatived by the express terms of the contract.