Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/375

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AUSTRIAN EMPIRE
335


tained with Bulgaria.

tained by leading Rumanian politicians that so soon as her troops had crossed the Hungarian frontier Bulgaria and Turkey would attack Rumania. The negotiations carried on through the intermediary of Austria-Hungary between the Courts of Sofia and Bucharest had then, it is true, been proceeded with, but had broken down again, this time owing to the reciprocal distrust and the irreconcilable interests of the two Powers. At the same time it had become known to those in Bucharest how closely the Turks had attached themselves to the Central Powers, and that they were holding themselves in readiness to enter the World War on their side. Rumania consequently declared that she could no longer leave Bulgaria a free hand against Serbia. Thus under the new King of Rumania, Ferdi- nand, who was not bound by ties of personal friendship with the sovereigns of Austria-Hungary and Germany, the party hostile to the Central Powers gained in influence. Ferdinand did indeed stand firm in his neutrality, and he rejected Russia's summons to hasten to the aid of the Serbians, who had been attacked by Austria-Hungary. But Czernin could not suc- ceed in obtaining from him a binding declaration that he would not let his troops enter the field against the Central Powers.

At this time Germany and Austria-Hungary were equally powerless to decide the King of Bulgaria to take part in the Serbian War. Even the increased inducements held Negotia- ou t to him in this event by the Vienna Government did not move him from this attitude of reserve. This was due not only to his distrust of Rumania, Greece and Turkey and his fear of Russia, but also to his doubt as to whether by joining the Central Powers he would really be placing him- self on the winning side. Accordingly he was forever changing his attitude and that of his Government according to the vicis- situdes of the war. If the armies of the Central Powers met with success, they all showed a growing inclination to bring the treaty negotiations, which had never been allowed to drop for a minute, to a conclusion. But if, as in Dec. 1914, unfavour- able news reached Sofia as to the military situation of the Cen- tral Powers, then the old reasons for dragging on the negotia- tions were raked up again. The fact that the Entente Powers kept going further and further in their offers to Bulgaria, should she enter the war on their side or even should she remain neutral, contributed towards strengthening the resolve of the Bulgarian Government to put the screw on the Central Powers in the matter of their demands. Thus at the end of 1914 they demanded far-reaching concessions in the matter of their terri- torial claims, and that under a written promise. Austria- Hungary was refractory for a time, but at the beginning of 1915 declared herself prepared even for these concessions, but demanded, with the backing of the German Government, the armed intervention of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers. But neither King Ferdinand of Bulgaria nor Rado- slavov, the Bulgarian minister-president, was willing to con- cede this, for the military situation of the Central Powers was for the moment unfavourable. They declared their wish to remain neutral.

The negotiations with Rumania and Bulgaria revealed the fact that both Powers, different though their interests might be, followed a similar policy. They wished to delay their decision as long as possible; they wished at the . right moment to join the side of the winning party so

as to carry off the greatest possible advantages at the price of the least possible sacrifices. In these circumstances the importance to the outcome of the war of Italy's decision increased every month. For a long time, until far on in the winter of 1914, the policy of leading Italian statesmen was dictated by the wish to preserve their neutrality while keeping up their armament. They accounted for their attitude by referring to the letter and the spirit of the Triple Alliance ; they gave their former allies friendly words, but maintained a cor- dial attitude towards the Entente Powers. At the same time they urged at Vienna their demands for compensations by inter- preting Article VII. of the Triple Alliance Treaty in their own favour. It was not at first clear what they meant by it. During

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the official negotiations which took place between the Cabinets of Vienna and Rome, no word was spoken on the Italian side of old Austrian territories. But it was learnt at the Ballplatz, by way of Berlin, that Italy was thinking of the Trentino. Berchtold absolutely refused to listen to any such demands. He would not hear of a territorial indemnification on any ac- count, and was warmly supported in this by Tisza, while Con- rad even at that time, or at any rate in times of military mis- fortune, considered that even Italian neutrality would not be too dearly bought at the price of great sacrifices. But neither the prayers of the leading military commander nor the unceasing efforts of leading German political and military circles were able to change Berchtold's mind. He went on, indeed, with the negotiations, but spun them out without binding himself to anything. When San Giuliano died on Oct. 16 1914, nothing decisive had yet happened. Even during the few weeks for wjiich Salandra, the then Italian minister-president, directed Italy's foreign policy, no energetic steps were taken. Salandra fell in with the feeling of the country. It was not until Son- nino had taken over the leadership of Italy's foreign affairs that a further advance was ventured on by Italy in view of the unfavourable military position of the Central Powers, and under the influence of that section of the Italian press which was active in the interests of the Entente. It was once more reported in Vienna that Sonnino had spoken in Berlin of the cession of the Trentino, and that the German Government was now advocating this sacrifice. But even now Berchtold refused to entertain the question. Francis Joseph, so it was said, would never give his consent to a diminution of his empire. Only Sonnino kept on his way unperturbed. At the beginning of Dec. 1914 when Austria-Hungary was advancing upon Serbia he had a declaration made at Vienna to the effect that the excited state of opinion in Italy compelled him to press for the adjustment of the question of compensations. Salandra supported him, by speaking in Parliament of Italy's socro ego- ismo, her just aspirations and legitimate interests, and, while giving expression to the pacific character of the Italian Gov- ernment, he stated emphatically that neutrality alone was not sufficient to assure Italy's interests in all circumstances until the end of the war.

In the middle of December the negotiations between Vienna and Rome began afresh, but at once came to a deadlock. The German Government, which attached extraordinary importance to winning over Italy, now tried to persuade the Ballplatz to make concessions. At the same time it sent to Rome Prince Biilow, who worked in the same sense, and represented conces- sions on the part of Austria-Hungary as a sacrifice, heavy indeed, but necessary in order to assure Italy's neutrality. But Berchtold was still resolutely opposed to such a demand, and expressed this view also in his direct negotiations with the Italian ambassador in Vienna, the Duke of Avarna.

Berchtold's fall from power, and the appointment of Baron Burian to succeed him as Austro-Hungarian foreign minister (Jan. 13 1915), made but little change in the posi- tion of the Vienna Government. Negotiations with Italy were indeed continued, but led to no rapproche- ment between the two opposing points of view. It was not till March 9 1915 that Burian expressed his willingness to discuss with Italy, in principle, the cession of Austrian terri- tory. He did so under the impression of the unfavourable mili- tary position of the Triple Alliance Powers the Russians were fighting in the Carpathians, and Przemysl was about to fall and with the knowledge of the renewal in Feb. 1915 of the agreement between Italy and Rumania, which let it be feared that a declaration of war by Italy would be followed by that of Rumania; under increasingly heavy pressure, moreover, from the German Government, which, in the event of a favourable outcome of the war, held before the eyes of the Vienna Govern- ment, as compensation for the losses of the monarchy in Tirol, not only a loan in cash but also the rich coal-mines of Sosnovka.

The opening of negotiations at once showed how far the Italian demands exceeded what Austria-Hungary was now pre-