Ismail to reopen the Nile. This work was efficiently done by Ismail
Ayub Pasha, and the White Nile was clear for large vessels when
Gordon reached Khartum in 1874. The river did not long remain
free, for in 1878 Emin Pasha was unable to ascend the Bahr-el-Jebel
from the south on account of sudd. It was cleared in 1879–1880 by
officials in the Egyptian service, but had again accumulated in 1884.
In consequence of the Mahdist movement nothing could then be
done to clear the river, and the work was not taken in hand again
until 1899, when, by direction of Sir William Garstin, the Egyptian
inspector-general of irrigation, an expedition under Major Malcom
Peake, R.A., was sent to cut through the sudd, which then extended
from the Bahr-el-Ghazal confluence almost to Gondokoro. During
1900 a channel was cut through the northern and heaviest portion
of the sudd. The work was one of much difficulty, some of the blocks
being 1 m. long and 20 ft. deep; the water beneath flowed with great
velocity. To remove the obstruction the surface was first burnt;
then trenches were cut dividing the sudd into blocks 10 ft. square,
and each of these was hauled out with wire hawsers and chains
by gunboats working from below. For a distance of 172 m. N. of
Shambe (i.e. about midway between the Ghazal confluence and
Gondokoro) the true bed of the river could not, in many places, be
found, but Major Peake forced a passage to Gondokoro through a
spill channel or series of shallow lakes lying west of the main stream.
In 1901 Lieut. Drury, a British naval officer, removed many of the
remaining blocks of sudd, opening to navigation a further 147 m.
of the river. Beyond this point for a distance of 25 m. the Bahr-el-Jebel
could not be traced, so completely was the channel choked by
sudd. In 1902, however, Major G. E. Matthews discovered the true
bed of the river, which by 1904 was completely freed from obstructions,
and freedom of navigation between Khartum and Gondokoro
was permanently secured. The effect of the sudd-cutting operations
on the supply of water available for irrigation purposes in the lower
river was slight. Nevertheless, Sir William Garstin reported that
the removal of the sudd “undoubtedly checked the fall in the river
levels which would otherwise have taken place.”
Political Relations.—Explored in part by Egyptian government expeditions, the upper Nile as far south as Albert Nyanza became subject, between 1840 and 1882, to Egypt. Possession of the greater part of the river above Wadi Halfa then fell to the followers of the Mahdi. In 1896–98 an Anglo-Egyptian army reconquered the country, and from Victoria Nyanza to the Mediterranean the main river came under British or Egyptian administration. The west bank of the Bahr-el-Jebel, as far north as 5° 30′ N., was in 1894 taken on lease from Great Britain by the Congo Free State during the sovereignty of Leopold II., the territory leased being known as the Lado enclave (q.v.). The Kagera, the main headstream, lies almost wholly in German East Africa.
Authorities.—For the story of exploration see the works of Bruce, Speke, Grant, Baker and other travellers (whose books are mentioned in the biographical notices). Their achievements, and those of ancient and medieval explorers, are ably summarized in The Story of Africa, vols. ii. and iii., by Dr Robert Brown (London, 1893–1894), and The Nile Quest, by Sir Harry Johnston (London, 1903). See also J. Partsch, Des Aristotel’s Buch: “Über das Steigen des Nil” (Leipzig, 1909). For the Kagera region consult Caput Nili, by Richard Kandt (Berlin, 1904). Latest additions to geographical knowledge are recorded in the Geographical Journal (London) and the Cairo Scientific Journal. For the hydrography, geology and climate see: The Physiography of the River Nile and its Basin, by Captain H. G. Lyons, director-general, survey department, Egypt (Cairo, 1906), an authoritative work, and numerous other publications of the Survey and Public Works Departments; “Notes on the History of the Nile and its Valley,” by W. F. Hume, in Geog. Jnl. (Jan. 1906); Egyptian Irrigation (2nd ed., London, 1899) and the Nile Reservoir Dam at Assuan and After (London, 1901), both by Sir William Willcocks; the Annual Reports (1899 and after) of the Egyptian Public Works Department, by Sir William Garstin and others, and those on Egypt and the Sudan by Lord Cromer and Sir Eldon Gorst (London; official publications). Of special value is the Blue Book Egypt No. 2, 1904, which is a report by Sir William Garstin on the basin of the upper Nile, dealing at length with the lake area, the Nile affluents and the main river as far south as Khartum, from the topographical as well as the hydrographical aspect. Sir W. Garstin and Captain Lyons give full bibliographical notes.
