apart. The German destroyers appeared, and after opening fire on the " Laverock " retired. March 17 1917 saw a more suc- cessful attempt. This time the barrage patrol consisted of four destroyers, the " Laertes," " Laforey," " Llewellyn " and " Paragon," patrolling on separate beats running S.W. and N.E. about 2 m. apart. Off Deal were lying the " Canterbury," " Faulknor " and four destroyers; the " Broke " and five de- stroyers were in Dover. At 1 1 150 P.M. the " Paragon," on patrol at about the centre of the barrage on a N.E. course, sighted three or four destroyers, challenged them, received a heavy broadside and a torpedo, broke in two and sank. The " Laforey," 2 m. off, under the impression that the " Paragon " had struck a mine, was on her way with the " Llewellyn " to pick up survivors when the latter was hit by a torpedo, which was attributed at the time to a submarine. The destroyers at Dover went out but saw nothing, though the Germans were seen at 2:35 A.M. off Broadstairs, where they sunk a merchant ship and disappeared. The " Moewe " had slipped out to the north again, and while these events were happening in the Straits got back to Kiel after capturing 27 ships, one of which she had succeeded in send- ing in to Swinemunde. But another raider on the way out had not been so fortunate. At 4 P.M. on March 17 the a.c. " Achilles " (Capt. F. M. Leake) and the a.m.s. " Dundee " (Comm. S. M. Day, R.N.R.) had intercepted the " Leopard " disguised as the Norwegian s.s. " Reina Norge," 200 m. N.E. of the Faroes, and after a short action had sent her to the bottom.
April 20 saw another raid at Dover, but this time the raiders did not escape so easily. The system of patrols had been changed since the last attack. Instead of patrols of single destroyers, two patrols were maintained, one called the Western Barrage Patrol of two flotilla leaders patrolling on the N. and W. side of the Straits as far as the S. Goodwin Light vessel. The other, called the E. Barrage Patrol, consisted of a division of destroyers, patrolling on a line S.W. from a buoy approxi- mately halfway between Dover and Calais. Reserves were available at Dover and Deal as before, and on the night in ques- tion the W. Barrage Patrol consisted of the " Broke " (Comm. E. R. G. Evans) and the " Swift " (Comm. A. Peck). The German force, consisting of the 2nd Flotilla, which comprised their best and fastest boats, was in two sections. One went off to the S. and appeared off the French coast. The other of about six boats hugged the northern shore and fired at the English coast off Dover in an aimless sort of way. The night was dark, and at 12:45 A - M - they were on their way home about 3 m. E. of the S. Goodwin on an easterly course when they were sighted on the port bow about 600 yd. off by the " Swift " and " Broke," steering an opposite course. This time there was no challenging. The " Swift " fired a torpedo, put her helm hard-a-starboard and attempted to ram, but passed through the enemy's line and went off in pursuit of the leader. The " Broke " fired a torpedo, turned hard to port and crashed into 642, the third boat in line. A hand-to-hand fight ensued in the darkness with German boarders, who were driven back by the fo'c'sle gun's crew led by Midshipman Donald Gyles. The " Broke's " engines were disabled by a shell, but she shook herself clear and completed the destruction of another destroyer, GSj, already disabled by one or both of the torpedoes previously fired. The reserve division which had put to sea from Dover, only arrived in time to help to pick up the German survivors. This ended the raid of April 20, which made the " Broke " and Comm. Evans famous, and with the exception of two ineffectual sorties on April 25 and May 2, when the Germans shelled Dun- kirk and Ramsgate, stopped such ventures for nearly a year.
