offensive, but his troops were unfit for it. The III. Army, while retreating, had turned round the left of the IV. Corps. The latter was firmly supported by the right of the II. Army Corps, which had not given way. The point of touch between the armies was at Mont-Quintin, to the N.E. of Montmedy. The V. Corps needed to recover its strength and the 4oth Div. of the VI. Corps was in a bad condition after its efforts of the previous day. The Colonial Div., which had formed Gen. de Langle de Gary's army reserve, had been pushed on by him to the first line, and was ordered to resume the attack by pivoting round the II. Corps, which was to wait until the Ruffey army was enabled by an advance northward to cover its right flank. But the IV. Army was not iA a condition to attack; on the left the J. B. Dumas Div. of the IX. Corps, which was fresh, pushed forward, but found itself in a difficult position, since on its right the XI. Corps remained in the rear. During that day the XII. Corps, both its flanks uncovered owing to its neighbours having given way, had a serious check.
Generally speaking, on the evening of the ,23rd, the front of the IV. Army was marked by a straight line drawn from Month- erme to Mont-Quintin, near Virton, and facing north-east- wards; the front of the III. Army, by a straight line extending from Mont-Quintin to Nouillon-Pont-Spincourt through Mar- ville. Gen. de Langle de Gary was ready to make any sacrifice to prevent the right flank of the V. Army from being uncovered; Gen. Lanr-ezac, on the other hand, had retreated on his own authority and without warning his neighbours.
On the 24th the IV. Army was astride the Mouse, its front being marked by Revin, Mezieres, Donchery, Douzy, St. Wal- froy and Avioth; at Mont-Quintin it was in touch with the III. Army. There was some fighting during the day in different parts of the front of the IV. Army. On the left wing, the IX. Corps, which had been joined by the Moroccan Div., moved from the Semoy to Mezieres without being followed by an enemy on whom it had inflicted a severe lesson. On the morning of the 25th the II. Army Corps sent patrols from Avioth to Lahagne, near Bellefontaine, to bring back wounded men who had been left there because unfit to be moved. One of the patrols (Lt. Benoit, of the i8th Chasseur Battalion) killed a German staff commander on whom were found the orders given to the Ger- man IV. Army for the forcing of the Chiers and Meuse crossings, on Aug. 26 and 27.
In the IV. Army, a patrol (Sergt. Ronchon of the 3rd Hussars) attacked a German motor-car and seized orders which showed that the German 33rd Res. Div. was to attack from Metz towards Etain. A trap was set for that division, not without great difficulty, owing to the lack of coordination between the staffs of the III. Army, the Lorraine army, and that of the general-in-chief. All the energy of Col. Tanant, staff sub-chief of the III. Army, was required to organize a manoeuvre. If, however, the German 33rd Res. Div. managed to escape on account of these difficulties and because the reserve troops were slow to move, they did not do so without confusion and consider- able losses. Thus, the French IV. and III. Armies had not lost all material and moral value, as was believed in the German camp. As soon as the ground was in their favour they would be able to resist the enemy.
During Aug. 24 the Colonial Corps had had to repulse violent attacks at St. Walfroy, and the V. Army Corps had beaten a somewhat hasty retreat. On the 251)1 the right of the IV. Army retired between Chiers and Meuse; the same day the IV. Corps experienced so serious a check at Marville that its chief, Gen. Boelle, who was in close touch with Gen. Gerard, asked him to undertake to bring back his corps artillery regi- ment to him. This detail shows how intimate was the coopera- tion between the III. and IV. Armies.
The right of the III. Army, badly covered by the cavalry division, whose chief was, moreover, relieved of his command, was left in the air by the suppression of the Lorraine army (night of Aug. 25-26). Gen Maunoury, indeed, received orders to leave the defence of the Hauts-de-Meuse to Gen. Pol Durand and to return their respective forces to Verdun and Toul. Gen.
