main kinds, sensation and reason. Sensation alone is insufficient to explain all our intellectual phenomena; all sensation is momentary and individual (cf. Empiricism). How then are we to account for memory and the principles of necessity, similarity, universality? It is argued that there must be in the mind an enduring, primary faculty whereby we retain, compare and group the presentations of sense. This faculty is a priori, transcendental, and entirely separate from all the data of experience and sense-perception. Here then we have a dualism within experience. The mind is not to be regarded as a sensitized film which automatically records the impressions of the senses. It contains within itself this modifying critical faculty which reacts upon and arranges the sense-given presentations.
In Ethics and Theology.—In the domain of morals, dualism postulates the separate existence of Good and Evil, as principles of existence. In theology the appearance of dualism is sporadic and has not the fundamental, determining importance which it has in metaphysics. It is a result rather than a starting-point. The old Zoroastrianism, and those Christian sects (e.g. Manichaeism) which were influenced by it, postulate two contending deities Ormuzd and Ahriman (Good and Evil), which war against one another in influencing the conduct of men. So, in Christianity, the existence of Satan as an evil influence, antagonistic to God, involves a kind of dualism. But generally speaking this dualism is permissive, inasmuch as it is always held that God will triumph over Satan in His own time. So in Zoroastrianism the dualism is not ultimate, for Ahriman and Ormuzd are represented as the twin sons of Zervana Akarana, i.e. limitless time, wherein both will be finally absorbed. The postulate of an Evil Being arises from the difficulty, at all times acutely felt by a certain type of mind, of reconciling the existence of evil with the divine attributes of perfect goodness, full knowledge and infinite power. John Stuart Mill (Essay on Religion) preferred to disbelieve in the omnipotence of God rather than forgo the belief in His goodness. It follows from such a view that Satan is not the creation of God, but rather a power coeval in origin, over whose activity God has no absolute control.
In Theology.—Dualism is also used in a special theological sense to describe a doctrine of the Nestorian heresy. According to this doctrine the personality of Christ is twofold; the divine Logos dwells as a distinct personality in the man Jesus Christ, the union of the two natures being analogous to the relation between the believer and the indwelling Holy Spirit.
History of the Doctrine.—The earliest European thinkers (see Ionian School of Philosophy) endeavoured to reduce all the facts of the universe to a single material origin, such as Fire, Water, Air. It is only gradually that there appears any recognition of a spiritual principle exercising a modifying or causal influence over inert matter. Anaxagoras was the first to postulate the existence of Reason (νοῦς) as the source of change and progress. Yet even he did not conceive this Reason as incorporeal; it was in reality only the most highly rarefied form of matter in existence. In Plato for the first time we find a truly dualistic conception of the universe. Asserting that Ideas alone really exist, he yet found it necessary to postulate a second principle of not-being, the groundwork of sensuous existence and of imperfection and evil. Herein he identified metaphysics and ethics, combining the good with the truly existent and evil with the non-existent. Aristotle rebels against this conception and substitutes the idea of πρώτη ὕλη and development. Nevertheless he does not escape from the dualism of Form and Matter, νοῦς and ὕλη. The scholastic philosophers naturally held dualistic views resulting from their extreme devotion to formalism. This blind dualism found its natural consequence in the revolt of the Renaissance thinkers, Bruno and Paracelsus, who asserted the unity of mind and matter in all existence and were the precursors of the more intelligent monism of Leibnitz and the scientific metaphysics of his successors. The birth of modern physical science on the other hand in the investigations of Bacon and Descartes obscured the metaphysical issue by the predominance of the mechanical principles of natural philosophy. They attempted to explain the fundamental problems of existence by the unaided evidence of the new natural science. Thus Descartes maintained the absolute dualism of the res cogitans and the res extensa. Spinoza realized the flaw in the division and preferred to postulate behind mind and matter a single substance (unica substantia) while Leibnitz explained the universe as a harmony of spiritual or semispiritual principles. Kant practically abandons the problem. He never really establishes a relation between pure reason and things-in-themselves (Dinge an sich), but rather seeks refuge in a dualism within consciousness, the transcendental and the empirical. Since Kant there are, therefore, two streams of dualism, dealing, one with the radical problem of the relation between mind and matter, the other with the relation between the pure rational and the empirical elements within consciousness. To the first problem there is one obvious and conclusive answer, namely that matter in itself is inherently unthinkable and comes within the vision of the mind only as an intellectual presentation. It follows that philosophy is in a sense both dualist and monist; it is a cosmic dualism inasmuch as it admits the possible existence of matter as a hypothesis, though it denies the possibility of any true knowledge of it, and is hence in regard of the only possible knowledge an idealistic monism. It is a self-destructive dualism, a confessedly one-sided monism, agnostic as to the fundamental problem. To the second problem there are two main answers, that of Associationism which denies to the mind any a priori existence and asserts that sensation is the only source of knowledge, and that which admits the existence of both transcendental and empirical knowledge.
DUALLA, one of the principal negro peoples of Cameroon estuary, West Africa. When the Germans established themselves in that region, the Dualla were under many petty chiefs, whose domains were usually restricted to one village. Over these were two greater chiefs, Bell (Mbeli) and Akwa, representing the principal families of the tribe. The Dualla are physically a fine race. They are proud of their racial purity, and it was formerly usual for all half-caste children to be strangled at birth. The Dualla tattoo themselves, the women the whole body, the men the face only. They also pull out their eyelashes, which they believe prevent sharp sight. The monarchical system is more developed among the Dualla than any other of the peoples of Cameroon. The kings, many of whom have grown rich through trade, retain part of their former power, subject to the German government. The Dualla, who are laborious, industrious and capable of great physical endurance, are great traders and are proportionately prosperous. The average price for a wife among the Dualla is from £90 to £120; but sometimes a great deal more is paid. Girls are usually betrothed young and may be divorced if sterile. The penalty for adultery is a fine imposed on the seducer; if he cannot pay he becomes the husband’s slave. Cannibalism as a religious rite was formerly common among the Dualla. All accessions to power were preceded by a sacrifice, a king having no authority till his hands were stained with blood. The religion is fetish blended with ancestor-worship, and certain secret societies exist among them which seem to have a religious connexion. The dead are buried within the hut, which is abandoned shortly afterwards; slaves were formerly buried with men of importance. Missionary efforts have yielded many converts, and some churches have been built. Many of the natives can read. The Dualla are in possession of an interesting code, in accordance with which messages can be sent and even conversations maintained by means of drums, or rather gongs, giving two notes. (See Cameroon.)
DU BARRY, MARIE JEANNE BÉCU, Comtesse (1746–1793), French adventuress, mistress of Louis XV., was the natural daughter of a poor woman of Vaucouleurs, and was born there on the 19th of August 1746. Placed in a convent in Paris at an early age, she received a very slight education, learning little but the catechism and drawing; and at the age of sixteen entered a milliner’s shop in the rue St Honoré. Subsequently she lived as a courtesan under the name of Mdlle Lange. Her great personal charms led the adventurer Jean, comte du Barry, to take her into his house in order to make it more
