Page:EB1922 - Volume 31.djvu/44

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and, if the crisis came, he could only maintain his power by the same methods by which it had been attained.

It was in Germany and Germany alone that organized and official opinion put forward, as the very basis of political life, frank and unabashed, the power of the sword. Historically this could easily be explained, and no nation can free itself from its own past. English opinion, just because it required the main- tenance of sea-power, on which the existence of the Empire and the security of the nation depended, was always prompt to recognize the equal necessity to Germany of a strong army. But it could not be obscured that, while in other nations the maintenance of great armaments was regarded as a burden of which they would gladly be freed, in Germany the increase of military power was welcomed as an end in itself. It was not mere- ly a weapon of security, an instrument of Government it wasthe basis of the state; the efforts of the pacific writers were not merely criticised on their merits, but condemned as heresy. And this was no mere academic principle it was made the corner-stone of German diplomacy. Whatever the question at issue might be, always there was heard from Germany the ultimate appeal to the German army. This bred a habit of impatience. Whenever Germany was worsted in diplomacy and this often happened there were many who would cry out that after all there were other means by which she could secure the victory.

Every increase in German armaments required an appeal to the patriotism of the people. These appeals could not be made without arousing a dangerous spirit. The German Government had been glad to secure the support of the newly formed Flotten- verein for their great naval programme; its emissaries found their way into every town and village in the country, and the literature they disseminated necessarily encouraged hostility to Great Britain. The Pan-German League openly advocated a policy which would have involved Germany in war with every country in the world, but the rising spirit of Chauvinism had spread far more widely, and the very fact that it was criticised by the Socialists tended to make sympathy with it the hallmark of a " good German." The Government, which depended for the naval and military votes on the spirit of militant patriotism, found that they had aroused a force which they could not, even if they would, control. During the year 1913 the centenary celebrations of the great events by which Germany freed herself from the Napoleonic yoke added fuel to the flame. Inspired by the intense consciousness of Germanic superiority, the Ger- mans were ready, when the time came, to emulate in war, as they had surpassed in peace, the deeds of their forefathers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Official documents and publications: The texts of the treaties will be found in British and foreign state papers. The most important special collection of treaties is: Dr. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879-1914 (1920). The text of the Franco-Russian agreement is published in Documents diplo- matiques: L' Alliance Franco-Russe, issued by Ministere des Affaires fetrangeres (Paris, 1918). The treaties between the Balkan States in 1912 were published by Guechoff in L' Alliance Balkanique (1918); see also BALKAN PENINSULA: Balkanicus, The Aspirations of Bul- garia; Report of the International Commission to inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Carnegie Endowment, 1914) ; Le Traitc de Bukarest (Bukarest: Imprime'rie de I'Etat, 1913). The official statement of the German case on the responsibility for the war, Das deutsche Weissbuch ilber die Schuld am Kriege (1919), contains a good deal of material, especially on the relations with Russia and Balkan affairs. Siebert, Diplomatische Aktenstiicke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre (1921), appeared too late to be used in this article. The fullest general treatment of the period is that by Reventlow, Deutschlands Auswartige Politik 1888-1913 (1914). The second edition, 1915, differs materially from the first. Egelhaaf, Geschichte der neuesten Zeit (1918), is a well- arranged textbook, but the treatment of the events connected with the war is very partisan. The fullest treatment in English is that of Bernadotte Schmitt, England and Germany 1740-1014. Zur Europiiischen Politik 1897-1914: Unveroffentlichte Dokumente in amtlichem Auftrage herausgegeben unter Leitung von Bernhard Schwertfeger, 5 vols., contains selections from the despatches of Bel- gian diplomatists during the years before the war, which were taken from Brussels during the German occupation.

For British policy before the war, see Lord Haldane, Before the War (1920) ; Lord Loreburn, How the War Came (1919) ; Sir E. Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace; Prof. Gilbert Murray, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey; Sir Geo. Prothero, German Policy before

the War (1916). The correspondence between the German Emperor and the Tsar has been published in The Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar (The Willy-Nicky Correspondence), edited by N. F. Grant.

