TABLE D. Distribution of Divisions.
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Western Theatre.
Eastern Theatre.
Other Theatres.
Total divisions or equiva- lents.
1914
Aug. begin .
97
26
.
123
Aug. end
93
30
123
Sept. "
93
3
.
123
Oct. " . .
1 06
32
138
Nov. "
104
34
.
138
Dec. " . .
98
40
.
138
1915
Jan. end
IOI
46
,
147
Feb. "
99
48
H7
March "
IOI
53
154
April
i5
56
161
May
1 06
64
I (Ital.)
171
June
1 06
64
I
171
July . . .
i5
65
I
171
Aug.
104
67
I "
172
Sept. .
107
56
8 (Balk.)
172
Oct.
114
47
II
172
Nov. .
117
46
9
172
Dec. .
1 18
47
7 "
172
1916
Jan.
118
47
7 "
172
Feb. .
121
47
4
172
March .
123
46
3 "
172
April
124
45
3
172
May
125
45
2
172
June
122
49
2
173
July . . .
123
52
2
177
Aug.
119
62
2 "
183
Sept. .
128
68
2 "
198
Oct. . . .
128
75
2 "
205
Nov.
130
73
2 "
205
Dec.
135
72
2 "
209
1917
Jan.
139
71
3 "
213 .
Feb. .
144
68
3
215
March .
151
72
3
226
April
156
72
3
231
May
155
75
3
233
June
155
78
3
236
July . . .
148
85
3
236
Aug.
147
86
3
236
Sept. .
149
82
3 (Balk.) 3 dtal.)
237
Oct.
147
81
3 (Balk.) 7 dtal.)
238
Nov.
153
74
3 (Balk.) 8 (Ital.)
238
Dec.
1 68
61
3 (Balk.) 6 (Ital.)
238
1918 Jan.
174
57
/ 3 (Balk.) \ 14 (Ital.) /
238
Feb.
185
49
J3 (Balk.)l 1 i (Ital.) /
238
March .
197
39
2 (Balk.)
238
April
202
34
I "
237
May
208
32
240
Otherwise, the equipment and organization of all the divisions assembled in France in March 1918 was the same: three infan- try regiments, each regiment with its three battalions, three machine-gun companies, and three light Minenwerfer detach- ments, the whole under an infantry brigade staff ; one field artillery regiment of two groups guns and one group howitzers (in all nine batteries), which (with sector artillery or reenforcing artillery) was under the divisional artillery staff; (one M.G. Sharpshooter detachment of 36 M.G.); three heavy and medium Minenwerfer batteries which, a little later, were reformed, with the light M.W. units, as infantry regimental companies. In the case of attack divisions, a group of three batteries of medium artillery was included organically and up to 40 or 45 army batteries at- tached for the purposes of a particular battle. In one respect only was material preparation wanting. Tanks were not looked upon with favour, only a few units being constituted.
All cavalry divisions in the W. were dismounted and acting as infantry in quiet parts of the line. They were in process of reconstitution as infantry under the name of Schutzen.
The divisions in line were under corps staffs which though long fixed in sector still retained the old numbers they had had in the open warfare of 1914-5, with a district or personal designa- tion (e.g. Gruppe Lille, Gruppe Conta) as well. Certain corps staffs numbered above 50, which had neither troops nor home regions of their own, had been created in 1915-6 as reserve head- quarters available for the control of particular operations. The corps or " group " were allotted to armies which from right to left (2 m. to Switzerland) were as follows: IV. (Flanders), VI. (Artois), XVII. (Artois), II. (Picardy), XVIII. (N. of Oise), VII. (S. of Oise), I. (Reims), III. (Champagne), V. (Verdun); and thence to the Swiss border a series of army groups (small armies) known as C., XIX. Army, A., B.
These armies were grouped in groups of armies (Heeres- gruppen) known by the names of their commanders Prince Rupprecht (IV., VI., XVII., II.), German Crown Prince (XVIII., VII., I., III.), Gallwitz (V., C.), Duke Albrecht (XIX., A., B.). During Aug. 1918 a Heeresgruppe Boehn was created, between Rupprecht and the German Crown Prince, comprising the XVIII., the IX. (staff brought over from Russia) and the VII., but did not last long. The XVIII. Army was then assigned to Rupprecht and the IX. staff was withdrawn, and the VII. re- turned to the German Crown Prince's group of armies.
Some 40 divisions remained on the eastern front to overawe the Soviet Government to " prevent the formation of an Anglo- Bolshevik front," and to occupy the corn lands of S. Russia. These were gradually " milked " of their best elements, and had a reduced artillery strength.
At this date (end of March 1918) the ration strength of the whole German army had increased to 7,917,1 70. The losses of the period April r 1917 to March 31 1918 which must include some at any rate of the casualties of the " Michael " offensive had been 257,748 killed, 37,004 died of disease, 138,070 missing, 679,777 wounded; and the " definitive " losses may be taken at 650,000. Comparison of these figures with those for 1916-7 gives a measure of the relief which was afforded to Germany by the success of her defence and the breakdown of the Entente's 1917 offensive. Only about 900,000 recruits had to be found instead of 1,600,000 as in 1916-7. Recruiting policy was accord- ingly less desperate. The 1919 class was called to the colours without haste though still two years in advance of the proper time trained carefully, and acclimatized to war conditions on the quiet Russian front, in the winter of 1917-8. It was regarded by Ludendorff collectively as the means of replacing the casual- ties to be expected in his great offensive. A great effort was made by drastic combing-out of industries not only to obtain comba- tants but also substitutes for every battle-fit man who was still serving in rear areas and on quiet fronts. Even the Alsatians and Lorrainers, hitherto employed almost exclusively on the eastern front, were to be brought over and incorporated in Rhineland units, in whose provincial patriotism it was thought that the Alsatians and Lorrainers might be brought to share. This was only an extension of a practice which had already been begun in 1916 of re-sorting the personnel of units according to their province of origin, as in the pre-war army.
The moral of the army was still good. In spite of war-weari- ness, it was felt that in one last effort peace could be won. For the first time the Germans enjoyed a numerical superiority and leisure for thorough battle training. If at home discontent was ready to break out in revolt, the effects were not at that period felt at the front, owing to an industrious propaganda, assiduous " welfare work," and largely to the disappearance of peace-time social barriers between men and officers the latter, indeed, being now for the most part either commissioned or made acting officers from the ranks.
The offensive of March 1918 was launched, and was successful, but at heavy cost, and it did not win the war. Others followed it, always with the same result. By the end of April the 1919 class was largely absorbed, and preparations were being made for the call-up of the 1920 class. By the end of July 1919 men were practically exhausted, and the now incessant battle casual- ties had to be made good by returned wounded. Meantime
