To the I. Corps also Sept. 26 had brought disappointment.
Shortly before midnight (Sept. 25-26) a German attack broke
through at the junction between the 7th and 9th Divs. and penetrated into the quarries, which passed back into German hands,
the left of the 7th Div. recoiling to the old German support
trenches. On its right the 7th Div. maintained all but its most
advanced positions, and linked up with the 1st in front of Hulluch, but two attempts to recover the quarries failed. At
Fosse 8 the 73rd Bde. of the 24th Div. (which had relieved the
26th Bde.) had great difficulty in holding its ground against
counter-attacks. Fosse Alley, however, the intermediate line
between the front system and Haisnes, which had been evacuated when the quarries were lost, was reoccupied and held by
the 27th Bde., and the Germans had to pay highly for such
ground as they regained. But they had now brought up several
fresh divisions, and pressed their attacks hard, especially against
the inexperienced 73rd Brigade. Before midday on Sept. 27
these troops, short of ammunition, food and water, and quite
unable to reply effectively to the German bombers, were driven
out of their positions. A dashing advance by the remnants of
the 26th Bde. prevented the loss of the Hohenzollern, which had
seemed imminent, but the recapture of Fosse 8 and the dump
made Fosse Alley untenable and compelled its evacuation.
Against the 7th Div., however, the Germans were less successful,
and Sept. 27 saw the right of the position of the I. Corps fairly
satisfactorily consolidated.
While the I. Corps had been defending its gains, the IV. had been striving to make more. During the night of Sept. 26-27 the Guards Div. had relieve ' the 2ist and 24th opposite Hulluch and Bois Hugo. On the afternoon of the 27th its 2nd Bde. attacked Bois Hugo and Puits 14 bis, while its 3rd advanced through Loos against Hill 70. Both attacks were splendidly pressed and achieved valuable gains. Chalk Pit Wood was reached and secured, though Puits 14 bis could not be held against heavy counter-attacks, and a line was established just W. of the La Bassee road to link up with the ist Div. opposite Hulluch. Similarly the 3rd Guards Bde. put Loos out of danger of recapture by making good a line just below the crest of Hill 70.
By the evening of Sept. 27 all hopes of a speedy and decisive success were gone. No break-through had been achieved, and Gen. Foch's attack also had been checked. Still the vigour with which the Germans hurled counter-attack after counter-attack at the positions taken from them testified to the value they attached to them. The fighting was fiercest round the Hohenzollern Redoubt, which the 28th Div. took over from the 9th on Sept. 28 and held under considerable difficulties till Oct. 3, when a specially violent attack drove them from its ruins, though even then they retained a substantial portion of the 9th Div.'s gains of Sept. 25. On Oct. 5 the Guards relieved the 28th Div., and during the next week made several minor gains by bombing-attacks. Fighting was also heavy without producing any marked change in the tactical situation round the quarries on the frontage held in succession by the 7th, 2nd and 12th Divisions. From the Vermelles-Hulluch road to Loos the Germans were less aggressive, their only serious effort on this front being on Oct. 8, when they attacked in great force, only to be repulsed with very heavy losses especially by the 1st Div. at Chalk Pit Wood and by the French, who had taken over Loos itself on Sept. 30.
After this repulse the Germans made no more big counter- attacks. By recovering the dump and Fosse 8 they had won back observation posts which overlooked much of the salient which the battle had produced. Sir John French was naturally loth to abandon the effort to recover them, and decided to bring up the 46th (North Midland) Div. for a fresh attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt, while simultaneously the I2th and 1st Divs. should attack the quarries and Hulluch. The attack, delivered on Oct. 13, was only partially successful, but did result after heavy fighting in. the recovery and retention of the bulk of the redoubt. The 12th Div. failed to retake the quarries, but made useful gains which improved its line. The 1st Div., however, once again found Hulluch too much for it, so that the net result of the attack did not encourage a repetition, and with this major operations in the battle area ended. The French continued attacking in Champagne for some weeks, though even there all prospect of decisive success was gone, while in Artois they had already abandoned their offensive.
When the results of the British offensive are set against the high hopes entertained before the attack it is excusable to write it down as a failure. The gain of ground was not worth the 50 to 60 thousand casualties incurred in its capture, but the German losses on the British front were almost as heavy, and the capture of over 20 guns and 3,000 prisoners was no small encouragement. It had been shown that the Germans could be driven from positions they believed impregnable. Moreover, valuable experience had been gained not only in the use of the new weapon, gas, but in staff work, in administrative arrangements and in tactics, experience to be turned to good account in 1916. At Loos an effort had been made to apply the lessons of Neuve Chapelle. It was partly because Neuve Chapelle had shown the dangers of retaining too close a hold on the immediate reserves that it had been arranged that the troops (immediate reserves included) were to press forward without limitation. Loos showed the advantages of the "limited objective" and of dealing with untaken portions of a hostile line rather by outflanking them than by renewing direct attacks; it also showed that the patterns of grenades in use in the British army were too varied and mostly unsuitable for wet weather, with other lessons major and minor. It is easy in the light of the experience gained at and after Loos to criticize the whole plan as too ambitious for the resources, human and material, at the commander-in-chief's disposal; to point out the unwisdom of employing raw troops in a great battle within a fortnight of their landing in France; to argue that, had the frontage attacked been narrower and the divisions disposed in greater depth, more immediate reserves would have been available. Still the balance remains on the side of gain. Loos inflicted heavy losses on the Germans; it was a foretaste of heavier losses in store for them. The performances of the 9th, 12th and 15th Divs. showed that the improvised " New Armies " of Britain were likely to prove a factor of decisive importance in the war.
(F) The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line, 1917. In order to follow intelligently the operations which took place during the early part of 1917 it is necessary to understand thoroughly the situation which had arisen and the general atmosphere which had been created as a result of the prolonged fighting on the Somme. In Dec. 1916 Gen. Nivelle was appointed to the chief command of the French forces. He declared great confidence in his ability to break through the enemy's defences by the delivery of a mighty blow specially prepared, and immediately disclosed his project to the British commander-in-chief, Sir Douglas Haig. The plan was briefly as follows: (a) to deliver the main attack by three French armies on the Aisne front one of these armies to be in reserve for purposes of exploitation; (b) to deliver a subsidiary attack by the British army on the Arras front; (c) to undertake minor actions between Reims and Arras to contain the enemy; (d) vigorous exploitation. In order to give effect to these proposals and to enable the French to undertake the major operations with large reserves, Gen. Nivelle's plan included the relief of French troops by the British as far S. as the Amiens-Roye road. The weakness of this plan, apart from the Russian revolution and release of German reserves, which could not be foreseen, lay in the imposition of the major task on the French armies, already exhausted by two years of heavy fighting and the strain of the defence of Verdun, while the British, at the height of their strength and vigour, instead of being trained and concentrated for a vigorous blow, were relegated to defensive work and the minor rôle. These operations were to take place as early as possible, and it was hoped that the respective attacks would be launched early in April. The Somme battles had evidently shaken the enemy seriously, and had caused his defensive front
