Czech. It is one of the oldest towns in Moravia, and possesses a Gothic town-hall and an old castle, once occupied by Matthias Corvinus. It has an important cloth industry, and manufactures of sugar, ropes, machinery and agricultural implements. Prerau was at one time the chief seat of the Moravian Brethren.
PREROGATIVE, in law, an exclusive privilege of the Crown.
The word, originally an adjective, is derived from the centuria
praerogativa, or century which voted first on a proposed law
(rogatio) in the Roman comitia centuriata. In English law,
Blackstone says, “ by the word prerogative we are to understand
the character and power which the sovereign hath over and
above all other persons, in right of his regal dignity; and which,
though part of the common law of the country, is out of its
ordinary course. This is expressed in its very name, for it
signifies, in its etymology, something that is required or demanded
before, or in preference to, all others ” (Stephen's Comm. vol. ii.
bk. iv. pt. i. ch. vi.). The prerogative is sometimes called jura
regalia or regalia, the regalia being either majora, the regal
dignity and power, or minora, the revenue of the Crown.
The theory of English law as to the prerogative of the king seems to be not quite consistent. On the one hand, he is a perfect and irresponsible being, holding his ollice by divine right; George V., “by the Grace of God of Great Britain and Ireland King,”[1] is still the heading of every writ. On the other hand, his powers are defined and limited by law. This is laid down as early as the 13th century (Bracton, 5b). A consequence of this position is that the prerogative may be confined or extended by the supreme legislative authority, and that the courts have jurisdiction to decide whether or not any alleged right falls within the prerogative. The prerogative of the Crown, still of great extent, has been gradually limited by a long series of enactments, the most worthy of notice being Magna carta, Confirmatio cartarum, Prerogativa regis, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement. The most important of the obsolete prerogatives which have been at one time claimed and exercised are the following: (1) the right to impose a tax upon the subject without the consent of parliament. (2) The right to dispense with the obligation of statutes, by the insertion in a grant of the clause non obstante statuta (see Dispensation). (3) The right of purveyance and pre-emption—that is, of buying up provisions at a valuation without the consent of the owner—and the right of impressing carriages and horses (see Purveyance). (4) The authority to erect tribunals not proceeding according to the ordinary course of justice was declared illegal by 16 Car. I. c. 10 (the act dissolving the Star Chamber, the court of the marches of Wales, and the court of the president and council of the north). (5) The revenue from first-fruits and tenths (see Annates). (6) The right of corody—that is, of sending one of the royal chaplains to be maintained by a bishop until the bishop promotes him to a benence-has become obsolete by disuse. (7) The right by forfeiture to the property of a convict upon his conviction for treason or felony was abolished by the Felony Act 1870. (8) The immunity of the Crown from payment of costs has been taken away in almost all cases. (9) The right to alienate crown lands by grant at pleasure was taken away by 1 Anne c. 8. In very few cases has the prerogative been extended by statute; the Regulation of the Forces Act was an example of such extension. By that act the jurisdiction of lords-lieutenant of counties over the auxiliary forces was revested in the Crown.
The prerogative may be exercised in person or by delegation. The prerogative of conferring honours is generally (though not necessarily) exercised by the king in person, as in the case of investment with knighthood and military or civil decorations. The delegation of the prerogative often takes place by commission, issued with or without a joint address from both houses of parliament. Parts of the prerogative-generally in the nature of profit, and so in derogation of the revenue of the Crown—may be conferred upon subjects by grant in letters patent, which will be presumed after enjoyment by the subject for a certain time. What in the king is a prerogative becomes a franchise in the subject, e.g. chases, warrens, wrecks, treasure-trove, courts-leet. The existing prerogatives may be divided, with Blackstone, into such as are direct and such as are by way of exception; or perhaps better, with Chief Baron Comyns, into those affecting external relations and those affecting internal relations. Under the first class would fall the power of making war and concluding peace. As incidents to this power the king has the right of sending and receiving ambassadors, of concluding treaties, and of granting passports, safe-conducts, letters of marque and reprisals. These rights may be limited by international agreement; thus the Declaration of Paris, 1856, abolished privateering as far as the assenting nations (of whom Great Britain was one) were concerned. The prerogatives affecting internal relations may be conveniently, if not scientifically, classified as personal, political, judicial, ecclesiastical and fiscal.
