Page:EB1922 - Volume 30.djvu/916

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866
DUNAJEC-SAN, BATTLES OF THE


sapping, and in this manner it had, by the 28th, worked its way up to the Russian wire entanglements.

Meanwhile the Russians had resolved on a counter-offensive with superior forces against the S. wing of the IV. Army. Their plan was to advance from the N. and N.E. over the San at Sieniawa and to the N.W. of it, and thus to put a term to Mackensen's progress.

On the 2yth the strongly reenforced III. Caucasian Corps (Gen. Irmanov) delivered a surprise attack upon the Sieniawa bridge-head. The Austro-Hungarian loth Div., consisting in part of untrust- worthy Czech troops, gave way, and was thrown back to the W. bank of the San and the Lower Lubaczowka, losing 9,000 prisoners, 9 guns and 4 machine-guns. Strong reenforcements hurried forward from other divisions succeeded in stiffening the badly weakened right wing of the army on the W. bank of the San, and in averting the menace to Mackensen's left flank. On his front also the Russians on the 2yth delivered unexpected but unsuccessful attacks against the Lubaczowka and the positions of the VI. and XLI. Corps at Chotyniec and Starzawa.

On the 28th the Russians renewed their attacks in this area and on the San. On the Lubaczowka they succeeded in penetrating the lines held by the German X. Corps, but were driven out by a flank- ing movement. On the next day they again delivered strong as- saults in the Sieniawa area and made vain attempts to pass the San.

The N. wing of the IV. Army, in conjunction with the I. Army on its left (now under Kirchbach, in place of Dankl, who had been appointed to the command in Tirol), moved forward on the 24th to attack the fortified line Machow-Rudnik, and by the 26th had forced the Russians back to the S. of Grebow. The Russian attack at Sieniawa, however, necessitated the immediate withdrawal of forces to strengthen the right wing of the IV. Army and the cessa- tion of the N. wing's offensive. On the 3Oth, therefore, there was a temporary cessation of activity; at the same time indications were observed of a renewed Russian blow against the inner flanks of the IV. and XI. Armies. The Supreme Army Command gave expres- sion to this fear in instructions to these armies to devote special care to the strengthening of their positions and to hold reserves in readi- ness on their threatened wings. The III. and II. Armies were mean- time to pursue their attacks.

During the following days, from May 30 to June 3, Przemysl was stormed (see PRZEMYSL). Throughout this period hard fighting was also taking place immediately S.E. of the fortress and on the San between Przemysl and Rudnik. In the latter area it was the Rus- sians who took the initiative. Since the capture of the Sieniawa bridge-head by the III. Caucasian Corps, it became clear that strong forces were being concentrated against the XI. Army, and that the Russian IX. Corps in the LHanow-Rudnik area was being reenforced. The XIV. and XV. Corps of the Russian IV. Army had been brought over the Vistula to the area Sandomierz-Nisko.

In front of the Austro-Hungarian IV. Army and the northern wing of the German XI. Army (in all, n| inf. and 2 cav. divs.) stood the whole of the Russian III. Army (some 20 inf. and 4 cav. divs., with 6 militia brigades). The Russians appeared to be plan- ning an energetic counter-attack; on June 2 the Austro-Hungarian IX. and XIV. Corps had had to repulse heavy attacks and to pre- vent attempts to cross the San.

On the evening of June I the 8th Inf. Div. on the left wing of the XIV. Corps W. of Rudnik had been hard pressed and forced to fall back to its next line of defence ; all attacks on the 2nd were beaten off, but there was danger of a Russian break-through just W. of Rudnik, as the whole XIV. Corps in conjunction with the IX. Corps had been pressed back to the line running from the heights W. of Tarnagora, by Jezowa to Jata, where it came into touch with the right wing of the VIII. Corps which was bent back on the line Stany-Przyszow. In the case of this latter corps nothing worth mentioning occurred. All attacks on the Lubaczowka were repulsed by the German X. and Guard Corps, on the northern wing of Mackensen's army.

On the following day the IV. Army front continued quiet, the troops fortifying their new defensive line, which was not attacked. The fall of Przemysl having freed troops of the III. Army for use elsewhere, the Austrian X. Corps (24th and 25th Divs.) was hastily dispatched to Lancut and Rzeszow, to reenforce the IV. Army. Troops were also dispatched to the XI. Army, the German 22nd Div. to Lancut, the 8th Bavarian Div. to Radymno, the German XXVI. Corps to Jaroslaw, and the loyth Div. to Przeworsk.

On the 4th the Russians renewed their massed attacks against the IV. Army, but these were all repelled with heavy loss. The 59th Regt. near Tarnagora repulsed an attack by the four regiments of the Russian 6lst Inf. Div. The northern wing of the XI. Army also dealt successfully with a series of Russian attacks delivered as late as the night of the 4th. On this day the Russians' power of attack seemed to have exhausted itself. They had suffered enor- mous losses and the driving-back of the Austro-Hungarian XIV. Corps was the only success they had to show. Only on the 6th did strong forces from the Russian VIII. Army once more attempt a counter-attack on Mackensen's eastern front; but this did not suc- ceed in preventing the establishment of the XLI. Corps on the line Starzawa-Czerniawa. On the front of the IV. Army all was quiet on June 4. The Russian plan of holding the San line, and relieving

their hard-pressed VIII. Army by a powerful counter-offensive in the Rudnik area, had thus failed.

