ranged against one another across the North Sea. In terms of gun-power the British fleet was decidedly superior; 13 of the British dreadnoughts were armed with 13-5 guns and the others with 12 in., while the Germans had i2-in. guns in only nine of their ships and n in. in the remainder.
On July 29, the day that the British Home (or First) Fleet left for the north, the First Lord (Mr. Winston Churchill) pressed the Cabinet for the initiation of the Precautionary Period, and the warning telegram went out to all squadrons abroad. By Aug. i the tension had increased. Germany had issued her ultimatum to Russia and had declared Kriegsgefa.hr. In Hamburg British ships were being detained. Immediately this news arrived the Admiralty issued orders at 2:15 P.M. to act on the instructions for mobilization, but the reserves were not yet called out. Late that night the news came in that Germany had declared war on Russia, and at 1 125 A.M. on Aug. 2 the Admiralty issued the order to mobilize. By 4 A.M. on Aug. 3 the whole fleet stood mobilized and ready for action.
The German mobilization had taken a somewhat different course. Arrangements had been made for the fleet to visit various ports in Norway, but on July 15, when the cruise commenced, the German Admiral Staff was already beginning to doubt the wisdom of its continuance. By July 23 the Kaiser had adopted the view that the fleet should be recalled, but the Chancellor was loth to do anything to aggravate the current tension and proposed to wait and see what England did. But no sooner had Adml. von Ingenohl anchored in Sogniefiord on July 25 and opened his mails than he became deeply impressed with the gravity of the situation. He went straight to the Kaiser and persuaded him to let the fleet sail for its home ports. It got under way on the 26th, and at 7 P.M. on July 27 had assembled off Stavanger. On the 3oth the German ambassador at St. James's sent word that Sir Edward Grey had told him that the British fleet had sailed for the north of Scotland. Strained rela- tions were notified to all commanders-in-chief that day, and on the 3ist at 5 P - M - the telegram for Kriegsgefahr (Precautionary Period) went out. Everything was now hastening downhill. War was declared with Russia on Aug. i. The 2nd and 3rd Squadrons came round from Kiel to the North Sea the same day and at 8 P.M. that evening the order to mobilize went out.
One important step had not been taken. The German Admiral Staff had asked for orders to be issued for armed merchantmen to proceed to the trade routes, but the Chancellor had demurred and only one proceeded to sea. Before any more could sail the British Grand Fleet was at its post and actually put to sea on the morning of Aug. 4 to circumvent movements of this sort.
Its old commander, Adml. Sir George Callaghan, was no longer with it. It was thought that a younger commander was required to face the heavy responsibilities of war. By 8:30 A.M. Sir George Callaghan had struck his flag, and the fleet put to sea on Aug. 4 under its new commander, Sir John Jellicoe. That night at ii P.M. the eventful order went out to all ships and squadrons " Commence hostilities at once against Germany."
The Grand Fleet, for so it was to be designated, was already at sea engaged in a sweep to the south-east. These sweeps were an essential feature of the British war plans, which were primarily based on the concentration of the main fleet in the north to guard the northern exit of the North Sea. The closure of the southern exit was to be effected by flotillas supported by older squadrons and by the use of mines.
By its mere concentration at the outlets of the North Sea the British fleet performed all its principal tasks. It covered the trade routes, cut off Germany from the ocean, protected the coast line against invasion and secured the transport of the army. Further afield the focal and terminal areas of trade were guarded by cruiser squadrons. The protection of the coast was entrusted to patrol flotillas, under the Admiral of Patrols (8th Flotilla in Forth, pth Flotilla in Tyne, 7th Flotilla in Humber, 6th Flotilla at Dover). This strategy was simple and effective. It offered ample opportunities for offensive tactics, survived the whole war, and was justified by the course of events.
The plans embodying it were only prepared in the latter
part of 1913, and differed materially from those of the previous decade, which had favoured large landing operations om the German coast. The whole coastline of Great Britain stood behind the British plans, stretching like a colossal breakwater across Germany's path to the sea, and reproducing the geo- ' graphical conditions of the Dutch wars.
This breakwater was 500 m. long. From the Shetlands to Norway (Sumburgh Head to Udsire) was 190 m., a distance well within the compass of a strong fleet. Dover Straits was only 21 m. wide, and though the concentration of the main fleet at Scapa 500 m. away left it exposed to attack, any British force south of 56 (i.e. the latitude of the Forth) threatened the flank of a force attacking the Channel, and Germany never actually took the risk of such a venture with any of her big ships.
So long as the enemy refrained from an attack in force, the dispatch of British troops across the Channel was almost as easy as sending them to Ireland or across the Thames. The length of the principal route from Southampton to Havre was only loo m., and the average time of transport only 13 hours. No transport was, therefore, ever more than seven hours from port. The route was over 100 m. west of Dover Straits, and in these circumstances the whole transport system could be quickly and rapidly controlled.
But Dover remained the weak point of the war plans, and all the more so as the actual organization of the southern area was defective. In the north there was one command. In the south there were five, namely, the Channel Fleet, the Dover Patrol, Cruiser Force C, the Harwich flotillas and Commodore (S). There can be little doubt that a determined attack in this area at the beginning of the war would have severely shaken the whole fabric of British strategy, but the enemy never attempted it. British troops poured in a continuous procession across the Channel. With the exception of the " Goeben " and " Breslau " in the Mediterranean there was nothing to threaten the safety of the Channel to the westward, and on Aug. 10 this anxiety was removed by the news that the " Goeben," after a strange chapter of accidents, had entered the Dardanelles the evening before. (See GOEBEN AND BRESLAU.)
Germany's strategy was defensive. This was forced on her by her inferior strength and unfavourable position. It was based on the idea that the British fleet would enter the Bight, where it was hoped to wear it down by ruthless minelaying and submarine warfare. Then when the British fleet had been reduced to reasonable proportions and when an equilibrium of strength (the greatly desired Kriifteausgleich) had been attained, a decisive battle would be dared. First a policy of waiting, of sorties and attrition, then a decisive action. This was the substance of the German operation orders for the North Sea.
Movements during 1(114. I n pursuance of these aims, at 8:30 P.M. on Aug. 4, an hour after orders to prepare for war with England went out, the " Konigin Luise " of the Hamburg American Line was despatched to lay mines off the Thames. She fulfilled her task but never returned. While Jellicoe was carrying out his sweep in the north Comm. Tyrwhitt with the " Amethyst " and " Amphion " and the Harwich flotillas carried out a similar operation in the south. About 10 A.M. on the sth the " Konigin Luise " was sighted on her way back, and the " Lance " and " Landrail " followed hot on her trail. She could go only 21 knots, and was quickly overhauled and sunk about 50 m. east (true) from Lowestoft. But she had laid her mines off Aldeburgh, and the " Amphion " returning ran on one of them and went down in a few minutes with a loss of 1 50 men. This threat to the North Sea routes emphasized the necessity of minesweeping, and started the enormous expansion of that important service which became one of the principal features of the war (see MINELAYING).
Meanwhile the Germans had seen nothing of the British fleet, and on Aug. 6 10 German submarines, escorted for 100 m. by the " Hamburg " and " Stettin," went off into the North Sea to look for it, with orders to remain on the line between Stavanger and Scapa Flow till 6 P.M. on the loth. Their first cruise was not particularly successful. A torpedo was fired at
