menace threatened the army more and more as the days went
on. For a fortnight past the " Race to the Sea " had been in
progress in France. Each side, hoping to envelop the outer flank
of the other or seeking to protect its own flank from the same
fate, was being led by a series of parallel and practically
synchronous efforts to displace the centre of gravity and the
decisive point of the campaign towards the sea. Thus by the end
of Sept. the battle-front had been extended from the Oise to
Arras and Bethune, and fresh German masses were traversing
Belgium in a westerly direction.
The real peril to which the Belgian army was exposed lay in the possible failure of the Allied left to gain on the enemy's right and join up with the Belgians on the Scheldt. Yet this junction must be effected at all costs, even if the fortress had to be abandoned in order to get into contact with the Allies.
The King was strongly in favour, however, of holding the fortress until the last extremity, in order to bind the troops and material now concentrated before it, and also to gain the maxi- mum of time for the formation of a Franco-British-Belgian front on the Scheldt and the Dendre the natural rampart of the coast, the Straits and England. To prevent the Germans from reaching the coast would be an inestimable service rendered to the Allies, and the King was determined not to relinquish the idea save in the last resort. Every day gained at Antwerp meant a French port saved to-day Boulogne, the next day Calais, the next Dunkirk and the withholding from the Germans of the Straits of Dover, the most important maritime artery in the world.
Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, fully realized the capital role which the fortress might play in the war. With great foresight and initiative he had drawn the attention of the British War Office to the strategic importance of Antwerp in the beginning of September. In the first days of Oct. he came in person to the besieged fortress to take stock of the situation. The Belgian Command gave him a frank state- ment of its intentions, and King Albert informed him personally of the role he proposed for the Belgian army on the extreme left wing of the Allied front. Being entirely in agreement, Mr. Churchill returned in all haste to London to push forward the immediate dispatch of all the troops the French and English Governments could spare to Antwerp and Ghent. It was ur- gently necessary (i) to guarantee the effective union of the Belgian army with the general Allied front and (2) to bring about this union on a level with Antwerp, or, failing this, on a line as far east as possible with its left resting on the Dutch frontier or the coast, so that the enemy could in no case seize and envelop the Allies' extreme left wing.
Given the double aim which the King had in view, that of holding Antwerp as long as possible and not allowing himself under any circumstances to be cut off from the Allies, there was no time to be lost in transferring the main base of supplies from Antwerp to Ostend, whence the army could carry out its subsequent operations in concert with the Allies. The transport of materials and supplies and the evacuation of the manu- facture and storage establishments, of the wounded, the prisoners and the recruits therefore commenced on Oct. i. Although the only through railway connexion between the E. and W. banks of the Scheldt was that by way of Willebroeck, Puers and Tamise railway bridge, within range of the enemy's guns, the trains followed one another night after night, with all lights out, until Oct. 7 without attracting attention. West of the Scheldt the evacuation transports and convoys were protected by the 4th Div. round Termonde, and the Cavalry Div. round Wetteren. 1
1 A first attempt on Termonde had been made on Sept. 26 by the 37th Landwehr Bde. advancing from Alost down the left bank of the Dendre. Not only had this been hung up at Gyseghem, half-way, but Alost itself ,in its absence had fallen to an attack by Belgian forces from Wetteren. The 27th and 28th were taken up in recapturing Alost, which was thenceforward held, though the garrison was " constantly and severely worried by cavalry, cyclists, armoured cars and armoured trains " in the words of the German account. A detachment of the.brigade was sent up to watch the S. side of Ter- monde, .and one from the 4th Ers. Div. was similarly posted (not
British Assistance. The immediate result of Mr. Churchill's personal intervention was the arrival at Antwerp, on the evening of Oct. 3, of a brigade of 2,000 men of the British Royal Naval Division. The apparition, at dawn on the 4th, of these the first Allies the Belgian soldiers had set eyes on during the two months of the war aroused a wholesome enthusiasm among the dis- pirited defence troops. Unhappily, this assistance could be no more than a moral stimulus for a fresh burst of energy.
Meanwhile, the German infantry E. of the Senne advanced steadily as near to the Nethe line as the Belgian fire permitted, while the medium and heavy artillery moved up to new posi- tions, and the super-heavy batteries, freed by the fall of all works between Waelhem and Fort Lierre inclusive, got into place to attack Fort Breendonck on the left flank and Fort Kessel on the right three German 30-5 batteries W. of Hom- beek engaging the former, and the Austrian 3O-5's at Heykant and one 42-cm. battery 2 at Isschot the latter. On the 4th the six pieces concentrated upon Fort Kessel at ranges of 9,000-9,300 yd. quickly finished their work, the place being ruined and evacuated just before midday. It was not until the 6th, however, that fire was seriously directed upon Fort Breendonck.
Gen. von Beseler's original scheme was that each unit on the III. Res. Corps front should strive on its own account and at its own time to obtain a foothold beyond the Nethe, while the Marine Div. remained echeloned back on the left, and the 26th Landwehr Bde. advanced on the right as close to Fort Kessel as possible. The fire directed upon the half-exposed left of the sth Res. Div., however, soon made it necessary that the right of the Marine Div. should also attempt to advance. In this it was unsuccessful, and during the 4th the whole of the 5th Res. Div. and part of the 6th could do no more than approach the water-line.
On the right of the 6th Res. Div., on the contrary, a bold advance carried the Germans into Lierre, and there began in that town a prolonged and fierce struggle, the British Marine Bde. deployed along the Little Nethe and the 5th Belgian Div. on the Nethe between Lierre (excl.) and Hit Ven (excl.) com- pletely holding up both the right of the 6th Res. Div. and those troops of the 26th Landwehr Bde. which, on the fall of Fort Kessel, had pushed up to Klosterheyde.
On the evening of Oct. 5 the German force in Lierre was still pinned down by the fire of the Marine Bde. Further south, under cover of a very heavy bombardment, they had succeeded in crossing the river, but were held a short distance beyond it, along the road from Hit Ven to Lierre, with only precarious com- munications behind them.
On Oct. 6 at dawn the 5th Div. tried, by a general counter- attack, to throw the enemy back to the S. of the Nethe. But with the whole mass of the German artillery free to cover its infantry the counter-attack was foredoomed. The Belgian guns vig- orously supported it, and a determined attack near Ringenhof. was for a moment successful and produced a crisis in the German line. But no more could be done. The assistance of Fort Broechem was at an end, since on this day it was taken under fire by the 42-cms. and the Austrian 3O-5-cms. which had ruined Fort Kessel and then advanced to their third positions at Vythoek and Koningshoyckt respectively. More and more German infantry was, by one means or another, got across the Nethe, and the debris of the ist, 2nd and sth Divs. and the English Marine Bde. fell back little by little in the afternoon
without fighting) at Baesrode. The whole force on the left was placed under the 4th Ers. Div. staff, but until the arrival of further troops from the governor-general's forces (ist Res. Ers. Bde.) nothing could be done. On Oct. 4 the arrival of these troops, behind which the 1st Bav. Lw. Bde. was also coming up, released the 37th Lw. Bde. from Alost, and an advance was made by this brigade to Schoonarde on the Scheldt, with a view to forcing the passage there and reaching Termonde from the rear. On the 4th, 5th and 6th, however, attempts to do so were repulsed by the defenders, and throughout the critical days the Germans were unable to interfere with movements in the Lokeren region. (C. F. A.)
2 The 42-cm. battery which had attacked Forts Wavre Ste. Catherine and Koningshoyckt was a railway battery, and had to remain inactive for the time being. (C. F. A.)
