line Novo Alexandryn-Lubartow. In the centre Woyrsch had extended his Muciejowice bridgehead and was passing all his forces over the Vistula for the advance on Siedlce-Lukow, and under this threat the Russians had entirely evacuated the left of the Vistula. Warsaw city fell on the 5th, though the German IX. Army was unable to force the river there a kilometre broad till the 8th. Ivangorod was evacuated on the sth. Thus the German front had assumed a still more pronounced N.E. direction than at the beginning of the Mackensen manoeuvre; owing to its battle and route conditions, Linsingen's Army was back instead of forward of the alignment, and the Russians had retreated clear of the dangerous central salient to a line marked by the Liwiec, the Bystrica and, facing Mackensen, the middle Wieprz, the Swinka and the Ucherka. The Austrian I. Army, occupied principally with flank-guarding Linsingen along the Bug, had advanced its right to Vladimir Volhynskiy but no far- ther. On the other flank of the Russian retreat Gallwitz was firmly held for the time being. In other words the Russians handled with great skill by General Alexeiev, commander-in-chief of the N.W. front, were successfully effecting their retreat to that line (Kovno-Grodno-Brest-Litovsk-W. of Kovel-Luck- Dubno) which had been already in peace-time regarded as the line of safety for deployment. In territory, they had abandoned no more than they would have been prepared to give up gratui- tously in their pre-war concentration scheme.
But this in itself was, after a year of warfare, a confession of defeat. The enormous losses of that year in men and material losses such that the great army of peace-time with all its resources had practically ceased to exist and the stocks of arms no longer sufficed to equip even the men in action, let alone new formations, with rifles left no doubt that as a dominant factor in the war Russia was out of the reckoning. In the light of after events, the decision to continue the struggle after the loss of the San line in June is seen to be the first step to the Russian Revolu- tion. Yet, on purely military grounds, it was justifiable on the assumption that the French effort to break through the Champagne front would succeed. Only this confidence in victory in September, indeed, can explain the stagnation on the Western front from April to August (broken only by the May battle in Artois), enabling Falkenhayn to withdraw some 12 divisions for the Eastern operations.
By August it was evident that the chances of cutting off any considerable formed army of the Russians in the Kielce region was at an end, and again there came up on the German side the controversy between Falkenhayn and Ludendorff as to what the operations were intended to achieve. Falkenhayn held firmly to the view that the Russian army must be beaten before any wide enveloping movement was undertaken to surround its debris. Writing after the war, he maintained the same opinion, only reproaching himself with not having com- pelled G.H.Q. East to give Gallwitz 20 divisions instead of 14. And certainly, if prisoners and booty were considered, he had in fact inflicted what by all military standards was a " suf- ficient " or " decisive " blow for by the middle of Aug. the Russian losses in prisoners alone had reached the figure of 750,000 since May I, nearly 50% of their combatant strength as it had been at the end of April. But the time-limit was close at hand, and the withdrawals of forces to France and Serbia, delayed as long as possible, had now to be begun. The weeks remaining must, according to Falkenhayn, be devoted to inflicting as much additional loss on the Russians as was possible by frontal pressure coupled with flank attacks on the middle Niemen and east of the Bug, i.e. in the immediate vicinity of the frontal fighting, and possibly raids by light forces on the communications behind Kovno and Brest-Li to vsk. At a suitable date the operation would be closed down, and the best line of defence taken up as a winter front.
I^^ndorff, on the contrary, considered that the actual annihilation of the Russian armies was the only " sufficiently decisive result " that would give freedom of action in the West, and with renewed insistence which went as far as a personal appeal by the Field-Marshal to the Kaiser demanded the
reinforcement of his left (Niemen army) with a view to quick swooping down on Vilna and Molodechno and the closing of the " corridor. " The axis Orany-Lida, originally suggested, was now too near for the required effect, but the principle was the same, and the movement would originate from a more favourable situation of the Niemen army than that existing in June. Preparations for the attack on Kovno by the X. Army were already well advanced, and Ludendorff considered that even at this stage complete success would be possible.
At this period the fighting on the Vindava-Schavli-Dubissa line had definitely turned in favour of the German Niemen army, the Russian V. Army receiving little or no further reinforcements when Mackensen's and Gallwitz's attacks developed. Below was progressing beyond the line named in each of the three directions Mitau-Riga, Poneviesh-Dvinsk, Keidamy-Wilkomir, and about Aug. i his various columns, total- ling about 75 inf. and 5! cavalry divisions, were approximately on the line River Aa-R. Musha-E. of Poneviesh-Keidamy. To the southwest, the German X. and Russian X. Armies were still making war in the same fashion as in March, the Germans based on the Suwalki-Schali lines, and the Russians on their Kovno-Niemen-Grodno fortifications, making periodi- cal thrusts in the region between. But the last important Rus- sian thrust was delivered early in May, as a" relief offensive" toward Schali; and the German reaction became a methodical advance toward Kovno and Olita, which at the time here considered brought their left almost up to their opponent's stronghold. Behind the German advanced line preparations had been made for the siege of Kovno, an essential part of the scheme which Ludendorff still advocated.
The Final Phase. It was evident that the scheme of bringing Below and Eichhorn down upon Vilna and Molodechno, and capturing Kovno in time, would call for the reinforcement of either or both, and, on this ground principally, Falkenhayn preferred to continue the campaign on the same lines as before, though a little later he conceded to Hindenburg freedom to dispose as he chose of the forces in his own area and to Mackensen freedom to pass to the E. of the Bug. Conrad, meantime, was planning an operation in East Galicia with the II., South and VII. Armies.
Thus the last phase of the tremendous campaign consists of 4 parts: (a) the frontal drive of (right to left) the Bug Army, the XL, Woyrsch, IX., XII. and VIII., (6) the attack on the north flank and the rear of the " Corridor " by the German X. and Niemen Armies, (c) the N.E. swerve of the Bug Army and the A.-H. I. Army, and (d) the autumn campaign in E. Galicia. All these were carried out without any great regrouping or reinforcement, and indeed, as regards (a) the forces concerned, were gradually reduced in order to form the army for the Serbian front and to increase the reserve in France. In the case of the operations in E. Galicia, the Russians followed a clear purpose and the parts of their efforts were coordinated. But elsewhere, under the tremendous pressure of the row of hostile armies stretching from Lomza to Wlodawa and Vladimir Volhynskiy, the only general policy was that of gaining time at the expense of ground and of avoiding envelopment at all costs, and the day-to-day situations were met as best they could be. On the German and Austrian side the offensive energy of the troops was beginning to approach its limit, except as regards troops N. of Grodno, so that it may be said that the allied left and the Russian left alone retained the capacity for fresh achievement, while the rest were wearing each other out at an increasing rate.
The central campaign, between the Bobr and the Bug, may best be summarized by recording the battlefields of each of the German armies in succession.
Protected on its right by the Austrian I. Army, the Bug Army fought and won the battles of the Ucherka (Aug. 7-12) and of Wlodawa (Aug. 13-17), and in concert with the XL Army continued its advance northward along the Bug against Brest-Litovsk. Meantime, the crossing of the Bug was authorized in so far as concerned the establishment of bridgeheads; and in carrying out orders with this object the German subordinate
