front. The Drocourt-Queant front and support lines were thus
in the hands of the Canadians after little more than four hours'
fighting. The operation had been brilliant in the extreme, but
the exploitation proved more difficult, as neither tank nor artillery
support was available in sufficient strength. As a result the advance on the front of the 4th Canadian and 4th British Div. made
no progress beyond the line south of Etaing-Dury. On the
right, however, the 1st Canadian Div. got forward beyond Cagnicourt and Villers and established its front some distance to the E. of these places. Meanwhile the XVII. Corps pushed the 57th Div. through the gap opened by the Canadians and swung down astride the Drocourt-Queant line towards its junction with the Hindenburg line, which was at the same time assailed in front by the sand Division. Later in the day the 63rd Div. passed through to continue the advance; by nightfall the tangle of trenches and wire at the junction were in British hands and the villages of Queant and Pronville had also been wrested from the
enemy.
That night the German Seventeenth Army withdrew its two right corps in haste behind the Canal du Nord, where they again faced round for a renewed stand. Their losses had been heavy; ii divisions had been defeated with a loss of close on 11,000 prisoners and many guns; the artificial defences had not held up or even appreciably checked the British advance, which now threatened to turn from the N. the whole of the Hindenburg line.
Fortunately for the Germans the Canal du Nord proved a sufficiently formidable obstacle to give pause to the First Army's progress. It was decided that that army should halt and reconstitute for the present, as any further advance could only be carried out by a deliberate and carefully planned assault on the canal line. This attack was not to take place till Sept. 27.
In their operations between Aug. 26 and Sept. 3 the 10 British divisions of the First Army had defeated 13 hostile divisions, and taken from them over 16,000 prisoners and 200 guns. The right wing of the German Seventeenth Army had been forced to fall back some 12 m., abandoning in succession a series of strong and well-fortified defensive systems, the loss of which had an instant effect on the situation to the south.
2. Third Army's Advance to Hindenburg Line (Sept. 3-26). As a result of the First Army's success the German Seventeenth Army on Sept. 2 was ordered to fall back to the Hindenburg line, and to commence the move that same evening. By Sept. 8 the two corps (III. and XIV. Reserve) which faced the British Third Army had completed their withdrawal and held the fortified front from Sains on the Canal du Nord by Havrincourt to just S. of Gouzeaucourt, with detachments to the W. of this line, established in the old British and German trenches of 1917.
The British Third Army followed up the retreating enemy, being impeded only by rearguards whose resistance was easily overcome, and by Sept. 9 were once more in touch with the main body of the German Seventeenth Army along the whole of its front. At this period the line was held from right to left by the V. Corps (Shute) (2ist and i?th Div. in front line, 38th Div. in reserve); the IV. Corps (Harper) (5th New Zealand and 37th Div. in line, 42nd Div. in reserve); the VII. Corps (Haldane) (62nd and 2nd Div. in line, 3rd and Guards Div. in reserve); and the XVII. Corps (Ferguson) (52nd and 63rd Div. in line, 57th Div. in reserve).
In order to obtain observation and jumping-off ground for the attack on the main Hindenburg system it was necessary to clear the enemy from the positions still held by him forward of this line. This was successfully accomplished in two operations, on Sept. 12 and Sept. 18. On the former of these dates the IV. and VI. Corps in the centre of the army advanced on a front of five miles between the Cambrai-Peronne and Cambrai-Bapaume roads. The IV. Corps, attacking with the 37th Div. on the right and the New Zealand Div. on the left, occupied Trescault and the heights north of it, while the 62nd Div. of the VI. Corps carried Havrincourt after stubborn fighting and maintained it in face of a series of counter-attacks, delivered with fresh forces both on this and the following day. The 2nd Div. also made some progress to the N., effectively securing the flank of the 62nd and keeping touch with the XVII. Corps, which had been held up ever since Sept. 2 on the W. bank of the Canal du Nord.
Sept. 18 saw the V. Corps on the right of the Third Army attacking in its turn, in conjunction with the Fourth Army to the south. The 38th Div. was brought up into line for this operation on the left of the 17th, the 21st Div. being on the right of the corps front. The attack was fairly successful, though the 21st Div. was unable to attain all its objectives and the 38th Div. was held up in front of Gouzeaucourt, and a series of further minor attacks on the succeeding days proved necessary before the positions required for the general offensive against the main Hindenburg line were completely secured along the whole front of the Third Army.
3. Advance of Fourth Army to Hindenburg Line (Sept. 3-26). The results of the fighting on the line of the upper Somme and the Tortille at the end of Aug. and the beginning of Sept. had been such as to induce the German Second Army to give up all hope of putting up any further resistance W. of the Hindenburg line, and to order a withdrawal of its troops to that fortified position. Accordingly, from the morning of Sept. 4th, the British Fourth Army was able to make rapid progress along its whole front. The line at the beginning of this advance was held as follows: on the right was the Australian Corps (Monash) with the 32nd, 5th Australian and 3rd Australian Div. in line, and the 1st and 4th Australian Div. in reserve; on the left the III. Corps (Butler) with the 74th and 12th Div. in line and the 58th in reserve. Facing them the front of the German Second Army was held in order from the right by the LIV., XI. and LI. Corps; in all, eight divisions.
The first few days of the British advance passed with little resistance from the enemy, who fell back rapidly under cover of the fire of light machine-guns and isolated field guns. British cavalry and cyclists found some scope for useful activity and considerable progress was made. On Sept. 8, however, the Germans made a stand in the old British battle zone of March 21 on the general line E. of Vermand to E. of Roisel-Epehy. A series of partial assaults by the various front-line divisions having had little result it became evident that a deliberate attack would be necessary to overcome this obstacle. Accordingly the army front was reorganized, the IX. Corps coming in on the right, taking over the 32nd Div., and putting the 1st into line on its left, with the 6th and 46th in support. Gen. Rawlinson then proposed to undertake an operation on a large scale with the object of capturing the outer defences of the Hindenburg line along the whole front of the Fourth Army. These outer defences consisted of two strongly fortified lines, the first of which had been the German outpost line in the spring of 1917 and the British main line of resistance before March 1918, and the second the British outpost line corresponding to this main line a less formidable obstacle about a mile farther east. The capture of these defences, which would afford observation over the greater part of the main Hindenburg line proper, was of course an essential preliminary to any operation against the latter.
Accordingly the period from Sept. 11 to 17 was devoted to pushing on the preparations for this projected attack. The line was advanced in several places by means of strong fighting patrols, so as to run on the evening of the 17th from Holnon by Maissemy and Jeancourt to St. Emilie and W. of Epehy. By this time everything was ready for the general offensive, which was timed to commence at 5:20 A.M. on the 18th in conjunction with the First French Army to the S. and the Third British Army to the north.
It was intended that the advance should be carried out in three stages, the final objective (which it was not considered must necessarily be reached on the first day) being the old British outpost line from Thorigny by Pontruet, W. of Bellicourt and of Bony to W. of Vendhuille. This gave a front of attack of some 14 m. in length and involved an average penetration of 3 miles. Twenty-three tanks joined in the attack, which was preceded by no bombardment but was covered by the fire of 978 guns.
Generally speaking the operations of the Australian Corps in the centre were completely successful, those of the IX. and III.
