during their period of pregnancy; the observance by these women of all matters pertaining to timely hygiene; proper supervision and care in confinement, including adequate obstetrical and nursing care and provision for nursing supervision of the infant during the first month of life, it is possible to reduce the infant death-rate from congenital causes in the first month of life at least one-half, and, in many instances, two-thirds. Such results seem to show that the present high rates from congenital causes are unnecessary.
Percentage for Various Disease Groups, U.S. Birth Registration Area, 1919.
Total Rural Urban
Infectious diseases . ... 2-8 2-9 2-4
Respiratory diseases . ... 14-8 13-5 16-2
Diarrhoeal diseases . ... 18-2 15-7 20-5
Congenital diseases . ... 42-7 41-6 44-0
All other causes . . ... 21-5 26-3 16-9
IOO-O IOO-O IOO-O
Diarrhoeal Diseases. The causes of infant mortality from diar- rhoeal diseases already have been incidentally discussed. They may be summed up, however, as wrong methods of feeding, lack of hygiene, depressed vitality due to heat and lack of observance of the ordinary methods of hygienic care during infancy.
Respiratory Diseases. -The infant death-rate from respiratory diseases is largely the result of broncho-pneumonia, secondary to measles or whooping-cough. The effect of influenza upon the infant death-rate in the United States has been marked. The results, however, have been due not so much to infant deaths from influenza as to the fact that the mother has died from the disease and the infant, owing to deprivation of breast feeding, has been unable to resist the disease. Experience in public health work has seemed to show that the occurrence of respiratory diseases, in common with the occurrence of contagious diseases in infancy, is due very largely to improper methods of living and is closely allied to lack of ventilation of living-rooms and overcrowding of families.
Contagious Diseases. This group furnishes only a small propor- tion of the total infant death-rate. Deaths in this classification are mainly those due to measles and whooping-cough, both of which must be considered as extremely dangerous diseases in infancy.
National Maternity and Infant Welfare Law. Reference has been made to the efforts of the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor, Washington, and the various state and other bureaus of child hygiene to reduce the infant death-rates of certain localities. The 67th Congress of the United States passed a bill " to promote the welfare and hygiene of maternity and infancy." This bill, signed by the President, was to be operative during five years. It provides that each state shall receive $10,000 outright, an additional - $5,000 provided it appropriates an equal sum, and thereafter a pro rate share of approximately $1,000,000, based upon the population of the various states, provided, however, that the state in ques- tion raises an amount equal to this additional appropriation. The money thus given is to be used for the purposes stated in the bill, that is, promotion of maternity and infant welfare work. The general central administration of the act is to be carried out by the committee, composed of the surgeon-general of the U.S. Public Health Service, the 'U.S. Commissioner of Education and the chief of the Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor, the chief of the Children's Bureau being the executive officer. The purpose of this bill is to reduce the maternity and infant death-rates by help- ing the states to establish work of their own for the purpose.
BIBLIOGRAPHY. Birth Statistics for the Registration Area of the United Slates, IQIQ, Bureau of the Census, Department of Com- merce, Washington, D.C. ; W. H. Park, Public Health and Hygiene; Statistical Report of Infant Mortality for 1920, American Child Hygiene Assn. ;Wm. H. Guilfoy, M.D., The Influence of Nationality upon the Mortality of a Community; Physicians' Pocket Reference to the International List of Causes of Death, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. (S. J. B.*)
INFANTRY (see 14.517). To appreciate the lessons learned from the experience of infantry in the World War in relation to the past as well as to the future, it is necessary to emphasize one particular aspect of infantry evolution the gradual decrease in size of the unit which one man can command. It is desirable also to visualize what " command " really implies. A corporal is
said to " command " the squad of recruits which he is training on
a barrack square; he does it by shouting words of command to
them. Marshal Foch also " commanded " the Allied armies in
western Europe in 1918; he did it, however, without raising his
voice above its usual pitch. Between the Marshal and the corpo-
ral were a host of intermediate commanders of every sort, kind
and description, but we are concerned here mainly with infantry
commanders and especially with those in the junior ranks. For
theirs is the hardest task in a battle, and it is upon them that
success depends. " The wisest plans, the most thorough prepara-
tions, the most brilliant guidance avail nothing unless the fight is won by the fighters by the platoons." The minds of superior officers therefore are devoted especially in peace-time to hard thinking on the problem of what they can possibly do or invent to make junior infantry commanders superior to the adversaries whom they are likely to meet in action. A general's command implies much forethought as well as some experience in its holder, and thus his " command " again has a different meaning. He is a trainer, and it is with respect to this part of " command " that we shall chiefly be concerned.
If we turn to the past for a moment, we find that the Greeks invented and trained their phalanx and the Romans their legion, and with these two systems the infantry arm dominated the known world for several centuries. Each of these tactical forma- tions was based upon a most precise drill, executed almost daily by junior commanders. Moreover this drill was in each case suited to the age and the esprit de corps of the period. In battle the voice of the infantry superior could be heard and was in- s'tantly obeyed, both in the phalanx and the legion. Then ensued the Dark Ages and comparative chaos, which was dominated by feudal horse soldiers, until archery made infantry again supreme. Precise drill was at the root of the success of the archers, and fire orders were strictly enforced. If we take Crecy (1346) as an example, we find that Edward III. initiated fire orders himself, though he left the command of the front-line to his son, the youthful Prince of Wales in charge of the archers. A careful survey of the ground at Crecy from the commanding position of its windmill, in which King Edward was posted, enables one to see why it was possible for him to issue fire orders and instructions to the archers posted below him. They were only a few hundred yards from him, but he could see better than they could when the crowd of French cavaliers would offer the best target to the British longbowmen. These bowmen had under several reigns been disciplined and drilled with precision in the use of their weapons, and that is why they defeated the gallant but undiscip- lined mob of horsemen who attacked them without method at Crecy. It is also obvious that the diminutive size of that battle- field enabled the commander-in-chief, posted behind his reserve, to initiate fire orders and see their effect in fact, he performed duties which now appertain to platoon commanders. Moreover, the size of the whole battle-field corresponded with a sector allot- ted to one battalion, or at most to two, in 1918. Thus the process of devolution of the physical command occupied some five centuries, chiefly because it took all that time to alter infantry armament from bows to Lewis guns ; partly also because each generation of professional soldiers clung with punctilious tenacity to the ad- mirable drill of a previous age. Similar tenacity is visible to-day, but changes are in the air. Frederick the Great (1740) attained parade-ground precision even during the shock of encounter, and won his battles by means of remorseless drill, stepping to music and machine-like fire tactics with inaccurate muskets. Such is the force of tradition in any army that in 1914, German companies in Flanders were trying to copy Frederick's tactics with the aid of song instead of a band to inspire their P arademarsch within close range of British infantry. But their opponent's rifles were accurate in 1914.
Frederick, however, did not teach one system on the barrack square and then practise a totally different one on active service; but that is what the British infantry did before the S. African War (1899) and what some soldiers would like it to do again. Their line of reasoning is that, as every war alters tactical forma- tions, it is not of much avail to learn in peace-time tactics which will assuredly be discarded in the next war.
British Infantry in 1913. In Oct. 1913 the British infantry underwent a drastic change, in spite of much opposition. The old " Eight Company " system was abolished, and the continental system was adopted of dividing the battalion into four companies, each 200 strong. This change gave a peace strength of about loo men per company actually available for training. This admirable reform, which fortunately was accomplished on the verge of the World War, was effected by amalgamating two of the old companies to form one of the new and enlarged compa-
