ments (of 6 guns each). The remainder of the cavalry was to be allotted to the infantry, as divisional cavalry. The foot artillery had been, or was on mobilization, brought to a strength of 25 regiments, out of which came on mobilization a " battalion " of four heavy field batteries per army corps, and also mobile siege trains of considerable strength, the remainder being fortress and coast artillery. For the mobile defence of fortresses there had also been created 16 fortress machine-gun detachments of 6 guns each. The pioneers (engineers) had a strength in 1914 of 32 battalions. Other technical formations are here ignored, owing to considerations of space, but it should be remarked that the most recent laws, those of 1912 and 1913, had provided for considerable expansions in these branches.
One other category of combatant troops remains to be noted, the Jagers (light infantry). In all, 18 Jager battalions were in existence, some of them specialized to mountain warfare and the remainder (provided with a cyclist company each) to cooperation with the cavalry divisions.
Strength and Recruiting. Although service was universal and obligatory in principle, yet in practice the growth of military establishments had naturally not kept pace with the growth of population, and quite half of the able-bodied males of military age had received no military training whatsoever.
The liabilities of the German citizen to military service are shown in Table B. 1
With a growing population, and with the competition of the navy for available funds, it was inevitable that there should be this divergence between the theory and the practice of universal service. The reductio ad absurdum was reached when, with a population more numerous than that of France in the ratio of seven to four, and in a period of feverish war preparation through- out Europe, Germany was not able to maintain as many soldiers under arms as France. This was the case from 1913 onwards, and it was due primarily to the expenses of the competition in naval armaments. Within the army itself there was no remedy, short of reducing the term of service, and all political and military tradition and influences combined to make this impossible. It was for the court and militarists in Germany an article of faith that the " barrack-army " was the blind instrument of govern- ment to be used against external or internal foes. This theory presupposes a discipline like in kind to that of a professional army; the civic characters inseparable from a nation in arms, however highly trained, were obstacles to that discipline, and any move towards converting the army into a citizen force was anathema, even in the year in which the centenary of 1813 was celebrated in a fever of national pride. Yet in Germany, as
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17 to ist muster Lsm. I.
Men selected at 1st muster for infantry < do. for cavalry
TABLE B. Liability to Service. 22-27! :
Reserve
20-23
, Active
23-27! Reserve
22-24
Active
22-25
A ctive
Men put back twice and selected at / 20-22 3rd muster for infantry . \ Lsm. I.
do. for cavalry f 20-22
\ Lsm. I.
Men allotted to trained Ersatz reserve ) 20-32! _.. at 1st muster \ Ers. Res. Lwhr. II.
Men allotted to untrained Ersatz re- / 20-22 22-32! serve at 3rd muster . \ Lsm. I. Ers. Res.
Men finally assigned to Landsturm I. / 20-22 22-38! at 3rd muster \ Lsm. I. Lsm. I.
Lwhr. I.
Lwhr. I.
24-29! Reserve
25-29! Reserve
Lsm. I.
Lwhr. II. Lwhr. II. Lwhr. I. Lwhr. I.
341-38! Lwhr. II.
Lwhr. II.
381-45 Lsm. II.
It will be noted that the Landwehr is exclusively a force of trained men, and Landsturm I. consists wholly of untrained men. The Ersatz reserve, originally intended to produce part- trained drafts for the active army and always legally on that basis was in practice a category into which the physically fittest of the men excused from training were put, the remainder going into (or rather staying in) Landsturm I.
Table C gives statistics for recruiting in 1911 and 1912 (the outbreak of war prevented those of 1913 from being pub- lished) showing the practical application of the system.
TABLE C. Recruiting, 1911-2. (All figures include navy as well as army.) Muster: 191*
Men of 20, first appearance .... 563,024 Men of 21, second appearance . . . 367,688 Men of 22, third appearance . . . 289,089
Older special cases 51,574
1.271,384
70/2
557,6o8
385,163
294,825
52,272
Disposal:
(a) Struck off " Excluded " nently unfit '
(criminals, etc.), " perma-
826
1,289,868 916
35,500 36,326
(6) Put back to following year (aged 20 and 2I 2 )
(c) Assigned to active service. Voluntarily enlisted (not including volunteers below
muster age) 39.53 1
Levied 3 ........ 223,925
263,456
(d) Definitely assigned to inactive categories
Ersatz reserve 4 94, 73 2
Landsturm I. 4 142,307
237,039 Total o(a,T>,c,d 1,271,384
40,413 239.717 280,130
90,207
137,922
228,129
1,289,868
elsewhere, a few realized that the prevalent competition in peace strengths was leading nowhere, and that a great European war would be won or lost by nations and not by selected and specialized percentages of nations. Schlieffen, the ablest soldier Germany had produced for 50 years, was one of these. Instead of 50 high- quality divisions, followed after an interval by garrison forma- tions, he proposed to defeat France by the immediate bringing into line of more than 100 divisions in which active and reserve elements were intimately mingled.
As this view, though opposed to the prevailing opinion, proved to be correct, it is unnecessary here to discuss the last stages of competition in peace preparedness before war came in 1914. It is, however, important to note that reservists were called up for refresher trainings in increasing numbers, and that a proportion of the professional officer cadre was set aside for the command of reserve formations in war. Still, these two facts did not indicate with certainty that reserve formations were to appear along with the active, on the first battle-fields. In France, similar measures were taken without any such implication.
When, therefore, the German masses poured through Belgium in Aug. 1914, precious time elapsed before the French G.O.C. became aware that with nearly every identified active corps on the wheeling wing of their opponents was a duplicate reserve corps. The surprise was great, for though it was a matter of
1 The retention of men in the reserve and other categories for an additional half-year was meant to provide for the event of mobiliza- tion between Oct. and March, in which months the youngest class with the colours was still too little trained to mobilize with the rest.
2 At a man's third appearance his case was bound to be disposed of definitely.
3 Of whom roughly half, each year, were of the 2o-year-old class mustered for the first time.
4 By far the greater number in these categories had been put back twice.