While Przemysl was being invested and captured Puhallo's and Bohm's armies were engaged with Brussilov's left wing S.E. of the fortress. The former had taken over the III. Army from Boroeyic, who on May 24 was put in command of the V. Army against Italy. Early on June 2 Bohm made an energetic attack in con- junction with the German Beskiden Corps on the right wing of the III. Army, but on this day met with no success. Only by slow degrees and step by step could the divisions of the II. Army work their way forward up to the strong hostile positions. On the ;jrd the Beskiden Corps succeeded in breaking through the Russian lines at Husakow and in establishing itself on the heights W. of Myslatycze, while the divisions of the XVII. Corps in touch with it to the W. gained a firm footing on the crest N.W. of Husakow. The success of the attack was greater next day. In conjunction with the XI. Army the XVII. Corps pushed forward to the heights E. of Wola Locka, and there met with strong resistance. The Beskiden Corps was engaged by the evening against the hostile positions W. of Czyski and N. of Rakosc (S.W. of Mosciska), where it connected with the left-wing corps <5f the II. Army, which had itself done excellent work in the area to the S. of the Beskiden Corps and in conjunction with it.

Battle of Stryj, and Fighting^ on the Pruth and Dniester (May 24- Jun? 75). Simultaneously with the attacks of the IV., XL, III. and II. Armies, there began on May 24 on the German Southern Army front a 48 hours' intense artillery preparation, which was fol- lowed by the actual attack on the morning of the 26th. The front of Linsingen's army extended from Hruszow on the Bystrycza E. of Drohobycz, S.W. of Stryj, and E. of Bolechow to the Dolina area. The 5 inf. divs. of Shtcherbachev's XI. Russian Army were opposed by 8 inf. divs. and 3 independent brigades.

The results of the first day's operations were brilliant. Field- Marshal Szurmay's corps on the left stormed the hostile positions at Gaje, while the 38th Honved Inf. Div. and the left wing of Gen. Count Bothmer's German Corps in touch with it pressed forward successfully before Stryj. Hofmann's Austro-Hungarian corps also made progress N. of Dolina. Gen. Gerok's XXIV. German Reserve Corps fighting on the right wing to the S.W. of Dolina, on the other hand, beat off all attacks. As on the second day, however, the Russians everywhere maintained their strong positions with the utmost stubbornness, the attack was brought to a standstill, and recourse had to be made to sapping, as on the II. Army front.

During the next few days the Russians endeavoured to clear their front by a series of strong counter-attacks mostly delivered by night against Hofmann's Austro-Hungarian corps; and they succeeded by the morning of the 3Oth in forcing it back behind the Swica to the line Lisowice Hoszow. Here, however, their progress was checked by Hofmann and the 24th Reserve Corps.

On the 3 1st Bothmer's energetic attack on Stryj turned the scale of victory in favour of the Southern Army. Advancing in conjunc- tion with Szurmay's S. wing from the Holobutow area, he defeated the enemy, taking 9,050 prisoners, 8 guns and 15 machine-guns and, pushing on through Stryj, established himself on the line Liso- wice-E. of Stryj-S. of Brigidau.

The effect of this was immediately felt on the Southern Army front. Szurmay's left wing, on June I, stormed the Russian line N.E. of Drohobycz, and pursuing by Kolodruby and Mikolajow, drove the enemy back on Medenice. The 1st Cav. Div. and 5 bat- talions of the II. Army, which had joined in the attack, were placed under the Southern Army. On June 2 Bothmer's corps took Lisia- tycze, but its 1st Div., fighting E. of Stryj, made no progress. The 38th Honved Inf. Div. and Szurmay's right wing during the night drove the Russians back to the Dniester.

The Supreme Army Command now proposed, while securing its flank on the Dniester, to push Bothmer's corps and the main body of Szurmay's corps eastwards towards Zurawno against the flank of the Russian IX. Army, thus relieving the pressure on Pflanzer Baltin. The execution of this scheme produced excellent results. Yielding to Bothmer's pressure, the whole Russian line was in retreat early on the 4th. While Szurmay on the line of the bridge-heads of Mikolajow and Kolodruby undertook to guard the flank facing the Dniester, Bothmer advanced on Zurawno with the 38th Honved and German 1st and Guard Divs. By the evening Hofmann and Gerok, taking up the pursuit towards Kalisz, had reached the line Zawadka-Holyn. Here on the 5th the right-wing corps of the Rus- sian IX. Army stood stubbornly at bay, while Bothmer was already preparing to force the Dniester at Zurawno, which he had taken by a coup de main. Meanwhile the 1st Cav. Div. had advanced by Tejsarow on Zydaczow, and on the W. flank Szurmay repulsed pow- erful counter-attacks by the Russian XXII. Corps.

On the 6th Gerok and Hofmann broke the resistance of Lechitski's right wing at Holyn and Zawadka, and pursued the XI. Corps, which had been in action there, by Kalisz on towards Wojnilow. Bothmer, with the 38th Honved Inf. Div. and the Guard Div., stormed the heights N. of the Dniester, and on the 7th, after violent fighting with parts of the Russian XVIII. Corps, forced the Rus- sians to retire from Nowoszyny. The 38th Honved Div. reached Bukaczowce that evening. On the 8th Hofmann's troops forced