On April 6 the United States entered the war, and Vice- Adml. W. S. Sims was dispatched to determine the best methods of cooperating with the Allies. This was a black month for merchant shipping. At sea the war developed into a protracted struggle with the submarine, which became by degrees the dominant aspect of the war (see SUBMARINE WARFARE), while the battle-fleets were active as breakwaters behind which the submarine and its antagonists fought out the issues of the war at sea. The reply to the submarine took three forms, the reorgan-
ization of the naval staff, the institution of a convoy system (see CONVOY), and the development of antidotes in the form of mine barrages and technical devices such as hydrophones and depth charges. In these spheres the United States navy was able to render valuable assistance: convoys required for destroy- ers, which the Grand Fleet could not supply. The U.S. de- stroyers, the first six of which under Comm. J. K. Taussig arrived at Queenstown on May 4, eased the situation and proved a wel- come and necessary reinforcement.
In the Mediterranean the war had become more and more a war of flotillas. There the Straits of Otranto took the place of the Straits of Dover and a force of some 50 vessels, chiefly drifters, patrolled it to prevent the passage of German and Aus- trian submarines from their base at Cattaro. These little ships were attacked by a force of Austrian cruisers and destroyers on May 15, and as they stoutly refused to surrender, 14 were sunk, the skipper of the " Gowan Lea " receiving a V.C. for his gallant efforts to engage an overwhelmingly superior force. In the " Floandi " the wireless operator, Harris, was hit, but continued to send out messages till he fell dead at his post. The light cruisers " Dartmouth " and " Bristol " heard the call, and on their approach the enemy fled back to Cattaro; though the " Dartmouth " (Capt. A. P. Addison) was hit by a torpedo but got safely back.
At Dover Adml. Sir Reginald Bacon had endeavoured to extend the war against the submarine to the land and to attack it in its base by bombarding the locks at Zeebrugge and Ost- end. These bombardments were carried out in summer by the monitors " Lord Clive," " General Wolfe," " Prince Rupert," " Prince Eugene " (all 2 i2-in.), " Marshal Soult," " Erebus " and " Terror " (all 2 is-in.). The two latter joined the force in 1917 and took part with the " Marshal Soult " in an important bombardment off Zeebrugge on May 12 1917, carried out at a range of *8,ooo yards. Though these bombardments did not actually prevent the Germans using the ports, they damaged the dockyards and made it more difficult for them to do so, besides adding largely to British experience of bombardment work. During a shelling of Ostend on June 5 six German de- stroyers sallied out but were engaged by the Harwich Flotilla and driven back to port with the loss of 820. It was only now that the British authorities woke up to the extent to which the enemy continued to ply his trade along the coast between Rotterdam and German ports. The Harwich Flotilla began to harass it and succeeded in sinking some 24 ships during the year, capturing four on July 16 and driving two others ashore. The traffic between Sweden and Germany could no longer be checked, for with the collapse of Russia the Baltic had passed completely under German control. On July 9 the British battle-fleet received a severe blow in the loss of one of its dreadnoughts, the " Vanguard " (Capt. Jas. D. Dick), by an internal explosion, in the same terribly sudden way as the " Bulwark " and " Natal." She was lying at anchor in Scapa when at 11:20 P.M. a great sheet of flame leapt up from her forward, and when the smoke cleared away she was gone. Seven Allied ships-of-war suffered this fate during the war the " Bulwark " at Sheerness Nov. 26 1914, " Benedetto Brin " Sept. 27 1915, " Natal " at Inver- gordon Dec. 30 1915, "Leonardo da Vinci" Aug. 2 1916, " Tsukuba " Jan. 14 1917, and " Kawachi " July 12 1918.
Meanwhile a big project for mining Heligoland Bight had been given to the Plans Division as its first task, and prepara- tions for it were steadily progressing, though its execution was delayed till Oct. by lack of mines. The enemy's outpost forces and minesweepers were not left immune from attack, and on Sept. i, the 4th L.C.S. and isth Flotilla made a raid on the Channel by Horn's Reef, driving four German minesweepers ashore off Ringkiobing. These minesweepers, working some- times 150 and later 180 m. from Heligoland, formed an, excellent target for attack, but as they always had heavy ships waiting in support and British heavy craft could not risk mined waters, British light-cruiser raids could not be carried out.
No big operation had taken place in the Baltic since 1915, and a German incursion into the Gulf of Finland, in Nov. 1916,