Among the memoirs and reminiscences the more important are: Prince v. Billow, Imperial Germany (1914); Grand Admiral v. Tir- pitz, My Memoirs; Karl Helfferich, Die Vorgeschichte des Welt- krieges (1919) ; Bethmann Hollweg, Reflections on the World War (1920); von Jagow, Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (1919); Baron Beyens, L'AllemagneavantlaGuerre (1915) ; Dr. M. Boghitsche- witsch, Kriegsursachen ( 1919), (English translation, C. L.Van Langen- huyen, Causes of the War, 1919); Raymond Poincare, Les Origines de la Guerre (1921); Baron v. Eckardstein, Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwiirdigkeiten (1919). Of great importance are the four volumes by Otto Hammann: Der neue Kurs, Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, Um den Kaiser and Der missverstandene Bismarck.

For the growth of the German navy see Archibald Hurd, The Command of the Sea (1912); for Austria-Hungary: H. Wickham Steed, The Growth of the Habsburg Monarchy (4th ed., 1919); Dr. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Mon- archy (1911); for Morocco: Caillaux, Agadir (1919); Tardieu, La Conference d'Algeciras (1907); E. D. Morel, Morocco in Diplomacy (1912, republished as Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, 1920); Docu- ments Diplomatiques: Affaires du Maroc (1912). (J. W. H.-M.)


The Murder of the Austrian Archduke. The preceding pages of this article describe the state of Europe when, on Sunday, June 28, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife, while on an official tour of inspection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were murdered at Serajevo, the capital. The two assassins were young men of 20 years of age, natives of Bosnia and therefore Austrian subjects. Such evidence as is available seems to show that the motive for the crime must be traced to the intense racial animosity which had existed in Bosnia since the time of the annexation, increased as it was by the growing discontent in Croatia, and by the rising tide of aggressive nationalism in Serbia; no evidence has been forth- coming which would compromise any responsible Serbian officials, still less the Serbian Government itself. Among the accomplices were indeed two residents of Serbia, a major named Jankasitch and a Croatian exile, Tziganovitch, the first being a Comitadji chief, the second a temporary railway clerk. All the other accom- plices seem to have been Bosnians. The two assassins were eventually condemned to penal servitude; of the accomplices three were executed. This crime created a great sensation. It happened at the time of the German festivities at Kiel, associated with the completion of the enlargement of the canal, at which a British squadron was present. They were at once broken off. The German Emperor returned to Berlin. He intended to go to Vienna to attend the funeral of the Archduke, and at the same time to discuss the political situation with his ally; this project was abandoned, for the police had intelligence of a great plot; twelve assassins were on their way to Vienna.

Elsewhere, except among the comparatively few who really understood how precarious was the position in the Balkans, it was the personal aspect of this event which attracted attention. The general feeling was one of deepest indignation, and of the warmest sympathy for Austria and for the aged Emperor, Francis Joseph, whose life had already been so full of tragedy. In Austria it was regarded as a grave political portent. The death of the Archduke seems to have been treated in the highest quar- ters with remarkable equanimity, but the crime which was no isolated act was looked on as a blow at the very existence of the monarchy. The relations with Serbia had for long been the cause of grave disquiet, internal as well as external. There had in fact just been drawn up a very important Austrian memorandum for communication to the German Government; in it the Balkan situation was discussed, and stress was laid on the scheme at- tributed to Russia of creating a new Balkan league, which was to include Rumania and be used as an offensive weapon against the Triple Alliance. In this scheme the disaffection in Bosnia and Croatia, which was fermented by the agitation from Serbia, would be a dangerous instrument. Against this it had been in- tended to propose a pro-Austrian anti-Serbian alliance with Bul- garia and Turkey, which could be used also to check the pro- Russian influences in Rumania. Count Berchtold and his col-