the rest of the line severe local fighting had continued, but the Russian positions were quite unshaken, and Kuropatkin's reserves—which would have been invaluable in backing up the counter-attack of the 2nd of March—had returned to face Nogi. He had organized another counter stroke for the 6th, to be led by Kaulbars, but this collapsed unexpectedly after a brief but severe fight.
Kuropatkin now decided to draw in his centre and left towards Mukden. On the 7th, the various columns executed their movement to the Hun-ho with complete success, thanks to good staff work. The Japanese followed up only slowly. Nogi and Kaulbars stood fast, facing each other on the west front; after the arrival of the general reserve, Nogi was able to prolong his line to the north and eventually to bend it inwards towards the Russian line of retreat. Bilderling and Linievich were now close in to Mukden and along the Hun-ho. On the other side Oku had taken over part of Nogi's line, thus freeing the 3rd Army for further extension to the north-west, and the rest of the 2nd Army, the 4th, the 1st and the 5th were approaching the Hun-ho from the south (March 8th). On this day the Russian retreat on Tieling. fighting between Nogi and Kaulbars was very severe, and Kuropatkin now made up his mind to retreat towards Tieling. On the 9th, by Oyama's orders, Nogi extended northward instead of further swinging in south-eastward, Oku now occupied all the original line of the 3rd Army, Nozu alone was left on the south front, and Kuroki and Kawamura began to engage Linievich seriously. But Nogi had not yet reached the Mukden-Tieling railway when, on the night of the 9th, every preparation having been made, Kuropatkin's retreat began. On the 10th, covered by Kaulbars, who held off Nogi, and by strong rearguards at and east of Mukden, the movement continued, and though it was not executed with entire precision, and the rearguards suffered very heavily, the Russians managed to draw off in safety to the northward. On the evening of the 10th, after all their long and hardly contested enveloping marches, Nogi's left and Kawamura's right met north of Mukden. The circle was complete, but there were no Russians in the centre, and a map of the positions of the Japanese on the evening of the 10th shows the seventeen divisions thoroughly mixed up and pointing in every direction but that of the enemy. Thus the further pursuit of the Russians could only be undertaken after an interval of re-organization by the northernmost troops of the 5th and 3rd Armies. But the material loss inflicted on the Russians was far heavier than it had ever been before. It is generally estimated that the Russian losses were no less than 97,000, and the Japanese between 40,000 and 50,000. Japan had had to put forth her supreme effort for the battle, while of Russia's whole strength not one-tenth had been used. But Russia's strength in Europe, with but one line whereby it could be brought to bear in the Far East, was immaterial, and on the theatre of war a quarter of the Russian field forces had been killed, wounded or taken.
It remains to narrate briefly the tragic career of the Russian Baltic fleet. Leaving Libau on the 13th-15th of October 1904, the Rozhestvenski's voyage. fleet steamed down the North Sea, expecting every night to be attacked by torpedo-boats. On the 21st, in their excitement, they opened fire on a fleet of British trawlers on the Dogger Bank (q.v.), and several fishermen were killed. This incident provoked the wildest indignation, and Russia was for some days on the verge of war with England. A British fleet “shadowed” Rozhestvenski for some time, but eventually the Russians were allowed to proceed. On reaching Madagascar, Rozhestvenski heard of the fail of Port Arthur, and the question of returning to Russia arose. But a reinforcement under Rear-Admiral Nebogatov was dispatched from the Baltic via Suez early in March 1905, and the armada proceeded by the Straits of Malacca, Nebogatov joining at Kamranh Bay in Cochin China. The united fleet was formidable rather in number than in quality; the battleships were of very unequal value, and the faster vessels were tied to the movements of many “lame ducks.” Rozhestvenski had, moreover, numerous store-ships, colliers, &c. Nevertheless, the Japanese viewed his approach with considerable anxiety, and braced themselves for a final struggle. Of the various courses open to him, Togo prudently chose that of awaiting Rozhestvenski in home waters. The Russians left Kamranh on the 14th of May, and for a time disappeared into the Pacific. It was assumed that they were making for Vladivostok either via Tsushima strait or by the Pacific. Rozhestvenski chose the former course, and on the 27th of Battle of Tsushima (Sea of Japan). May the fleets met near Tsushima. About 1.45 p.m., the Russians, who were still in a close cruising formation, attempted to open out for battle as the Japanese approached. The Russian