fact afford to remain quiescent. The Allies, on the other hand, were practically compelled to remain quiescent. The general situation offered them no inducements to embark on fresh offen- sives. The great Aug. effort, which had been made when they were enjoying the advantages derived from concentration as opposed to dispersion, and when they were in the position to take the Turks unawares, had miscarried. It would have been folly after that experience to risk defeat and perhaps disaster in assailing formidable positions, effectively held and assiduously fortified. The Allies had in Aug. been rather superior in numbers to their opponents. But during the autumn Liman von Sanders was reinforced by several divisions, and at the juncture when Gen. Monro arrived and recommended evacuation of the peninsula, the Ottoman host gathered about the Dardanelles was already decidedly stronger in point of numbers than was the army which was clinging to patches of littoral without a sheltered base.
If there had been no fighting during these autumn months worthy of mention, much creditable work had been carried out by the invaders in respect to developing communications and to improving jetties and landing-places, especially at Suvla. One British and one French division were moved from the penin- sula to Salonika early in Oct., but an additional Australian divi- sion had arrived a few weeks earlier. In spite of the discouraging conditions in which they found themselves, and of the constant annoyance suffered from hostile artillery fire, the troops were in fair heart, while the tactical efficiency of the recently created divisions, which had not been of a high standard when they arrived in the theatre of war, had appreciably progressed. The proportion of sick had been high during the summer-time, but it decreased somewhat after Sept. On the other hand a very severe blizzard, lasting two days, swept the whole region towards the end of Nov. and caused havoc amongst the divisions in the Suvla area, which was particularly exposed to the elements; this visita- tion augmented the numbers in hospital by several thousands. The tempestuous weather, moreover, created serious damage at most of the landing-places, where solidly constructed jetties were in some instances completely demolished by the seas. The Allied forces had been organized as three distinct groups. That at Helles (which included the French contingent, still as at the outset on the right) was under the charge of Gen. Davies. That at Anzac, composed mainly of troops from the Antipodes, remained under Gen. Birdwood. That at Suvla was commanded by Gen. Byng. But as Gen. Monro found, himself responsible for the British troops at Salonika as well as for the Allied army of the Dar- danelles, he placed the latter under charge of Gen. Birdwood, while Gen. Godley relieved Birdwood at Anzac.
Like their adversaries, the Turks had suffered much from dis- ease during the summer. But as their numbers grew in the autumn, and as their headquarters staff noted how the invaders were dwindling away owing to transfers to Salonika and to no drafts arriving to replenish wastage, it became possible to keep a number of the Ottoman divisions in reserve, well in rear of the fighting fronts or else on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. This also permitted of the troops in the trenches being relieved and rested at frequent intervals. The defending side, in fact, came to be in a much more favourable position than was the at- tacking side in respect to diminishing the strain that is always experienced by fighting personnel when in close contact with an enemy even during periods of virtual inactivity. The Sultan's forces guarding the Straits were not yet at the end of Nov. deriv- ing much benefit from the strategical transformation which had taken place in the Balkans consequent upon communications being opened between Thrace and the Central Powers; but there was every prospect of heavy artillery and munitions shortly beginning to find their way through from Germany and Austria- Hungary to the Dardanelles.
Foreseeing that the British Government must ultimately resign itself to a withdrawal of the Dardanelles army from its dangerous situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula, Monro had al- ready, some days before the permission to evacuate reached him from home, given instructions that certain preparations were to be made towards facilitating that operation. That a retirement
of this kind was a hazardous undertaking was realized from the outset. There was no precedent for large military forces, in close contact with a formidable enemy, embarking within easy artillery range of positions in the hands of the opposing side, and the most sanguine amongst high military authorities in the councils of the Entente feared that a withdrawal could not be carried out without incurring heavy losses. The responsible authorities on the spot perceived that the process of gradually removing the huge accumulations of impedimenta that were massed about the land- ing-places and of reembarking the troops must take place during the dark hours and step by step, every effort being made to keep the Turks unaware of what was in progress. Sickly men and some stores and animals had been got away before Dec. 8, which lightened the task in prospect. The tactical principle on which withdrawal would be carried out when the time came had been fully considered. The naval authorities had been busy assembling and organizing the available small craft in anticipation of the operation that appeared to be imminent, and jetties damaged in the Nov. gales were being repaired. It should be noted that the matter in hand was, from the point of view of water transport, somewhat facilitated by the British Government's determination to hold on to Helles for the present, as nearly all the lighters, boats, etc., in naval charge could consequently be gathered at Anzac and Suvla.
Birdwood decided, in consultation with Godley and Byng, that the front trenches should be held up to the very last moment on the night of final evacuation, the troops manning them then hast- ening to the beaches, everything removable, whether animate or inanimate, having already left. There was to be no taking up of successive positions in accordance with the normal practice of rearguard actions. At a given moment the trenches, which at many points were but a few yards from those occupied by the Turks, would be vacated by detachments, which by that hour would have shrunk to mere handfuls of men. Scarcely a shot had since the beginning of Dec. been fired after dark by the British, Australasian and Indian troops, who were holding the long line stretching from the Gulf of Saros to near Gaba Tepe, so as to accustom the foe to quietude during the night watches. The last parties of the Anzac force were to ship at Anzac Cove but for a detachment on the extreme left, which would embark with the Suvla troops. The Suvla area was divided into two sections, the troops in the right (or southern) section retiring S. of the lake and taking to the boats on the southern side of the bay, the other section retiring N. of the lake and embarking on its northern side. The final night was provisionally fixed as that of the iSth-igth, and thanks to favourable weather and to the efficiency of the arrangements, the very critical operation was carried out with triumphant success, just as had been laid down by programme ten days before.
Night after night during the intervening ten days the landing places at Anzac and Suvla were scenes of unceasing activity. Masses of war material and food supplies were in the first instance removed, then most of the animals were got away, lastly portions of the troops began to embark and to proceed to Imbros or Mudros. During the daytime reliefs took place as usual, pre- tences were made of disembarking animals and stores at the jetties, and the result was that the Turks remained in complete ignorance as to what was going on close to their lines. Large bodies of infantry with a fair proportion of guns still remained on shore on the i7th, but of these roughly half -about 10,000 men and a number of guns in each area were removed that night, so that on the i8th only a meagre force, composed almost wholly of infantry and disposed almost entirely in the trenches, was holding a long front face to face with a numerically far stronger enemy. But, fortunately for the Allies, their dispositions had been so skilful that the Ottoman staff had not ascertained that the Anzac and Suvla areas had been almost vacated. The critical day passed without incident.
The hour fixed for finally quitting the front trenches in the Suvla area, and the adjacent northern portions of the Anzac area, was 1:15 A.M. on the igth. Owing to their vicinity to the cove the rest of the Anzac trenches were, however, to be held till a
