critical stages of the war mobile units were the great need, and regiments are more quickly made efficient than army corps, which as the experience of the two Irish divisions was to prove take a long time to organize and train. 1 Secondly, until the definite breach between the Sinn Feiners and the Redmondites in Oct. 1914, it was by no means certain that the National Volunteers were to be trusted, and even after the breach the police reported that a considerable proportion of the Redmondite volunteers were in sympathy with Prof. MacNeill. It might well have seemed too speculative an undertaking to train and arm " for the protection of the coasts of Ireland " (which were in little danger) a force which, under influences already at work, might be used for less innocent purposes.
It is, indeed, to these influences and to other causes which they exploited, rather than to any action or inaction of the The War Office, that the refusal to enlist for the war
Irish on the part of large sections of the population
Volunteers mus t be ascribed. In setting up the organization of the Irish Volunteers, the Sinn Feiners did not succeed in obtaining any large nominal following, but they made up for their lack of numbers by their fanatical zeal, and the efficiency of their organization. Of all the volunteer forces in existence during 1915 the Irish Volunteers and their allies the Citizen Army alone displayed any activity in drilling and exercising, which they were allowed to do without let or hin- drance, occasionally even enjoying the protection of the police. 2 Meanwhile their organizers and agitators were busy in those counties where the tradition of disaffection was strongest Limerick, Kerry, Kilkenny, Waterford, Wexford and Galway. Their object, openly avowed, was to prevent recruiting for the army and to build up their own force with a view to taking immediate advantage of " Ireland's opportunity." They con- jured up the' bogey of " conscription " with notable effect, until the exclusion of Ireland from the Military Service Act laid this spectre to rest for the time being. Many National Volun- teers ceased to attend drill because they feared that, if they drilled, they might be called upon to fight; and a certain number joined the Irish Volunteers as the best safeguard against con- scription. 3 The Sinn Feiners were helped, too, by the immense prosperity of the country, which what with separation allow- ances and the high prices of agricultural produce had never
1 Much bitterness was afterwards caused by the transference under stress of circumstances at the front of the artillery of the 1 6th (Irish) Division to the Guards.
'On Whit Sunday 1915, 1,100 Irish Volunteers, 700 of them armed, held a parade in Limerick. When returning to the station through the Irishtown quarter, where many soldiers' families lived, they were furiously attacked by a crowd of women (wives of the Munster Fusiliers) and had to be protected by the R.I.C.
On Nov. 19, at Loughrea in Galway, on the formation of a branch of the Irish Volunteers, the National Volunteers marched through the town and smashed the windows of prominent Sinn Feiners.
3 Reports of County Inspectors. The numbers of the Nationalist Volunteers given in the subjoined table, showing fluctuations during the year preceding the Easter 1916 rebellion, are taken from the official returns. Those in the sections marked (a), (b), (c) were reckoned as disloyal.
_
>
Irish
SSJ-2
rt v ft
Volunteers
V &
2 = g
I-*! >
If {haz-?
iirr
g
isS So
IJs
0^
May 6 1914
26,696
t
Oct. 7 1914
178,649
7,443
2,15
60
Dec. 16 1914
152,000
11,247
2,100
60
Jan. 15 1915
149,742
9,543
2.IOO
60
Dec. 27 1915
112,446
5-JI2
6,137 2,225
IOO
Jan. 3 1916 .
112,050
5-038
6,355 2,225
IOO
April 17 IQI6
104,984
4,457
8,381 2,225
IOO
been so full of money; for this disinclined the young men of the more prosperous classes to exchange present comforts for the miseries and dangers of the trenches. If, as the Sinn Feiners reiterated, this was solely " England's war," they had the most patriotic reasons for abstaining from it. On the whole the wonder is, not that Ireland did not provide more recruits, but that she provided so many.
Incredible as it may now seem, there was between Aug. 5 1914 and Dec. 5 1915 no law in force prohibiting the im- portation of arms into Ireland. 4 Certain warrants were, indeed, issued during this time to the police by the Lord Lieutenant, authorizing them to seize arms, sedition. but it was not until the amendment of the regula- tions under the Defence of the Realm Act, on Dec. 5, that they were empowered to seize arms and explosives landed on the coast. 5 In spite of these laws, arms and ammunition continued to be smuggled into the country. At the same time a flood of seditious literature began to be disseminated by the leaders of the Irish Volunteers. Its exuberance was to a certain extent tempered by the existence of the military censorship, but as this took notice only of matter which was judged to have military importance, articles merely abusing the British Government and army, or praising the gallantry and humanity of the Ger- mans, gained for the ignorant public an enhanced authority by having been " passed by the censor." From time to time cer- tain of the seditious papers, having exceeded all bounds, were suppressed (e.g. Irish Freedom and the Irish Worker in Dec. 1914), and others, after their printers had been warned by the authorities, ceased to appear (Sinn Fein, Fianna Fail and Ireland). But their place was taken by others no less violent 6 The Spark (Feb. 7 1915), The Workers' Republic (May 30) edited by James Connolly, The Hibernian (June 24), Nationality (June 26), Honesty (Oct. 16), The Irishman (Jan. 15 1916) and The Gael (Jan. 29). The only one of them to reach any high standard- of even journalistic excellence was Nationality, which, under the editorship of Mr. Arthur Griffith, became the most influential organ of the anti-Ally propaganda. The circulation of these seditious newspapers was never large 7 but they passed from hand to hand and wrought untold harm among the ignorant people. Their circulation was never seriously interfered with. 8
4 " Up to Nov. 1914 anybody could send arms or ammunition into Ireland provided the Customs regulations had been complied with." Evidence of Sir Mathew Nathan, Under-Secretary for Ireland, before the Royal Commission ( The Times, May 19 1916).
6 Sporting guns and ammunition were excepted. This exception was cancelled on Feb. 5 1915.
6 Ireland speedily reappeared as Scissors and Paste (Dec. 12 1914). This consisted of cuttings from British and foreign news- papers " selected for their derogatory references to the cause and military operations of the Allies and for their praise of the methods and successes of the enemy." It was suppressed on March 2.
7 Circulation of Sinn Fein papers:
Nov. 1915 Feb. 1916
Irish Volunteer 3,937 4,615
The Spark 1,587 2,382
Workers' Republic 1 ,390 1 ,549
Hibernian 2,555 2.567
Nationality 3,895 4,539
Honesty 1,250 1,592
Irishman 1,692
The Gael 1,246
8 In his evidence to the Royal Commission on the 1916 rebellion, Maj. Price, Assistant-Commissioner of Police, said: "One un- fortunate thing which hindered us a good deal was the attitude of the official Nationalist party and their press. Whenever Gen. Friend did anything strong in the way of suppressing or deporting these men (the organizers) from Ireland, they at once deprecated it, and said it was a monstrous thing to turn a man out of Ireland." On this the commissioners made the shrewd comment: " Irishmen no doubt appreciate the maintenance of order, but they appear to have an inveterate prejudice against the punishment of disorder." (Cd. 8279, p. 7.)
In July 1914 orders were issued under the Defence of the Realm Regulations for the expulsion from Ireland of four Sinn Fein agitators Pirn, MacCullagh, Blythe and Mellowes. They disobeyed and were arrested and imprisoned. The Limerick Corporation passed a resolution condemning the authorities for expelling Irishmen from their country.
