court refused to stop the arbitration on the mere ground that he was the client of a firm of solicitors, the conduct of one of whom was in question (Bright v. River Plate Construction Co., 1900, 2 Ch. 835).
Under the law prior to the act of 1889 (a) an agreement to refer disputes generally, without naming the arbitrators, was always irrevocable, and an action lay for the breach of it, although the court could not compel either of the parties to proceed under it; (b) an agreement to refer to a particular arbitrator was revocable, and if one of the parties revoked that particular arbitrator’s authority he could not be compelled to submit to it; (c) when, however, the parties had got their tribunal fixed, and were proceeding to carry out the agreement to refer, the act 9 and 10 Will. III. c. 15 provided that the submission might be made a rule of court, a provision which gave the court power to assist the parties in the trial of the case, and to enforce the award of the arbitrators; (d) the statute 3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 42 (s. 39) put an end to the power to revoke the authority of a particular arbitrator after the reference to him had been made a rule of court; and—a liability which existed also under the act of 9 and 10 Will. III. c. 15—any person revoking the appointment of an arbitrator after the submission had been made a rule of court might be attached. The Arbitration Act 1889 provides that a submission, unless a contrary intention is expressed in it, is irrevocable except by leave of the court or a judge, and is to have the same effect in all respects as if it had been made an order of court. The object of this enactment was to save the expense of making a submission a rule of court by treating it as having been so made, and it leaves the law in this position, that while the authority of an arbitrator, once appointed, is irrevocable, there is no power—any more than there was under the old law—to compel an unwilling party to proceed to a reference, except in cases specially provided for by sections 5 and 6 of the act of 1889. The former of these sections deals with the power of the court, the latter with the power of the parties to a reference, to appoint an arbitrator in certain circumstances. Section 5 provides that where a reference is to be to a single arbitrator, and all the parties do not concur in appointing one, or an appointed arbitrator refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting, or where the parties or two arbitrators fail, when necessary, to appoint an umpire or third arbitrator, or such umpire or arbitrator when appointed refuses to act, or becomes incapable of acting, and the default is not rectified after seven clear days’ notice, the court may supply the vacancy. Under section 6, where a reference is to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party, and either the appointed arbitrator refuses to act, or becomes incapable of acting, and the party appointing him fails, after seven clear days’ notice, to supply the vacancy, or such party fails, after similar notice, to make an original appointment, a binding appointment (subject to the power of the court to set it aside) may be made by the other party to the reference. The court may compel parties to carry out an arbitration, not only in the above cases by directly appointing an arbitrator, &c., or by allowing one appointed by a party to proceed alone with the reference, but also indirectly by staying any proceedings before the legal tribunals to determine matters which come within the scope of the arbitration. Where the agreement to refer stipulates that the submission of a dispute to arbitration shall be a condition precedent to the right to bring an action in regard to it, an action does not lie until the arbitration has been held and an award made, and it is usual in such cases not to apply for a stay of proceedings, but to plead the agreement as a bar to the action (Viney v. Bignold, 1887, 20 Q.B.D. 172). The court will refuse to stay proceedings where the subject-matter of the litigation falls outside the scope of the reference, or there is some serious objection to the fitness of the arbitrator, or some other good reason of the kind exists.
An arbitrator is not liable to be sued for want of skill or for negligence in conducting the arbitration (Pappa v. Rose, 1872, L.R. 7 C.P. 525). When a building contract provides that a certificate of the architect, showing the final balance due to the contractor, shall be conclusive evidence of the works having been duly completed, the architect occupies the position of an arbitrator, and enjoys the same immunity from liability for negligence in the discharge of his functions (Chambers v. Goldthorpe, 1901, 1 Q.B. 624). An arbitrator cannot be compelled to act unless he is a party to the submission.
An arbitrator (and the following observations apply mutatis mutandis to an umpire after he has entered on his duties) has power to administer oaths to, or take the affirmations of, the parties and their witnesses; and any person who wilfully and corruptly gives false evidence before him may be prosecuted and punished for perjury (Arbitration Act 1889, sched. i. and s. 22). At any stage in the reference he may, and shall if he be required by the court, state in the form of a special case for the opinion of the court any question of law arising in the arbitration. The arbitrator may also state his award in whole or in part as a special case (ib. s. 19), and may correct in an award any clerical mistake or error arising from an accidental slip or omission. The costs of the reference and the award—which, under sched. i. of the act, must be in writing, unless the submission otherwise provides—are in the arbitrator’s discretion, and he has a lien on the award and the submission for his fees, for which—if there is an express or implied promise to pay them—he can also sue (Crampton v. Ridley, 1887, 20 Q.B.D. 48). An arbitrator or umpire ought not, however, to state his award in such a way as to deprive the parties of their right to challenge the amount charged by him for his services; and accordingly where an umpire fixed for his award a lump sum as costs, including therein his own and the arbitrators’ fees, the award was remitted back to him to state how much he allotted to himself and how much to the arbitrators (in Re Gilbert v. Wright, 1904, 20 Times L.R. 164). But in the absence of evidence to show that the fees charged by arbitrators or umpire are extortionate, or unfair and unreasonable, the courts will not interfere with them (Llandrindod Wells Water Co. v. Hawksley, 1904, 20 Times L.R. 241).
If there is no express provision on the point in the submission, an award under the Arbitration Act 1889 must be made within three months after the arbitrator has entered on the reference, or been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the submission. The time may, however, be extended by the arbitrator or by the court. An umpire is required to make his award within one month after the original or extended time appointed for making the award of the arbitrators has expired, or any later day to which he may enlarge it. The court may by order remit an award to the arbitrators or umpire for reconsideration, in which case the reconsidered award must be made within three months after the date of the order.
An award must be intra vires: it must dispose of all the points referred; and it must be final, except as regards certain matters of valuation, &c. (see in Re Stringer and Riley Brothers, 1901, 1 K.B. 105). An award may, however, be set aside where the arbitrator has misconducted himself (an arbitrator may also be removed by the court on the ground of misconduct), or where it is ultra vires, or lacks any of the other requisites—above mentioned—of a valid award, or where the arbitrator has been wilfully deceived by one of the parties, or some such state of things exists. An award may, by leave of the court, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or decree to the same effect. Under the Revenue Act 1906, s. 9, a uniform duty of ten shillings is payable on awards in England or Ireland, and on decreets arbitral in Scotland.
Provisions for the arbitration of special classes of disputes are contained in many acts of parliament, e.g. the Local Government Acts 1888, 1894, the Agricultural Holdings (England) Acts 1883 to 1906, the Small Holdings and Allotments Act 1907, the Light Railways Act 1896, the Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890, the Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906, &c.
The Conciliation Act 1896 provides machinery for the prevention and settlement of trade disputes, and in 1892 a chamber of arbitration for business disputes was established by the joint action of the corporation of the city of London and the London chamber of commerce. At the time when the London chamber of arbitration