battleships, originally heading N.N.E., swerved to the E. as the Japanese battle squadron passed across their front. Togo's fire was concentrated first on the “Osliabia,” the leading Russian battleship, and by 2.25 she was hors de combat. At this time both the battle-fleets were running E. Togo, concentrating his fire on each ship in succession, and seeking by superior speed to head off the Russians, now inclined towards the S.E., and the Russians conformed. At 3, the Russian flagship “Suvarov” had fallen out of the line, though still firing. Rozhestvenski himself had been wounded, and the command had devolved on Nebogatov. Shortly afterwards the Russians suddenly turned N., and sought to pass, across the wake of Togo's battle-fleet, up the straits. Thereupon the leading Japanese ships promptly turned together, covered by the rear ships, which ran past them on the original course and then came round in succession; this manœuvre was so well executed that the Japanese again headed off their enemy, who swerved for the second time towards the E. The Japanese thereupon executed the same manœuvre as before, and steamed S.E. again (about 4.40). They were not unscathed, but the Russians were suffering far more severely. Meanwhile, the cruisers on both sides had been heavily engaged. The Russian cruisers kept on the right of their battleships, while the Japanese, very superior in speed, ran S., S.E. and E. across the rear of the enemy's main squadron, and about 3 ranged up alongside the Russian cruisers. The latter were slower, and hampered by the crowd of damaged battleships, store-ships and colliers; before 5 they were in the greatest confusion, which was presently increased by the battleship squadron, now turned back and heading W., with Togo in pursuit. The Russians again broke out northward; but some of the Japanese squadrons hung on to the remnant of the enemy's battle-fleet, and the others dealt with the numerous Russian vessels that were unable to keep up. Then Togo called off his ships, and gave the torpedo craft room and the night in which to act. At daylight the larger ships joined in again, and before long the whole Russian fleet, with few exceptions, had been captured or sunk.
After the disasters of Mukden and Tsushima, and being threatened with internal disorder in European Russia, the tsar, The Peace of Portsmouth. early in June, accepted the mediation of the president of the United States, and pourparlers were set on foot. The war meanwhile drifted on through May, June and July. Linievich, who succeeded Kuropatkin shortly after the battle of Mukden, retired slowly northward, re-organizing his forces and receiving fresh reinforcements from Europe. A Japanese expedition occupied Saghalien (July 8-30), and another, General Hasegawa, advanced through Korea towards Vladivostok. But the fighting was desultory. The peace negotiations were opened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on the 9th of August, and by the end of the month the belligerents had agreed as to the main points at issue, that Russia should cede the half of Saghalien, annexed in 1875, surrender her lease of the Kwangtung peninsula and Port Arthur, evacuate Manchuria and recognize Japan's sphere of influence in Korea. The treaty of peace was signed on the 23rd of August 1905.
Bibliography.—The first place in the already numerous works on the war is by the general consent of military Europe awarded to General Sir I. S. M. Hamilton's A Staff Officer's Scrap Book, and the second to the reports of the British attachés (The Russo-Japanese War: British Officers' Reports, War Office, 1908). Other firsthand narratives of importance are the American officers' reports (Reports of Military Observers, General Staff, U.S.A.); Major v. Tettau's 18 Monate beim Heere Russlands; von Schwarz, Zehn Monate beim Heere Kuropatkins, and Kuropatkin's own work (part of which has been translated into English). Of detailed military histories the principal are the semi-official series of narratives and monographs produced by the Austrian military journal “Streffleur” (Einzelschriften über den russ.-japanischen Krieg); the volumes of lectures delivered at the Russian Staff College after the war, French translation (Conférences sur la guerre russo-japonaise faites à l'Academie Nicolas); British official History of the Russo-Japanese War (1907-); German official Russisch-japanischer Krieg (1906-; English translation by K. von Donat); Löffler, Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg (Leipzig, 1907; French trans.); L. Gianni Trapani, La Guerra russo-giapponese (Rome, 1908); E. Bujac, La Guerre russo-japonaise (1909). Of critical studies the most important are Cordonnier's “Les japonais en Mandchourie” (Revue d'Infanterie, 1910); and Culmann, Étude sur les caractères généraux de la guerre en extrème-orient (Paris, 1909). One naval narrative of absorbing interest has, however, appeared, Semenov's Rasplata (English trans.).