Maunoury himself, with his staff, with Gen. Beaudenom de Lamaze and the 55th and 56th Res. Divs., was to proceed to Montdidier. It is well known that this was how the VI. Army was formed; their attack on the Ourcq, in concert with the English army and the French V. Army, brought about the rout of the German right at the Marne.
In the morning of Aug. 26 the right of the IV. Army and the III. Army crossed to the left bank of the Meuse. Dun (IV. Corps) was the point of junction between the IV. and III. Armies on the morning of the 26th. By the evening of that day the III. Army was almost entirely on the left bank of the Meuse, facing eastwards; the IV. Corps to the N., the W. and the S. of Dun; the V. Corps in. the Montfaucon region, the VI. Corps to the S. of Montfaucon and the N. of Verdun (H.Q. at Esnes). The 7th Cav. Div. was sent to Dombasle, between Verdun and Clermont, as though the army commander feared the enemy might turn Verdun by the S. and take the III. Army in reverse. The 42nd Div. had remained as an advanced guard on the right bank of the Meuse; on the afternoon of Aug. 27 it received orders to cross to the left bank; on the 28th it passed into the army reserve at Varennes. This division was, more- over, to be taken from the VI. Corps and allotted to the army detachment under the command of Gen. Foch.
The III. Army did not come in contact with the enemy on the 26th and 27th. But the 7th Inf. Div. was summoned towards Beauclair, to the W. of Stenay, and placed at the dis- posal of the II. Corps, while the front of the 8th Div. was extended nearly as far as the road from Stenay to Beauclair. Thus the German V. Army was not in pursuit; it was slowly advancing towards the Meuse, its left at Ornes alarming the governor of Verdun who asked the IV. Army for assistance. The centre passed through Damvillers; the right caused uneasi- ness towards Stenay.
On the evening of the 25th the orders to the IV. Army ran: " To-morrow the IV. Army will establish itself on the left bank of the Meuse in order to resist." On the evening of the 26th the orders were as follows: " From to-morrow the IV. Army will engage the decisive battle on the Meuse." These last instructions were enthusiastically received by the troops. The II. Corps was to defend the left bank of the Meuse, from Stenay to Luzy. The Colonial Corps, on its left, was to defend the crossing in the neighbourhood of Inor, leaving one division as an army reserve at Vaux-en-Dieulet. The XII. Corps was to hold the crossings of the Meuse in the Joncq region, the XVII. Corps facing Mouzon. The XII. Corps, reinforced by the 52nd and 6oth Res. Divs., was to prevent the crossing of the Meuse between Remilly and Mezieres. By the evening of Aug. 24 the 4th Cav. Div. had been given back to the V. Army. The mis- sion of the gth Cav. Div. (Gen. de 1'Espee) was to ensure the communications, in conjunction with the IX. Corps.
On the evening of Aug. 25 the IX. Army Corps (Gen. Dubois) received the special mission of covering the Signy-FAbbaye region and forming the connexion between the IV. and V. Armies. The situation, indeed, was becoming serious on the left of the IV. Army. The Saxon III. Army, of whose existence the French army had long remained ignorant, had shown signs of its presence since the 24th. The French V. Army, thanks to its retreat, no longer risked being taken in reverse; but as a large space unoccupied by troops existed between the IV. and V. Armies, it was to be feared that the German III. Army might penetrate there in order to act against the wing of one or other of the two French armies, according to its inclination. Gen. Dubois found himself thrust into the space, with the pth Cav. Div. to assist him. His position was unique all through the campaign, and it was owing to the suppleness of his manceuvr- ing that Gen. Dubois succeeded in performing the difficult mission with which he had been entrusted. On the evening of Aug. 25, he placed one of his divisions at Renwez (10 km. N.W. of Mezieres), facing the Meuse and the N.; and the other divi- sion farther eastward towards Rocroi in the N. and Signy-1'Ab- baye in the south. He thus completely covered the left flank of the IV. Army.
