Council of July 7 opposed Count Berchtold and declined to admit war to be inevitable. He deprecated a surprise attack, without previous diplomatic action, as likely to place Austria- Hungary in a bad light before Europe and rally the Balkan States against her; he favoured harsh, but not impossible (unerfullbar) demands upon Serbia, and even if their re- fusal should lead to war, he would not favour Serbia's complete annihilation, partly because Russia would then be forced to intervene, and partly because as Hungarian premier he could not sanction annexations at Serbia's expense. (Here he was following the traditional Hungarian view that the inclu- sion of further Slavs in the Dual Monarchy was a menace to Magyar supremacy in Hungary.) All the other ministers pres- ent viz. the three joint ministers, Berchtold, Bilinski, and Krobatin, the Austrian premier Count Stiirgkh and the chief- of-staff Baron Conrad were agreed that a mere diplomatic success, even if it led to the public humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless, and that demands must be addressed to her such as would render rejection, and consequent military action, probable. By threatening to resign, Count Tisza carried his point that there should be no mobilization until the ultimatum had been rejected. 1 His attitude is clearly revealed by two memoranda which he addressed to Francis Joseph on July i and 8. In the first he condemns Berchtold's idea of using Sarajevo as an excuse for the final reckoning with Serbia as " a fatal blunder," but begs Francis Joseph to make every effort to overcome William's " prejudice in favour of Serbia." From the second it transpires that it was " the satisfactory assurances " of Berlin which had decided all Tisza's colleagues in favour of war with Serbia. He himself dissents, and insists that Serbia must be given a chance of escape, though only through severe diplomatic defeat. This is necessary in order to avoid complications with Italy, to ensure Britain's sympathy and to enable Russia to remain inactive. 2 On July 14, however, after full discussion with Berchtold, Tisza called upon Tschir- schky and announced that " he had abandoned his original doubts and is quite in accord with energetic action," 3 and that " the note will be so drafted that its acceptance may be virtually ruled out." 4 Berchtold on his side informed Tschirschky that Tisza had not merely come round to his view, but had " in certain points introduced a stiffening." On July 15, in answering an interpellation, Tisza denied that war was inevitable, but signifi- cantly added that a State which does not regard war as ultima ratio cannot maintain itself as a State. Thus while Tisza must be credited with statesmanship such as was signally lacking in his colleagues, his final decision and his subsequent zeal in the conduct of war make it impossible to claim him or his Government as unwilling actors in the great struggle, just as it is beyond dispute that the Magyar policy towards Croatia and the nationalities was a foremost factor in provok- ing the Austro-Serbian conflict which actually fired that train.
The Ultimatum to Serbia. A further proof of Germany's failure to exercise a restraining influence on her ally is afforded by the detailed note presented on July 20 by the Serbian charge d'affaires in Berlin to Herr von Jagow, expressing the strongest detestation of the murder, the desire for friendly relations with Austria-Hungary and a readiness to meet all such demands as might be compatible with State independence. 6 Jagow, how- ever, deliberately refrained from taking up the note's con- cluding appeal for friendly intervention in Vienna, and there is no evidence to show that he even reported to Count Berchtold the Serbian appeal, while on the contrary he ignored King Charles's offer of mediation on July 10. The secret of the ultimatum was jealously guarded, and the long delay, created, as was intended, a false sense of security in some quarters. Its delivery at Belgrade, which took place at 6 P.M. on July 23, was carefully timed for the moment after President Poincare's departure from St. Petersburg after his State visit, the object
1 Goos, op. cit., pp. 53-62.
1 Goos, pp. 62-70.
- Diplomatische Aktenstiicke I, No. 23.
4 Die Deutschen Dokumente, No. 49.
6 Die Deutschen Dokumente, No. 86.
being to eliminate the chances of French mediation. The ultimatum, after reminding the Serbian Government of its formal undertakings of March 31 1909, charged it with " culpable tolerance " of terrorist propaganda directed against Austria- Hungary and blamed Serbian officers and functionaries with planning the Sarajevo murders. It therefore demanded that the " Narodna Odbrana " (League of .National Defence) and any similar society guilty of anti-Austrian propaganda should be dissolved, that objectionable passages should be expunged from Serbian educational works, that all officers or officials whom Austria-Hungary might name as guilty of propaganda should be dismissed, and that the Belgrade Government should not merely arrest certain specified persons charged with com- plicity, but should order the trial of others, allow Austro-Hun- garian delegates to take part in the inquiry and accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials " in the suppression of the subversive movement."
The general impression produced by this document upon European opinion is best summarized in the words of Sir E. Grey, who telegraphed the next day to Sir M. de Bunsen, that he " had never before seen one State address to another inde- pendent State a document of so formidable a character." The fifth demand in particular (that of collaboration), he pointed out, " would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty." 6 None the less, Serbia in her reply actually consented to " such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure and with good neighbourly relations." Only on one point did she reply in the negative; the share of Austro-Hungarian officials in the actual inquiry would, it was argued, be a violation of the constitution and the criminal code, but even this could be met by " communications in concrete cases." On all other points there was unqualified submission, and in certain respects, such as the offer to introduce legislation for fuller control of the press and to stiffen frontier regulations regarding weapons, the answer went much further than had been demanded. As a final proof of sincerity, Serbia offered to submit any outstand- ing points to the decision of the Hague Tribunal or even to the Great Powers which had imposed upon her the declaration of March 31 zooo. 7 Thus Serbia is found for the third time in six years offering to submit herself to the verdict of the Hague the two previous occasions being the Bosnian crisis and the Friedjung trial and each time it is Austria-Hungary who rejects the proposal. Three days later, as a last resort, the Serbian Government informed the Italian Foreign Minister that it was even prepared to swallow the whole note, " if only some explanation were given regarding the mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene," and went so far as to offer to accept these explanations from a third party, if Austria- Hungary was not disposed to give them to Serbia direct. 8
Austria-Hungary had demanded an answer to her note by 6 P.M. on July 25, thus leaving a period of 48 hours for either reply or mediation. The official 'documents published in Berlin and Vienna since the war make it abundantly clear that the Ballplatz deliberately couched the note in such terms as to be unacceptable; but even in 1914 this was obvious from its tenor and from the significant fact that Baron Giesl, who received the Serbian answer from Pasic a quarter of an hour before the expiry of the time limit, instantly handed him a fresh note announcing the rupture of diplomatic relations and the im- mediate departure of himself and his staff. Moreover the text of the answer was kept secret in Vienna for several days, until a sarcastic commentary could be added; and Belgrade, presumably owing to the confusion which prevailed there, appears to have taken no steps to bring it promptly to the notice of the other Powers. 9 This is the more regrettable, since even William II. (to judge from his marginal notes on
- British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 5.
7 British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. jp.
8 British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 04.
" e.g. it was communicated to Sir E. Grey by the Serbian minis- ter on the same day on which it reached London through the Aus- trian embassy with Count Berchtold's comments.
