and with increasing intensity on the whole battle-front till a
few days before the assault when the general bombardment was
opened. During this latter period extensive gas discharges
were carried out and frequent raids undertaken by day and
night along the whole front of attack.
Aircraft were incessantly at work during the whole of this time not only in air fighting and directing the artillery fire, but also in photographing the enemy's defences so as to ascertain the extent of damage effected and the best means of approach for the infantry. Much intelligence and information was gleaned from these photographs as to the progress of the preparation, and from the raids as to the condition of the enemy, and any modifications in regard to his method of holding his defences.
The general object of the attack was to engage and absorb the maximum number of hostile troops; the general plan was to secure the high ground at Monchy-le-Preux and the Vimy ridge and to bring the V. Army into effective operation on the southern flank of the battle; the general method of attack was a succession of comparatively short and deliberate advances, the separate stages of which were arranged to correspond approximately with the enemy's successive trench systems. As each stage was reached a short pause was to take place according to a prepared time-table to enable the troops detailed for the attack on the next objective to form up for the assault.
Tanks were allotted to each corps for specific tasks, such as the capture of the powerful redoubts of Telegraph Hill and the Harp (just S. of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines) and Railway Triangle, a stronghold formed by the junction of the Lens and Douai railway lines E. of Arras. The whole scheme of attack along the entire 15-mile front was carefully coordinated. A special feature in the operation was the debouching of the troops to the assault directly from the town of Arras, the subterranean passages and caves of which had been prepared so as to harbour the reserve troops and enable them to pass protected to the trench systems, and so to the assault.
The troops engaged in the attack were as follows (from S. to N.): III. Army (Gen. Sir E. H. H. Allenby), VII. Corps (aist, 3oth, 56th, and i4th Divs.), VI. Corps (3rd, I2th, 15th, and 37th Divs.), XVII. Corps (gth, 4th, 34th, and sist Divs.), I. Army (Gen. .Sir H. S. Home), Canadian Corps, ist, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divs., and i3th Bde. (sth British Division). In all there were 17 divisions, with 989 heavy guns and 1,890 field pieces. In addition the Cavalry Corps was brought forward behind the III. Army, in case the development of the battle should give rise to an opportunity for the employment of mounted troops.
The general attack on April 9 was launched at 5:30 A.M. under cover of a heavy and effective artillery barrage; the infantry advanced everywhere, and within 40 minutes the whole of the German first line system had been stormed and captured, except at the northern extremity of the Vimy ridge. At 7:30 A.M. the advance was resumed according to programme; more severe fighting took place in view of the greater opposition encountered. Several strong points and localities were stubbornly held by the enemy, but by 12 noon the whole of these and all the second objectives with the exception of the railway triangle had fallen, from Neuville Vitasse as far N. as La Folie farm. As always happens in such a battle, the enemy's troops managed to retain certain tactical localities. Meanwhile the artillery was brought forward to support the attack on the third objectives. Owing to the long range the wire in front of the enemy's third trench system had not been effectively cut in many places; nevertheless good progress was made, and many batteries were captured.
The battle now inevitably became more ragged, owing to the increasing opposition and to the local modification of plans necessitated by the unexpected occurrences inseparable from the battlefield. South of the Scarpe, St. Martin and Feuchy Chapel on the Arras-Cambrai road were captured. In the Scarpe valley the i$th Scottish Div. after a long struggle stormed the railway triangle, and moving rapidly forward captured the village of Feuchy. The 37th Div., hitherto in reserve, whose r61e it was to pass through the first-line troops to the assault of the high ground and village of Monchy-le-Preux, endeavoured to widen the breach made in the enemy's third line of defence in order to carry out its task, but was held up by the wire. South of the Scarpe, the enemy's third line had been captured in places, but he still retained possession of the greater portion of it, together with the high ground of Orange Hill and Monchy-le-Preux. North of the Scarpe practically the whole of the day's programme was carried through. On the right the 4th Div. in reserve passed through the troops in front line, and according to plan captured the village of Fampoux, thus making a great breach in the enemy's third system of defence. In the centre the Canadian Corps stormed the Vimy heights, entrenched itself on the eastern slopes, and sent patrols out along the front. On the left the 4th Canadian Div., en- countering violent opposition at Hill 145 on the northern ex- tremity of the ridge, was compelled to postpone the attack till the following day.
The operations of April 9 had been eminently successful, in spite of heavy squalls of snow and rain; and large numbers of the enemy's troops and guns had been captured.
During the night of the gth to loth the 37th Div. made progress through the break in the German third line S. of the Scarpe, advancing to the northern slopes of Orange Hill; and on the morning of the loth about noon the advance became general, the whole of the enemy's third line S. of the Scarpe being reduced, and the 37th Div. reached the north-western edge of Monchy-le-Preux. A great struggle then centred round this village, and all efforts of the infantry to seize it directly, and of the cavalry to pass around either flank of it, failed, chiefly owing to the lack of effective artillery support due to the long range and the rapidity of the advance. On the morning of the 11th, however, assisted by tanks, the fight was resumed, and by 9 A.M. the village was captured, and subsequently many counter-attacks repulsed.
Meanwhile the Germans had been stubbornly defending the Cojeul valley and the Hindenburg defences at their junction with the old third line, a vital part of the front, where the open forward slopes, swept from end to end by the enemy's machine-guns, rendered any advance extremely difficult. In this area an operation of a bold and hazardous character was undertaken on the morning of the nth, which was nearly successful. At 4:30 A.M., in conjunction with an attack by the right of the III. Army on Hemnil and Wancourt, the V. Army (4th Australian and 62nd Div.), assisted by tanks, made a gallant effort to breach the Hindenburg Line in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt. The execution of the attack, being over a wide extent of open country, was exceedingly difficult; Australian troops, however, penetrated as far as Riencourt-lez-Cagnicourt and the 62nd Div. reached Bullecourt, but owing to determined opposition and the failure of the attacks by the right of the III. Army these positions could not be maintained. Had both attacks been successful and the two armies joined hands forward, a very wide breach in the enemy's defences in an important area of the battlefield would have been effected with far-reaching results. It was not till the morning of April 12 that the 2ist and 56th Divs. succeeded in capturing Hemnil and Wancourt.
North of the Scarpe much fighting of an indeterminate nature took place at Roeux and the neighbourhood on this day, but at the extreme northern extremity of the battlefield the 4th Canadian Div. and 24th Div. secured the whole of the important positions on the flank of the Vimy ridge and astride the Souchez river at the ""Pimple " and " Bois en hache." The Germans now began to withdraw from the eastern slopes of the Vimy ridge, and British and Canadian patrols moved forward until by the evening of April 14 a line had been reached N. of the river Scarpe from Roeux to E. of Bailleul-Hirondelle Wood and Lievin to the old front line at the Double Crassier.
On the right by the evening of the I4th the attacking troops had fought their way forward with great difficulty along the Hindenburg Line as far as Fontaine-les-Croisilles and Wancourt Tower, while farther N. many counter-attacks on Monchy-le-Preux were repulsed.