The study of the zoology of the Nile valley was the special object of a Swedish scientific expedition in 1901, under the direction of Prof. L. A. Jägerskiöld. The Results were published at Upsala, pt. iii. appearing in 1909. For the botanical and other aspects of the Nile valley, see the works of Petherick, Heuglin, Schweinfurth, Junker and Emin. An orographical map of the Nile basin was published by the Survey Department, Cairo, in 1908. It is in six sheets on a scale of 1:2,500,000, with inset maps showing political divisions, distribution of rainfall and of vegetation. (F. R. C.)
NILE, BATTLE OF THE. This was fought between the British
and French fleets on the 1st of August 1798 in the roadstead of
Aboukir. The peace of Campo Formio, signed on the 17th of
October 1797, had left France without an opponent in arms on
the continent. War with Great Britain still continued, and for
a time the Directory appeared to be intent on its schemes for
an invasion of Ireland. Napoleon, fresh from his Italian victories,
was appointed to command, and he made a round of inspection of
Brest and the Channel ports. But all this show of
activity was designed to cover the preparations for an attack on
Great Britain “from behind”—in India and by way of Egypt.
The French naval forces at Toulon were got ready slowly in spite of
Napoleon’s urging and with the defects inevitable in the impoverished
state of the arsenal. Thirty-six thousand soldiers, including
the best of the army of Italy, were to be embarked from the
southern French ports, from Italy and from Corsica. Information
that a great offensive movement was about to be made by the
French reached both Earl St Vincent, the commander-in-chief of
the Mediterranean fleet, and the British government. Since Spain
had entered into alliances with France in 1796, the British fleet
had not cruised in the Mediterranean but had been occupied
in blocking the Spanish ships at Cadiz. On the 2nd of May 1798
St Vincent detached Nelson, then the junior rear-admiral, with
his flag into the Mediterranean, with three sail of the line and
frigates to make a reconnaissance at Toulon. On the 17th of
May a small French corvette was captured near Cape Sicié,
and from the crew Nelson learnt that the French were still in the
harbour. He could gain no information as to the aim of the
armament. Napoleon enforced strict secrecy by not letting
even the most important officers of the dockyard know whither
he was bound. On the 2nd of May the British government had
written to St Vincent stating their wish that a part of his fleet
should be sent into the Mediterranean. The first lord of the
admiralty, Lord Spencer, told him that he might either go himself
or send a subordinate. If the latter course was followed
Nelson was indicated as the officer to be chosen. Reinforcements
were sent to him to enable him to provide both for the cruise in the
Mediterranean and for the blockade of Cadiz. St Vincent had
already selected Nelson, and when the reinforcements arrived
he despatched Captain Troubridge with the inshore squadron
engaged in watching Cadiz—“the choice fellows,” as he described
them, of his fleet—to join Nelson at Toulon. The ships were
replaced by others similarly painted, so that the Spaniards might
see no difference and therefore be unable to send news to their
ally. Troubridge left on the 24th of May with as many vessels
as would bring Nelson’s whole command up, to thirteen 74’s
and one 50-gun ship.
While these measures were being taken to intercept him, Napoleon had put to sea on the 19th of May with fifteen sail of the line, twelve frigates and some two hundred transports. He sailed down the eastern side of Corsica and Sardinia to pick up the detachments which were to join him from the first-named island and from Civita Vecchia. On the evening of the 20th a gale from the N.W. brought some confusion on his flock of ships, but it also drove Nelson to the S.W. His flagship the “Vanguard” (74) was dismasted and compelled to anchor at San Pietro to refit. His frigates were separated from him by the weather, and the captains made, for Gibraltar, concluding that the admiral would go there to refit. The departure of his frigates left Nelson without vessels for scouting and had a material influence on the campaign. The “Vanguard” was made ready by the 27th of May, and resumed her station off Toulon. On the 7th of June Nelson was joined by Troubridge. Calms hampered his pursuit of the French, whom he now knew to be at sea, but on the 14th he was off Civita Vecchia; on the 17th he was at Naples, where he heard that the French had been seen going south, and made arrangements to obtain water and stores in the Neapolitan ports. On the 20th he was at Messina, where he first got definite information of the movements of the enemy. The French had appeared off Malta on the 9th and had occupied the island, which was surrendered to them on the 12th by the treachery of the French and Italian members of the order. Pushing on in the hope of finding them on the coast of the island, Nelson was off Cape Passaro on the 22nd, and there learnt that the French had sailed from the island. His instructions directed him to guard against possible French attacks on Sicily, or even an attempt to pass the Straits of Gibraltar and sail for Ireland.
