success. His effectives had now been brought up to eight divisions on this sector of the front, where the deep caves and concreted shelters and the undulation of the ground offered enormous strength to the defence. General Maistre, on the 12 km. of the attack front, between Moisy farm and La Raque, had in position three army corps in the formation of a square, two divisions in the first line and two in the second: from left to right, the XIV. Corps under Marjoulat; the XXI. under Degoutte and the XI. under Maud'huy; elements of the XXXIX. Corps under Deligny had to support the attack on the right. One thousand eight hundred guns were at his disposal: 900 of 75 mm., 850 heavy guns and 50 long-range or large-calibre guns, besides 460 trench guns. Never before had such a mass of artillery thun- dered on such a narrow front. The long-range guns were placed on the flanks where they could take a large portion of the German line in rear; the field artillery had been pushed up close to the parallel lines of assault in order to be able to support the attack as long as possible. The artillery preparation lasted for six days and completely disorganized the German position. The heavy shells reduced to shambles a number of prepared underground caves. On Oct. 23 at 5:15 A.M., in darkness and in foggy and cold weather, the attack began.
The XIV. Corps under Marjoulat, attacking from W. to E. towards Allemant, seized at one bound the two lines of trenches which constituted the first position, and then captured the village of Allemant, after having surrounded it; the tanks assisted them to reach the second position and a turning movement brought the corps in position facing north. On its right, the XXI. Corps under Degoutte, by an unimpeded advance, captured the two German positions together with the village of Vaudesson and even that of Chavignon, where it found itself in position in line.
The XI. Corps under Maud'huy supported its right; the 38th Div. under Guyot de Salins (which had captured Fort Douau- mont on Oct. 24 1916) had the honour of seizing Fort Malmaison and from thence advanced up to Voyeu-Chavignon. The 66th Chasseur Div. was less fortunate, and overlooked Pargny- Fillain, which still remained in the hands of the enemy.
During Oct. 24 and 25 the advance continued and reached the Ailette as far as Chavignon. But it was only on Oct. 26 that victory was complete on the right, thanks to the inter- vention of the XXXIX. Corps under Deligny.
The Chemin des Dames was taken in flank and in rear; a relief division, caught by the French artillery, had not been able to come up, and supply had become impossible. During the night Nov. 1-2 the Germans were compelled to evacuate it. " Our losses had been very severe," said Ludendorff, " some divisions had been cut to pieces." For himself, he was in- different whether he was on the N. or the S. bank of the Ailette; but " after our fights during the whole summer for the Chemin des Dames I suffered a pang in giving the order to abandon it, but we would have suffered losses incessantly if we had wished to stay on there."
This great victory, obtained with relatively small losses, was emphasized by the capture of 11,157 prisoners, 200 heavy guns, 222 trench mortars, and 720 machine-guns. For its careful preparation, clever handling and happy consequence, it will remain as a model of an offensive with limited objectives.
(C. M. E. M.)
V. BATTLE OF SOISSONS-REIMS, MAY-JUNE 1918
From the outset the aim of the main German offensive in 1918 had been to break the spirit of the opponents of Germany by numerous blows in the quickest possible succession and to dispose them towards peace. If, therefore, the German Supreme Command wished to retain the initiative, the first great blow must be followed, as rapidly as the transport of the powerful weapons of attack permitted, by a second blow. In itself the most favourable course would have been to continue the attack against the English front at Ypres and Bailleul. But here such strong English and French reserves had been posted ready in the meantime that the attack would have to reckon with strong Allied resistance. Similar conditions obtained on the
neighbouring German attacking front farther to the south. Before the front of the VII. and I. Armies, on the other hand, the Allies, relying on the difficulties presented to the attack by the strong positions on the heights of the Chemin des Dames, accessible only with difficulty, had weakened their forces, having sent to Flanders a large proportion of the fit and rested French divisions stationed here in exchange for French and English divisions worn out with fighting there and in need of rest. The disposition of the Allied forces suggested that they expected a continuation of the German offensive on the front between the North Sea and the Oise, since by far the greater part of their reserves were held in readiness there, to the considerable weakening of other fronts, notably before the German VII. and I. Armies, facing whose inner wings were stationed three war-worn English divisions. So the choice of the front of attack and the battle-ground fell on the oft-con- tested chain of heights between the Ailette and the Aisne, the Chemin des Dames.
The Battlefield. The tract of land between Reims and the great wooded districts of Compiegne and Villers-Cotterets is divided by the different tributaries of the Seine and the Oise, running from E. to W. into several parallel strips. The most northerly of these strips is a pronounced ridge with steep de- clivities northwards to the Ailette and southward to the Aisne; along its summit runs the Chemin des Damef leading from Craonne to the Laon-Soissons road. These heights afford an uninterrupted view far over the country lying to the north. In its superior height lies the tactical significance of the Chemin des Dames, for the sake of which so many heavy engagements had already been fought. Since the Chemin des Dames had been in French occupation, Laon with its important railway centre lay under their fire. South of the Aisne lies a second ridge, bounded on the S. by the Vesle. On the left bank of the Vesle rises the third strip consisting of the wide hill country which descends on the S. to the spacious valley of the Marne.
The Allied Position. The French position ran along the Chemin des Dames, and farther eastward into the valley. In front of the position was the Ailette, in whose valley the listen- ing posts of both sides were close to one another. The French positions were not only of great natural strength by reason of their favourable situation, but were also just here particularly strongly fortified by every technical device. The French also had at their disposal a numerous artillery of all calibres. The German attack on these positions was therefore to be regarded as a bold attempt, whose only prospect of success was in effecting a surprise on the French and English and in keep- ing secret from them the preparations for attack, especially the advance of the artillery.
Dispositions for the German Attack. The German Supreme Command had decided, on the basis of a plan of attack proposed by the army group under the Crown Prince as early as the end of April, to attack with the VII. and I. Armies from the district south-westward of Laon southwards of Berry-au-Bac in the direction Soissons-Fismes-Reims. If this attack pro- ceeded favourably it was to be prolonged on the right over the Ailette to the Oise and on the left as far as Reims. Simul- taneously an attack by the XVIII. Army was to be prepared westwards of the Oise with its centre of gravity in the direction of Compiegne. The German Supreme Command hoped that the push southward would succeed in reaching the neighbourhood of Soissons and Fismes, and by this means attract strong forces from Flanders, so that it might be possible to continue the attack there according to plan. The army group under the Crown Prince Rupprecht was to remain purely on the defensive. On this front, as on other sections of the western front where at- tack was not intended, feigned preparations for attack were to be made.
Preparations began about the middle of May. The VII. Army under Gen. von Bohm was charged with the main Ger- man attack across the Chemin des Dames, the I. Army under Gen. Fritz von Below with the neighbouring attack on the left, and the XVIII. Army under Gen. von Hutier with the at-
