and Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, met together. In reviewing the general situation they were forced to admit unanimously the absolute necessity of continuing offensive operations on the western front. A large part of the German reserves were exhausted, but if the enemy was given time to recover himself he would be free to attack either Russia or Italy with the greatest chance of success, and he would thus be able to hold on until the submarine war had obtained its full effect. In the new situation it was not a question of breaking the enemy front and of reaching at one blow distant objectives, but of exhausting the enemy's resistance. Once this object was gained " it was necessary to develop the results to the utmost possible."
The members of this conference were of the same opinion when they affirmed the necessity of fighting with all forces available, with the object of destroying the enemy divisions. " We are unanimous in thinking that there is no half -measure between that method and a defensive, which at this moment would be equiva- lent to a confession of weakness. We are unanimously of the opinion that our aim cannot be arrived at except through un- ceasing attack, with a limited objective." Allied staffs would determine methods and dates.
In the afternoon of the 4th the ministers of the two countries met at the Quai d'Orsay together with the members of the mili- tary commission. Mr. Lloyd George explained that he felt the need of persuading himself that all were quite agreed on the principle of the continuous offensive, the details of which were settled by the responsible authorities: " We prefer that the generals keep to themselves everything which concerns their plans of operation. When they are put on paper for communica- tion to ministers it is seldom that the ministers alone see them. What we do not need to know is the precise locality of the attack, nor the date, nor the number of guns and divisions engaged. It is essential that these details remain secret. In England we do not ask these questions." He changed the preamble of the mili- tary commission into a formal pledge of the British Government, specifying always that the expression " limited offensive " was not to be understood as an attack by two or three divisions, but as an operation analogous to that which the British armies had just carried out before Arras. Mr. Lloyd George further insisted that, considering the situation with which both parties were faced, a serious and continued effort was absolutely necessary. He endeavoured to show the French Government all that had been done since the month of April: " We must not allow our- selves to underestimate the results of our offensive. Doubtless great hopes had been held that had not been realized. But if we did not hope for more than was possible perhaps we would not find that enthusiasm which was so indispensable in war."
He enumerated the captures: 45,000 prisoners, 450 guns, 800 machine-guns and 200 sq. km. reconquered. " Suppose that it had been the enemy who had obtained this success . . . and imagine the wave of pessimism that would have swept over the public. That is sufficient to show the reality of the success which we have gained. . . . The losses which we suffer are very painful, but it is impossible to avoid them if we wage war. ... If it is a question of saving human life we say that feeble and repeated attacks cost as much as, and more than, wholehearted attacks. ... I hope that these considerations will lead you both," addressing personally M. Ribot and M. Painleve, " to admit that we must exert all our efforts at once."
The Prime Minister of England spoke in the forcible and virile language of a true statesman. Well informed of the situa- tion in his own country, he sensed the value of time when it came to men and money. He understood war and all its exigencies, even the hardest; he was capable of the high direction of war because he knew how to govern the expert without entering into the detail of his technique. Mr. Lloyd George took with him to England a written promise, but it was wrapped round with such reticence that he could not have had many illusions concerning the duration of the attack " sans repit " to which the French Government had just pledged themselves.
Whilst the British offensive was in full swing on the Scarpe the struggle continued in Champagne on the Moronvilliers
massif; a violent German counter-offensive had been repulsed on April 23 and the IV. Army under Anthoine seized Mount Cornil- let. The Craonne massif was seized on May 4, and the mill at Laffaux on the sth, together with a whole series of positions which the German counter-attacks failed to retake; it was a good success, but it should have been completed by advancing to the Ailette, for the X. Army held on to the crest with difficulty, where it suffered for many weeks heavy losses, which were due to the suspension of the offensive and not to the offensive itself.
The results of the Franco-British offensive were 62,000 prison- ers, 446 guns and 1,000 machine-guns taken; the French armies had lost, April 16-25, JS.ooo dead, 60,000 wounded and 20,500 missing. On the whole front of attack the advance was carried far enough to force the enemy to reconstruct his battle-line on an 8o-km. front; important positions remained in the hands of the Allies: the Vimy crest, the Laffaux mill, the fort of Conde, the Chemin des Dames, and the Moronvilliers massif. Railways of great strategic value were fired. If to these gains be added those resulting from the withdrawal in March, obtained by the mere threat of attack, the first months of 1917 represented for the Entente a total of very valuable successes.
The total of German losses had not been made known, but it can be estimated approximately by basing it on the number of divisions which were engaged on the attacking front. On April i 43 divisions were in reserve in rear; nine were en route for the French front, two coming from the eastern front and seven being newly constituted. The German armies had therefore 52 divi- sions available. On April 22 this figure was reduced to 16; on April 25 to 12; on May 4 all their divisions had been engaged. It was necessary to draw on the quiet sectors in order to maintain the battle. At first, divisions withdrawn from the front could, before returning to the line, take a few days' rest and refit. This soon became impossible. This wear and tear increased to an un- believable extent ; the remnants of troops withdrawn were thrown, without transition, on the Argonne front or on the heights of the Mouse. The nth Guards Div., for example, cut to pieces from May 5-10 on the Californian plateau, was identified on May 18 in the Argonne; and the 28th Div., relieved on the i8th, was identified in front of Verdun on the 28th. These divisions' only rest was during the time of their displacement. The same state- ments are made as concerns the English front; all goes to con- firm the extreme wear and tear of the German army.
On May 25, 99 divisions had already appeared on the front, amongst which n had appeared twice; there had been as well no divisional movements. But now the number of German divi- sions which took part in the battle of Verdun in 1916 was 43 in 10 months; in 3^ months 137 divisions had fought on the Somme. In 1917 the wear and tear was thus treble.
It is quite true that Gen. Nivelle had not obtained that break- through which he had hoped for, but thanks to the length and vigour of the attack the exhaustion of the enemy was very near to attainment. The Allies were in a position to profit by this, be- cause, at the moment when the. German reserves were entirely used up, 30 divisions remained intact on the side of the Entente: 16 French and 14 British. As the Germans had a total of 150 divisions on the Anglo-French front, as against 178 Anglo-French divisions, the system of reliefs was much more favourable for the Allies. One can understand then why the British Government and High Command insisted on the continuation of the attack.
But were the French troops in a state to repair their losses and to continue the offensive?
On April i 1917 the French armies on the front consisted of 2,905,000 men, a figure which had never been reached before. In order to keep up this'figure the 1918 class was available, and those that had not been called up from the preceding classes, which might be put down at a total of over 300,000 men for the coming year. Besides, during that very year, after the release began from all the war factories, more than 700,000 men were taken from the front for work in the interior in spite of the protests of Gen. Nivelle, and later of his successor Gen. Petain, who, in order to arrest this excursion to demobilization, had to threaten his resig- nation. The suspension of the offensive was inexcusable.
