opportunity for a well-timed offensive, using as a pivot for this the San and Vistula line (by that time completely prepared), the fortress of Przemysl, and the San and Vistula bridgeheads, designed for the purpose; (2) to open an immediate offensive against the Russian army masses, as yet divided, while, they were making their concentric advance.
The advantage of the first plan lay in the possibility of utilizing the whole of the forces to the last rifle and gun, and also of inflict- ing partial tactical defeats on the enemy by swift and skilful advances from the bridgeheads. Against this weighed the dis- advantage of allowing the Russians to bring up the whole of their superior forces. East Galicia, too, with Lemberg, its politi- cal and economic centre, as well as large portions of Central Galicia, would be relinquished without a struggle to the enemy, who could also make use of his increasing numerical superiority to invade Hungary with momentous political results.
The advantage of the second plan lay in the reasonable hope of falling on the still divided enemy armies with relatively su- perior forces. But here the danger was that, as the army would at first have to advance fan-wise owing to its obligatory initial situation, a mishap in any one of the armies might owing to the relatively small extent of the area available for manoeuvring compromise the whole situation and even bring all the armies into a critical position. Thus the second alternative was by far the more risky solution, depending as it did on skill in the leading of the various armies. Provided, however, that no important errors of detail were made, it promised the greater results; and it was the alternative chosen by the Army Higher Command.
For the Russians the natural procedure, aimed at from the very first, was to make a concentric attack on the Dual Monarchy simultaneously with a threat to East Prussia, and one to Berlin in the background. The enormous fighting masses of the Russian Empire, and the^elative shortness of the lines, admitted of this double project. Thanks to the early completion of their prepara- tion they were also enabled to make full use of their original enveloping base against Austrian territory and the armies forming up for deployment within it. All the main lines of transport converged thither, while the whole conduct of operations was materially advanced by the circumstance that the strategical and even the tactical communications between the two great concentration areas the territory between the Vistula and the Bug on the one side and Podolia on the other were completely guaranteed by the triangle of fortresses Kovno, Dubno and Luck (Lutsk). The Russian plan of operations was accordingly drawn up on these lines. In the area between the Vistula and the Bug were posted the V. Army (Chelm) and the IV. Army (Lublin) facing generally southward; and against East Galicia the III. and VIII. Armies facing generally westward, while the VII. Army followed in echelon to the left.
Preliminary Operations. Some characterization of the fighting methods on both sides, as evidenced in the beginning of the war, may not be out of place here.
In all Austro-Hungarian tactical regulations and training manuals the greatest stress was laid on the encounter battle. Conscious and deliberate initiative was represented as the leading motive of every sort of action in war or battle. In practice, particularly in the grand manoeuvres, this motive, correct as it was, came to be so exaggerated that the attack was practically asserted to be the one true form of battle. This undoubtedly created a certain rigidity of opinion which in the long run de- veloped into schematism. To fail to attack was to run great risk of adverse criticism and judgment, a decisive personal mo- tive being thus added. Another result was a frequently very marked belittling of the effect of weapons, which was particularly the case with the artillery. Rigorous battle-training and profit- able employment of this arm were consequently taken too little into account; and its tactical cooperation was developed rather on- the formal side. With the cavalry analogous principles were laid down. Dismounted fire action above all was a method of fighting rarely and unwillingly practised. The infantry was very well trained on modern principles, particularly in the technique of rifle fire; but the tactical cooperation of the three arms received
no special attention. Taking all in all it was reasonable to count upon a quick engagement by all detachments and groups, par- ticularly as the fighting more/ especially at the beginning of the war was at its highest level, and the flexibility of units and the uniform training of commanders of all grades seemed to guarantee high manoeuvring power.
For the Russian army the war with Japan had been an excellent training. The cooperation of all arms, and particularly the em- ployment of their strong artillery, had reached a high stage of development. Especially remarkable was their rapid fortifying of the field of battle by means of which a Russian front habitually covered itself almost as soon as an action began. In this respect the Russians were at first far superior to their opponents. In- directly this no doubt contributed to the clumsiness of most of the attacks, which often resulted, contrary to the wish of the Com- mand, in a stationary fire-fight in which the superiority of the Russian artillery was usually balanced by that of the Austro- Hungarian musketry training. In manoeuvring the Russians were less skilful than their opponents, who profited by this fact to extricate themselves from many an awkward tactical situation. The Russians were capable of great marching feats on occasion, but their pace was generally rather slow. Their fighting moral was excellent throughout; indeed their endurance in the most difficult tactical situations could not be surpassed. The reconnoi- tring activities of the Russian cavalry, particularly of the Cossacks, was remarkable, and not less remarkable was the use made of political propaganda, systematically introduced in peace, and the good organization of intelligence in the potential theatre of operations. On the other hand, the Russian cavalry was disin- clined to mounted action on a large scale and had a marked preference for the dismounted fire-fight. No considerable mounted attack therefore ever occurred, though on several occasions large masses of cavalry were opposed to each other.
On Aug. 15 the Austro-Hungarians pushed forward all the cavalry divisions in the deployment area to gain touch with the enemy. It was hoped that this, combined with a general air reconnaissance the day before, would give the necessary data for decisive conclusions. But the reconnoitring activity of the cavalry resulted only in a series of small cavalry actions, success- ful and unsuccessful, without bringing in trustworthy informa- tion as to the grouping of the enemy, whose fighting strength and readiness for operations were, speaking generally, under- estimated in consequence. Nevertheless Aug. 18 saw the issue of orders which formed the basis of the offensive scheme in all armies. This inevitably involved even merely geometrically the armies drawing apart excentrically. The Army Higher Command, however, reserved to itself the definitive grouping of the larger units. This was particularly the case with the IV. Army, in the centre, whose orders were " to group itself in such a way as to be able to push forward towards the N., N.E. or E."
On the three following days (Aug. 20, 21 and 22) the I. Army successfully accomplished the crossing of the Tanew region, dreaded for its impracticability, without mishap, and took possession through its advanced guards of the pronounced ridge lying north of this region from E. to W. For the rest, the I. Army was required to occupy the whole of the ridge on Aug. 22, the IV. Army, as before, to hold itself in readiness to proceed to the N. or N.E., while the III. and II. Armies (or rather that group of the latter, under Gen. von Kovess, which had arrived in the theatre of war), with fronts facing E., were to deal with any possible attacks.
Out of this situation there arose a string of combats which at first were favourable to Austria-Hungary. Thus at Czernowitz a Russian division was repulsed by an Austrian Landwehr divi- sion and thus also arose S. of Krasnik from the 23rd onwards a series of actions which are collectively known as " the battle of Krasnik." The I. Army went forward, with its nine divisions in columns aligned, and came upon the enemy in a prepared posi- tion but numerically greatly inferior. At first, indeed, there were only two and a half infantry divisions, hurriedly thrown forward from the Lublin concentration area, and though reinforcements were sent up to them they remained considerably inferior in