Personal.—In order that there may always be an existing head of the state the king is regarded as a corporation. He cannot die; there can only be a demise of the Crown—that is, a transfer of the royal authority to a different person. On the same principle the king cannot be under age, though in cases where the king has been of tender years a protector or regent has usually been appointed for administrative purposes. The king is personally irresponsible for crime or tort, it being an ancient common law maxim that the king can do no wrong, and that any injury suffered by a subject at the hands of the king is to be attributed to the mistake of his advisers. A curious consequence of this irresponsibility is that the king is apparently the only person in the realm who cannot under any circumstances arrest a suspected felon, for no action for false imprisonment would lie against him, and in the event of the arrest of an innocent person there would be a wrong without a remedy. He cannot be guilty of laches, or negligence. The maxim of the common law is “Nullum tempus occurrit regi.” This is still the law in criminal matters. With a very few exceptions, such as prosecutions for treason and offences against the customs, no lapse of time will in England (though it is otherwise in Scotland) bar the right of the Crown to prosecute. The king is exempt from taxation on the ground that, as the revenue of the realm is his prerogative, it is useless for him to tax himself. But lands purchased by the privy purse are liable to taxation (39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 88, s. 6). He is also exempt from tolls (which can only exist as a franchise granted by him), and from the poor-rate, as he is not mentioned in the Poor Law Acts. His person cannot be arrested or his goods dis trained or taken in execution. The privilege of exemption from taxation applies to his palaces and to the public buildings of the state. No kind of judicial process can be executed in a palace as long as it continues to be a royal residence. The privilege does not attach to palaces which the king has ceased to use as a dwelling, such as Hampton Court. The king has also several personal privileges of minor importance, such as the title of “majesty,” the right to a royal salute, to the use of the royal standard and of special liveries, &c.
Political.—The king is the supreme executive and co-ordinate legislative authority. As such authority he has the attribute of sovereignty[2] or pre-eminence, and the right to the allegiance of his subjects. All land is mediately or immediately held of him. Land derelict suddenly by the sea, land newly discovered by subjects and islands arising in the sea are his. As paramount authority in parliament he can dissolve or prorogue it at pleasure, but cannot
prolong it beyond seven years. In theory parliament only exists at his will, for it is summoned by his writ, and the vote for a member of parliament is only a franchise, not a right existing independently of his grant. He can refuse his assent to a bill passed by the houses of parliament.” This right has, however, not been exercised since 1707, when Queen Anne refused the royal assent to a Scottish Militia Bill. The king has power to issue proclamations and (with the assent of the privy council) orders in council, in some cases as part of the ancient prerogative, in others under the provisions of an act of parliament. Proclamations are only binding so far as they are founded upon and enforce the laws of the realm. They cannot alter the common law or create a new offence. The king is the fountain of honour; as such he has the valuable power of granting peerages at will, so far as he is not restrained by any act of parliament, and so far as he keeps within certain constitutional limits, e.g. he cannot insert a shifting clause in a patent of peerage. He also confers all other titles of honour, whether hereditary or not, and grants precedence and armorial bearings. The great officers of state are appointed by the king. The only restriction upon the creation of offices is that he cannot create new offices with new fees attached to them, or annex new fees to old offices, for this would be to impose a tax upon the subject without an act
- ↑ There is no difference in the prerogative as exercised by a king or a queen regnant, so that the word “king” in its constitutional sense includes queen. That the queen regnant has the same rights as a king was declared by 1 Mary sess. 3, c. 1.
- ↑ The word “sovereign” is frequently applied to the king in legal works. It should be borne in mind at the same time that the king is not a sovereign in the strict sense in which the term is used by Austin.
