in the duchy to Tuscany. On the 17th of October Maria Louisa of Austria, duchess of Parma, died, and Charles Louis succeeded to her throne by the terms of the Florence treaty, assuming the style of Charles II. His administration of Parma was characterized by ruinous finance, debts, disorder and increased taxation, and he concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with Austria. But on the outbreak of the revolution of 1848 there were riots in his capital (19th of March), and he declared his readiness to throw in his lot with Charles Albert, the pope, and Leopold of Tuscany, repudiated the Austrian treaty and promised a constitution. Then he again changed his mind, abdicated in April, and left Parma in the hands of a provisional government, whereupon the people voted for union with Piedmont. After the armistice between Charles Albert and Austria (August 1848) the Austrian general Thurn occupied the duchy, and Charles II. issued an edict from Weistropp annulling the acts of the provisional government. When Piedmont attacked Austria again in 1849, Parma was evacuated, but reoccupied by General d’Aspre in April.
In May 1849 Charles confirmed his abdication, and was succeeded by his son Charles III. (1823–1854), who, protected by Austrian troops, placed Parma under martial law, inflicted heavy penalties on the members of the late provisional government, closed the university, and instituted a regular policy of persecution. A violent ruler, a drunkard and a libertine, he was assassinated on the 26th of March 1854. At his death his widow Maria Louisa, sister of the comte de Chambord, became regent, during the minority of his son Robert. The duchess introduced some sort of order into the administration, seemed inclined to rule more mildly and dismissed some of her husband’s more obnoxious ministers, but the riots of the Mazzinians in July 1854 were repressed with ruthless severity, and the rest of her reign was characterized by political trials, executions and imprisonments, to which the revolutionists replied with assassinations.
Bibliography.—Massei, Storia civile di Lucca, vol. ii. (Lucca, 1878); Anon., Y Borboni di Parma . . . del 1847 al 1859 (Parma, 1860); N. Bianchi, Storia della diplomazia europea in Italia (Turin, 1865, &c.); C. Tivaroni, L’Italia sotto il dominio austriaco, ii. 96-101, i. 590-605 (Turin, 1892), and L’Italia degli Italiani, i. 126-143 (Turin, 1895) by the same; S. Lottici and G. Sitti, Bibliografia generale per la storia parmense (Parma, 1904).
CHARLES [Karl Ludwig] (1771–1847), archduke of Austria and duke of Teschen, third son of the emperor Leopold II., was born at Florence (his father being then grand-duke of Tuscany) on the 5th of September 1771. His youth was spent in Tuscany, at Vienna and in the Austrian Netherlands, where he began his career of military service in the war of the French Revolution. He commanded a brigade at Jemappes, and in the campaign of 1793 distinguished himself at the action of Aldenhoven and the battle of Neerwinden. In this year he became Statthalter in Belgium and received the army rank of lieutenant field marshal, which promotion was soon followed by that to Feldzeugmeister. In the remainder of the war in the Low Countries he held high commands, and he was present at Fleurus. In 1795 he served on the Rhine, and in the following year was entrusted with the chief control of all the Austrian forces on that river. His conduct of the operations against Jourdan and Moreau in 1796 marked him out at once as one of the greatest generals in Europe. At first falling back carefully and avoiding a decision, he finally marched away, leaving a mere screen in front of Moreau; falling upon Jourdan he beat him in the battles of Amberg and Würzburg, and drove him over the Rhine with great loss. He then turned upon Moreau’s army, which he defeated and forced out of Germany. For this campaign, one of the most brilliant in modern history, see French Revolutionary Wars. In 1797 he was sent to arrest the victorious march of General Bonaparte in Italy, and he conducted the retreat of the over-matched Austrians with the highest skill. In the campaign of 1799 he was once more opposed to Jourdan, whom he defeated in the battles of Osterach and Stokach, following up his success by invading Switzerland and defeating Masséna in the (first) battle of Zürich, after which he re-entered Germany and drove the French once more over the Rhine. Ill-health, however, forced him to retire to Bohemia, whence he was soon recalled to undertake the task of checking Moreau’s advance on Vienna. The result of the battle of Hohenlinden had, however, foredoomed the attempt, and the archduke had to make the armistice of Steyer. His popularity was now such that the diet of Regensburg, which met in 1802, resolved to erect a statue in his honour and to give him the title of saviour of his country; but Charles refused both distinctions.
In the short and disastrous war of 1805 the archduke Charles commanded what was intended to be the main army, in Italy, but events made Germany the decisive theatre of operations, and the defeats sustained on the Danube neutralized the success obtained by the archduke over Masséna in the desperately fought battle of Caldiero. With the conclusion of peace began his active work of army reorganization, which was first tested on the field in 1809. As generalissimo of the army he had been made field marshal some years before. As president of the Council of War, and supported by the prestige of being the only general who had proved capable of defeating the French, he promptly initiated a far-reaching scheme of reform, which replaced the obsolete methods of the 18th century, the chief characteristics of the new order being the adoption of the “nation in arms” principle and of the French war organization and tactics. The new army was surprised in the process of transition by the war of 1809, in which Charles commanded in chief; yet even so it proved a far more formidable opponent than the old, and, against the now heterogeneous army of which Napoleon disposed (see Napoleonic Campaigns) it succumbed only after a desperate struggle. Its initial successes were neutralized by the reverses of Abensberg, Landshut and Eckmühl; but, after the evacuation of Vienna, the archduke won the great battle of Aspern-Essling (q.v.) and soon afterwards fought the still more desperate battle of Wagram (q.v.), at the close of which the Austrians were defeated but not routed; they had inflicted upon Napoleon a loss of over 50,000 men in the two battles. At the end of the campaign the archduke gave up all his military offices, and spent the rest of his life in retirement, except a short time in 1815, when he was governor of Mainz. In 1822 he succeeded to the duchy of Saxe-Teschen. The archduke Charles married, in 1815, Princess Henrietta of Nassau-Weilburg (d. 1829). He had four sons, the eldest of whom, the archduke Albert (q.v.) became one of the most celebrated generals in Europe, and two daughters, the elder of whom became queen of Naples. He died at Vienna on the 30th of April 1847. An equestrian statue was erected to his memory in Vienna, 1860.
The caution which the archduke preached so earnestly in his strategical works, he displayed in practice only when the situation seemed to demand it, though his education certainly prejudiced him in favour of the defensive at all costs. He was at the same time capable of forming and executing the most daring offensive strategy, and his tactical skill in the handling of troops, whether in wide turning movements, as at Würzburg and Zürich, or in masses, as at Aspern and Wagram, was certainly equal to that of any leader of his time, Napoleon only excepted. The campaign of 1796 is considered almost faultless. That he sustained defeat in 1809 was due in part to the great numerical superiority of the French and their allies, and in part to the condition of his newly reorganized troops. His six weeks’ inaction after the victory of Aspern is, however, open to unfavourable criticism. As a military writer, his position in the evolution of the art of war is very important, and his doctrines had naturally the greatest weight. Nevertheless they cannot but be considered as antiquated even in 1806. Caution and the importance of “strategic points” are the chief features of his system. The rigidity of his geographical strategy may be gathered from the prescription that “this principle is never to be departed from.” Again and again he repeats the advice that nothing should be hazarded unless one’s army is completely secure, a rule which he himself neglected with such brilliant results in 1796. “Strategic points,” he says (not the defeat of the enemy’s army), “decide the fate of one’s own country, and must
