The division of mounted troops into three groups independ- ent, protective, and corps or divisional has already been explained. The corps or divisional group will consist, in every suitable country, partly of cyclists and partly of mounted men; it will have attached to it a few motor-cyclists and a few light and very fast tanks. These latter would correspond to the present-day armoured car but would be able to move off the roads. They would be used principally for what may be called first reconnaissance purposes, to save horseflesh. Owing to the advent of the aeroplane, the independent group will be smaller, during most of the stages of a war, than formerly was thought likely, but mobile land forces will still be required for detailed reconnaissances and other independent missions.
The composition of the independent and protective groups will be governed by the same principles, since their duties are interchangeable at any time. For both groups, a highly mobile mixed force is required, the ingredients of which will vary in their proportion to one another according to the characteristics of the enemy, the nature of the theatre of war, and the climate. In the different echelons of the ammunition, supply, and medi- cal services the replacement should be aimed at of all horse transport by cross-country mechanical tractors, which might also carry drinking-water for men, if not for horses; the heavier guns too might be drawn by mechanical means. To a division of cavalry at least two squadrons of aeroplanes should be allotted, one for protection against hostile aircraft, and one for cooperat- ing in an attack and for carrying out local reconnaissances required by the cavalry commander for his own information. In certain conditions the use of aeroplanes for supply is most desirable, but machines need not normally be attached to cavalry for this purpose. For intercommunication a liberal supply is needed of motor-cycles, capable if possible of moving across country. Light and fast tanks will be required, in small numbers only, for the reconnaissance purposes already indi- cated in the case of the corps or divisional mounted troops. Tanks, possessing heavier armour and ordnance but at least as mobile as the cavalry, will break down lanes through the enemy's wire entanglements and trenches, will increase his disorganization and render him ripe for a cavalry attack, and will crush his resistance where he is still holding out. In a word, where cavalry formerly had to wait for the infantry to come up and provide weight for an attack, the cooperation of tanks will now enable them to press forward at once. Though it is extremely dangerous to dogmatize regarding numbers, the proportion of tanks to cavalry should, in a civilized country against a well-organized enemy, perhaps be as much as two to a squadron, or 54 in a division of nine regiments.
In every case the backbone of the mobile force will still con- sist of horse soldiers, because they alone of mobile troops can provide the dispersion which is necessary to hold a position or to carry out certain other operations of war, such as the policing of a country in insurrection, the pursuit of an enemy, or the hand-to-hand conflict which is the ultimate object of all battles; and because also, in certain conditions of climate or ground, they alone will retain their mobility. For this latter reason also, part of the artillery should be horse-drawn.
Future Tactics and Training. Before the World War the principles which have already been enunciated held good in all European armies regarding the employment of mounted troops. It was therefore thought probable that in most cases they would come into conflict with, and have to beat, the hostile mounted troops, before being in a position to fulfil their role. Further, because both sides would be anxious to waste as little time as possible, it was considered likely that this first conflict between the opposing cavalries would, at least as often as not, take the form of a mounted collision. Neither of these conclu- sions was justified by the events in the western theatre, in Palestine or in Mesopotamia. The Turkish mounted troops were few in number and despicable in efficiency; the Germans in France and Belgium failed to make much use of their cavalry even during the retreat from Mons. Consequently, so far at least as these three campaigns are concerned, conflicts between
mounted troops were somewhat rare. And even when they did occur no mounted collision took place, except in a few instances when very small numbers were engaged. It is thought that, in the future also, mounted collisions will be uncommon, and for the following reasons. Every battle, whatever arm is taking part, resolves itself into a series of minor engagements, in each of which one side is on the offensive and the other on the defensive. It never happens, in these subsidiary fights, that both sides are so confident of victory as to attack simultaneously. Now, in the case of mounted troops, the side which for the moment feels itself to be inferior will of course take to the rifle. It follows then that a mounted collision will not take place unless the inferior side has no time to dismount, that is to say, unless it is completely surprised. And, even if it has neglected to take any precautions itself, it will probably get warning of the impending charge from the protective detachments necessarily thrown out by the other side. In recent years of peace and war the writer knows of only one case of a mounted collision between bodies larger than a squadron which had any semblance of reality. This was on manoeuvres in Berkshire in 1907, when two cavalry brigades met. On this occasion, for reasons into which it is not necessary to enter but which would not arise in war, both sides had almost entirely neglected to protect themselves. Patrols, on the other hand, coming suddenly round corners or over a rise of ground, have often met unexpectedly, and, just as in the case of dismounted patrols at night in No Man's Land, the ground has then remained in the possession of the side which has most quickly made up its mind to charge with the arme blanche. While, therefore, horse soldiers will often meet in war, collisions on a large scale in which both sides remain mounted will be seldom seen; but single troops or smaller patrols will often succeed best by immediately riding down on the enemy, and will thereby establish a moral ascendency which will be of the utmost value in the subsequent operations.
In the training of cavalry in the past too much attention has been paid to the mounted collision and too little to the mounted attack of infantry or dismounted cavalry. It has been thought apparently that the latter form of attack would be comparatively rare, and that the machine-gun and quick-firing rifle, reinforced by trenches and wire, would nearly always compel the attacker to take to the rifle himself. To take this view is to assume that cavalry will never meet an enemy who is hopelessly inferior in numbers or spirit, or who has run short of ammunition; to suppose that an army will on all occasions have sufficient time, energy and material to dig trenches and erect obstacles; and to ignore the moral effect of a cavalry charge on both the mounted attacker and the dismounted defender. The events of the World War have shown clearly the fallacy of such ideas. At Cerizay, in the retreat from Mons, the British 5th Cavalry Brigade charged some dismounted cavalry who were acting as vanguard to a force of all arms. The advance of this force was stopped for several hours and upwards of 300 of the enemy were killed, wounded or captured, the British casualties being about 40. When the Germans retired from Peronne in the spring of 1917, three regiments of the British $th Cavalry Div. galloped simultaneously through the villages of Villers Faucon, Guyencourt and Saulcourt and in a few moments had captured them at a negligible cost of life, the hostile rear-guard fleeing on the first appearance of the cavalry. Reference has already been made to the action of El Mughar in Palestine in 1917, in which i ,000 prisoners were taken by the 6th Mounted Brigade at a cost to themselves of under one hundred. In the same theatre of war in 1918 there were numerous successful charges. For instance, two weak squadrons of the 2nd Indian Lancers met a Turkish battalion at Megiddo, killed 46 with the lance and captured 470; near the Jordan two squadrons of the 29th Indian Lancers secured 800 prisoners, with about 30 machine- guns, in one charge; north of Damascus the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade struck a retiring column in flank after galloping six miles, and captured a divisional commander and 1,500 men. In these campaigns, which resulted in the capture of Jerusalem and in the expulsion of the Turks from Syria, the
